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Abstract
In this article, the author argues that it is only possible to determine whether judges are likely to be good
judges if we understand the practice of judging and the telos of justice toward which its aims, and that
elections cannot help voters determine what qualities are necessary in judges and for what reasons. Moreover,
I argue that traditional elections require virtues in politicians which are not often found in good (virtuous)
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Can a Good Judge Be a Good Politician?
Judicial Elections from a
Virtue Ethics Approach
Marie A. Failinger
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,' though unremarkable in terms
of First Amendment theory, is one of those cases where application is every-
thing. In White, the United States Supreme Court held that Minnesota's "an-
nounce" clause, which had prohibited candidates in judicial elections from
announcing their views on contested issues "likely to come before them," was
a content restriction under the Speech Clause of the First Amendment . As
such, it was subject to strict scrutiny; and as usual, the Court's application of
the second prong, requiring a "least restrictive alternative" or "narrowly tai-
lored" regulation, was "fatal in fact." 3 Perhaps the most interesting aspect of
the case from a constitutional perspective was the majority's decision to
probe with some specificity the state's proffered "compelling state interests"
in the appearance and reality of impartiality,4 since very few of the Court's
strict scrutiny opinions have bothered to parse what the state might mean
when it claims such an interest.
5
However, the implications of White go well beyond its meager contribu-
tion to First Amendment jurisprudence. These implications extend far beyond
the approximately sixteen states that, like Minnesota, employ nonpartisan
popular elections as a means to seat or ratify interim appointments of state
judges.6 Indeed, the White case has brought more popular visibility to the
recurring national debate about how judges are best selected.7
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. My thanks to Stepha-
nie B. Rust-Small who served as my research assistant on this project.
1. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2. Id. at 774-75.
3. Id. at 775-81. See J.J. GASS, AFTER WHITE: DEFENDING AND AMENDING THE
CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS 5 (Brennen Ctr. for Justice, Judicial Indpencence Series
2004), available at www.brennancenter.org/programs/dem fc canons.html.
4. White, 536 U.S. at 775-81 (discussion of three senses of impartiality).
5. See Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins
at Conception", 43 STAN. L. REv. .599, 603-04 (1991) (noting that "scant jurispru-
dence exists on" what a compelling state interest is, creating doctrinal instability).
6. In White, Justice Scalia notes that Minnesota has employed elections to select
judges since 1858, and since 1912, has used nonpartisan elections. 536 U.S. at 768.
Justice O'Connor notes that thirty-one states use popular election for some judges,
and a little more than half of them use nonpartisan elections. Id. at 792 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring). She also notes that "[m]ost of the States that do not have any form of
judicial elections choose judges through executive nomination and legislative confir-
mation." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). These figures vary depending on what year
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In this Article, I argue that direct judicial elections, at least to the extent
that they mimic other general elections, are not the wisest course for selecting
judges, though not precisely for the usual reasons cited by commentators-
e.g., that lawyers are in a better position to evaluate the merits of judicial
candidates than the public because they are less likely to be swayed by single-
issue politics or irrelevant matters.8 In fact, it seems to me that both the per-
spectives of the practicing bar and the public are necessary to hold judges
accountable. For example, a lawyer may be in a better position to identify
judicial incompetence, whereas members of the public might be more likely
to identify judicial arrogance or bias toward minority litigants.
Instead, I will suggest that the public virtues that make a person a good
judge are not usually the same virtues that make a good (one might say virtu-
ous) politician, e.g., a person who campaigns for popular election to a politi-
cally responsive office. If I am correct, then the presumption that philosophy
equals methodology equals right outcomes is unseated. Stated more con-
cretely, if we begin with the assumption that democratic accountability can be
best achieved through traditional direct elections, then we must necessarily
presume that the best or most virtuous campaigners are also the best or most
virtuous officeholders. Even conceding the much-debated validity of this
presumption for traditional executive or legislative candidates, I will argue
that it clearly does not hold true for judges. If my account proves plausible,
then even those who champion democratic selection of judges would want to
call for a system that selects those best at the task of judging. Such a system
would encourage true democratic accountability while selecting virtuous
and what positions are included. See also Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's
Experiment: Legislative Control of Judicial Merit Selection, 49 S.C. L. REV. 1217,
1227-32 (1998) (describing South Carolina's legislative appointment system). Drig-
gers notes that twelve states appoint judges, but in only three states-Virginia, South
Carolina, and Virginia-are any of them appointed by legislators rather than the gov-
ernor. Id. at 1222.
7. See, e.g., Jean Holloway, President's Message: Judges and Politics Don 't
Mix, WITH EQUAL RIGHT (Minn. Women's Lawyers, Minneapolis, Minn.), July 2004,
at 2 (on file with author); Bert Brandenburg, Keep the Courts Free and Fair: The
Influence of Special Interests and Partisan Politics Threatens the Independence of
Judges and the Rights of all Americans. But Groups are Unifying to Counter the
Trend, TRIAL, July 1, 2004, at 32; Beth Hanson, Judges' Free Speech on the Agenda:
US. High Court Weighs Certiorari for Suit Challenging Political Activity Ban, 176
N.J. L.J. 706 (2004); Top Cases of 2003, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 23, 2004, at 14 (discussing
White in conjunction with the Spargo case).
8. See, e.g., ABA COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY 22-23 (2003) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY] (noting the rise of single-
issue political organizations and the concomitant rise in single-issue campaigns in
state appellate court elections); Laura E. Little, The ABA's Role in Prescreening Fed-
eral Judicial Candidates: Are We Ready to Give Up On the Lawyers?, 10 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 37, 45-46 (2001).
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judges, unlike the current system, in which any law-trained citizen, no matter
how incompetent, can take her chances at the polls.
In making the argument that good judges do not usually make good
electoral candidates, and therefore should not be elected, I borrow from the
contemporary resurgence of virtue ethics. While there are numerous compet-
ing strands of this longstanding Western tradition, I will primarily focus on a
simplified version of the argument presented in Alasdair Maclntyre's text,
After Virtue.9 MacIntyre's account of virtues as habits of character necessary
for those carrying out social traditions also informs the practice of judging,
which is aimed toward the telos ofjustice in society.
I. RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY
IN JUDICIAL SELECTION
The Minnesota judicial canon struck down in White was essentially a
finger-in-dike attempt in a much larger code, a rule designed to prevent typi-
cal campaign excesses as well as the more mundane problems associated with
the selection of judges through popular election.' 0 Modeled after the ABA
Model Code of Judicial Ethics, state codes such as Minnesota's have been
undergoing revision for some time, and the cases leading up to and decided
after White have prompted further revisions in many states." Some of these
9. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed.
1984).
10. See MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5 (2004); see also infra
note 13.
11. See, e.g., Plymouth Nelson, Note, Don't Rock the Boat: Minnesota 's Canon5 Keeps Incumbents High and Dry While Voters Flounder in a Sea of Ignorance, 28
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1607, 1619-21 nn.66-67 (2002) (noting revisions in "an-
nounce" clause and "political participation" sections of state judicial codes). Nelson
describes the history of these canons, beginning with the ABA's first thirty-six "Can-
ons of Judicial Ethics" drafted in 1924 by a committee headed by Chief Justice Wil-
liam Howard Taft. Id. at 1614. This code included prohibitions against political
speech or "announcements" to "secure class support." Id. A new, but this time en-
forceable, Model Code of Judicial Conduct was adopted in 1972. Id. The provisions at
issue in White were then contained in Canon 7, which prohibited announcements of
views on "disputed political issues" or "disputed legal issues." Id. Revisions on the
1972 code, including the revision of Canon 7, began in 1986; and campaign provi-
sions were re-codified in a new Canon 5 which addressed political conduct of judges
and candidates generally (5A), appointed candidates (5B), sitting judges and elected
candidates (5C), and incumbent judges during their judgeships (5D). Id. at 1615.
These provisions were adopted by the ABA in August 1990. Id. However, not all
states moved to the 1990 revisions, and many commentaries on the case refer to
Canon 5 and Canon 7 interchangeably. See, e.g., Reynolds Cafferata, Note, A Pro-
posal for an Empirical Interpretation of Canon 5, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1639, 1640-41
(1992) (noting "pledges or promises" and "announce" provisions of Canon 7). For a
sample of how some states have retained Canon 7 and others have moved to Canon 5
2005]
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canons impose discipline for those election offenses that are clearly problem-
atic under any understanding of moral election behavior, such as lying about
one's opponent or direct influence-peddling.
12 Other parts of the canons, such
as the canon struck down in White, can only be fairly described as attempts to
make a judicial election as little like an election as possible, while still operat-
ing within the basic electoral framework.
3 Such canons have seemingly
as of 1999 at least, see Opinion and Order Implementing Recommendations of the
Supreme Court Judicial Campaign Finance Study Committee, 62 TEx. BAR J. 946,
947 n. 13 (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter Implementing Recommendations]. See also Weaver
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (11 th Cir. 2002) (holding canon preventing misleading or
false statements by candidate was constitutionally overbroad); Butler v. Ala. Judicial
Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207 (Ala. 2001) (invalidating similar provision as over-
broad). For a history of cases leading to White, see Adam R. Long, Keeping Mud off
the Bench: The First Amendment and Regulation of Candidates'False or Misleading
Statements in Judicial Elections, 51 DUKE L.J. 787,798-802 (2001).
12. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii) (1990)
(amended 2003) (requiring that the candidate should not: "knowingly misrepresent
the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the candidate or
an opponent"); Canon 5 B(1) (requiring that "[a] candidate for appointment to judicial
office or a judge seeking other governmental office shall not solicit or accept funds,
personally or through a committee or otherwise, to support his or her candidacy").
13. Minnesota's current Canon 5 (formerly Canon 7) provides, inter alia, that
any judicial candidate "shall not:"
(i) with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come be-
fore the court, make pledges or promises that are inconsistent with the im-
partial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office; or knowingly,
or with reckless disregard for the truth, misrepresent the identity, qualifi-
cations, expressed position or other fact concerning the candidate, or an
opponent; or
(ii) by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice inappropriate to judi-
cial office.
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i)-(ii) (2004).
See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d)(i)-(ii), requiring that
candidates "shall not:"
(i) make pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office; [hereinafter referred
to as the "pledges or promises" provision]
(ii) make statements that commit or appear to commit the candidate with
respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to come before the
court; [successor of the "announce" clause and hereinafter referred to as
the "commitment" provision].
About thirty-seven states had adopted some variation of the "pledges and "promises"
and "commitment" provisions of the 1990 Code. See GASS, supra note 3, at 3.
The Minnesota Canons also require that a judicial candidate not:
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; identify
themselves as members of a political organization, except as necessary to
vote in an election; (b) publicly endorse or, except for the judge or candi-
date's opponent, publicly oppose another candidate for public office; (c)
[Vol. 70
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come about because of the bar's perception that the no-holds-barred atmos-
phere of modem American elections poses too great a risk that judges without
the requisite professional credentials and moral character will be elected.14 To
ameliorate the pernicious effects of modem elections on the selection of
judges, the original canons prohibited or strictly regulated electoral activities
considered standard fare in general democratic elections, such as affiliating
with a party and supporting its activities, raising funds, offering (non-bribe)
incentives to voters to select a party favorite, and issuing "platforms" of pri-
ority issues on which the candidate promises to act after election.15
In crafting these restrictions, the drafters of the canons opened them-
selves up to the standard objections to attempts to limit democratic account-
ability. First, in a free culture, elections serve as a central ritual and teaching
moment on the importance, as well as the dangers, of political speech and
freewheeling democratic participation. 16 Without elections, we would have
make speeches on behalf of a political organization; (d) attend political
gatherings; or seek, accept, or use endorsements from a political organiza-
tion; or (e) solicit funds for or pay an assessment to or make a contribution
to a political organization or candidate, or purchase tickets for political
party dinners or other functions.
MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(1)(a)-(e). See also MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 5B(2) requiring that a candidate "shall not personally solicit or
accept campaign contributions or personally solicit publicly stated support. A candi-
date may, however, establish committees of responsible persons to conduct cam-
paigns for the candidate through media advertisements, brochures, mailings, candi-
date forums and other means not prohibited by law." The 1990 canons made a signifi-
cant adjustment to other prohibited activities for judges up for election, though not all
jurisdictions have accepted all of these revisions, see, e.g., the Minnesota canons cited
above. The 1990 revisions to Canon 5 provide that a judge or a candidate subject to
public election may: "(i) purchase tickets for and attend political gatherings; (ii) iden-
tify himself or herself as a member of a political party; and (iii) contribute to a politi-
cal organization." MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5C(1). Canon 5 also
provides that "when a candidate for election [he or she may] (i) speak to gatherings on
his or her own behalf; (ii) appear in newspaper, television and other media advertise-
ments supporting his or her candidacy; (iii) distribute pamphlets and other promo-
tional campaign literature supporting his or her candidacy; and (iv) publicly endorse
or publicly oppose other candidates for the same judicial office in a public election in
which the judge or judicial candidate is running." Id. at 5C(1)(b).
14. For examples of these arguments, see Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in
State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1197, 1214
(2000) (noting Kathy Abrams' view that in some cases, electoral accountability stan-
dards pose "weak procedural checks on judicial qualifications and performance, such
as honesty and temperament").
15. See supra note 13. See also Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v.
Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004) (holding that judge could not be constitu-
tionally sanctioned for "anti-gay" speech).
16. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Expressive Voting, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 330, 368-69
(1993) (noting that "[e]lections are the primary mass rituals by which the political
2005]
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very few publicly accessible models for what robust public speech regimes
might mean for regular citizens, what purposes free speech serves, and how it
can be misused by those who want to pander to the fears and emotions of the
electorate. The canons appear to subvert the democratic ritual by forbidding
judicial candidates from speaking about precisely those controversial issues
that the electorate wants to "talk" about-the death penalty, abortion rights,
law and order, and so forth. Of course, citizens arguably have the right to
engage in democratic activity three hundred sixty-five days a year, and many
citizens regularly exercise their political freedoms through legislative advo-
cacy and participation in community life. However, election years are like car
maintenance schedules, reminding the rest of the electorate, who are usually
busy with the many challenges of their own lives, that it is time for a citizen-
ship "tune-up," time to inspect the machinery of government and decide if
any replacement parts are necessary.
And, just as elections serve as a model for a public that needs to under-
stand the values and risks of freedom, they also serve as a symbolic re-
enactment of the equality principle-any person, from a populist like Dennis
Kucinich to a member of a politically ascendant minority group like Al
Sharpton to a very wealthy, connected person like George Bush, can run for
office and can be judged by the voters as if he were their peer.
17 Of course, as
with any important community ritual, 18 public elections engender a flood of
conflicting emotions within the electorate about the nature of political equal-
ity, especially in its sharp contrast with social and economic inequality in
America. Voters simultaneously embrace candidates standing as equals be-
fore their judgment and resent them for their success in achieving renown in a
supposedly democratic process. Voters look up to political figures as heroes
in whom they must believe to feel that their futures are secure, and yet voters
ethos is projected and affirmed. As a consequence of the voter's personal choice to
participate, she may receive, or 'hear,' the messages of that political ethos. To pass on
valuable features of the American identity and strengthen the bonds of membership,
the society regenerates social meanings and practices that are highly valued, such as
political autonomy and democratic governance.").
17. See David Greenberg, The Trials of John Edwards: Why the Ace Lawyer
Became a Lackluster Candidate, LEGAL AFF., Jan./Feb., 2004, at 46, 49 (reviewing
JOHN EDWARDS, FOUR TRIALS (2004)) (noting that Sharpton "intuitively understands
that having lived the American Dream confers far more than simple credibility; it
confers the potential power to inspire"); Leslie H. Southwick, Presidential Also-Rans
& Running Mates 2000 Part II: Nader-LaDuke, 7 GREEN BAG 257, 272 (Spring 2004)
(noting populist tone of Dennis Kucinich).
18. See, e.g., RICHARD SENNETr, THE FALL OF PUBLIC MAN 271-78 (1978) (de-
scribing how average people need to believe in a charismatic figure to avoid chaos,
but discard him as a phony when he does not produce; and how secular charisma is
based on popular resentment against the existing order, working on the populace to




are suspicious that they are being manipulated by candidates for their own
advantage. 1 9
Visible constraints on electoral processes, including highly visibly pa-
ternalistic interventions such as suppressing speech because it might mislead
the public,2° tend to inflame the worst sentiments of the electorate. By imply-
ing that voters' practical wisdom is not to be trusted, they further increase
voter suspicion and resentment of elite manipulation. 21 Indeed, most tradi-
tional opponents of judicial merit selection, which is thought to be the anti-
dote for campaign problems, have argued that the process is elitist, secretive,
unaccountable to and unreflective of the interests of citizens, and highly po-
litical.22 The historical tug of war between judicial appointment systems and
judicial elections seems to bear this suspicion out, at least in part. Appoint-
ment systems, virtually the only mechanisms used for selecting judges until
the late nineteenth century, 23 rested primarily on distrust of the democratic
system to produce good judges.24 Indeed, Michael Diminio writes that con-
19. See id.
20. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism Principle in the First Amend-
ment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 582 (noting that the Supreme Court has not upheld
speech restrictions premised on paternalistic rationales).
21. See, e.g., Thomas R. Phillips, Electoral Accountability and Judicial Inde-
pendence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 139 (2003) (suggesting that many scholars identify
the move from appointment to election systems as in part based on resentment of
appointed judges who were considered "'the last dying kick of aristocracy"') (quoting
Caleb Nelson, A Re-evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190, 191-92 nn.l1-14
(1993)). By contrast, many reformers thought that elections would strengthen judicial
independence, by breaking the tie between judgeships and political patronage. Id. Still
others believed that the move to elections was an attempt "'[to] weaken ... official-
dom as a whole' and 'rein in the power of all officials to act independently of the
people."' Id. at 140 (quoting Nelson, supra, at 224) (first alteration in original).
22. See, e.g., Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-partisan Court Plan: A Dino-
saur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-legal Environ-
ment?, 62 Mo. L. REV. 315, 319 (1997); Michael R. Dimino, Pay No Attention to that
Man Behind the Robe: Judicial Elections, the First Amendment and Judges as Politi-
cians, 21 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 301, 311-12 (2003) (noting concerns about profes-
sional elitism); John H. Hill, Jr., Taking Texas Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit
Selection, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 347 (1988) (noting that Texas' change to elections
was in reaction to Reconstruction "carpetbagger" judges, and the strong influence of
rural populations).
23. See Daugherty, supra note 22, at 316 (noting that the majority of states at
that time used lifetime appointments subject to good behavior, and popular elections
were "unheard of"). By the late nineteenth century, most states used judicial elections.
Id. at 316-17. See also Phillips, supra note 21, at 138 (noting that most states opted
for legislative elections or limited term appointments before the early nineteenth cen-
tury).
24. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 791 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that "[b]y the beginning of the 20th century, how-
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servatives opposing the tidal wave of judicial election legislation from the
period of 1846-1860 were concerned that good, i.e., scientifically minded,
judges would be "'subject[ed] ... to the whim of the people and the manipu-
lation of party leaders,"' which would breed contempt for the bench.
25 Such
elections, they feared, would "'hasten the day when nonlawyers would pre-
side on the bench.'
26
By seeming to paternalize voters in this manner, even if they arguably
deserve such treatment because of their apathy toward the issues in local judi-
cial elections,27 election constraints signal disrespect for the equality of citi-
zens with their decision-makers. And many voters believe there is no worse
signal of inequality, and no larger suspicion of hypocrisy, than when law-
yers-already suspect in the public eye for utilizing the rhetoric of equality to
gain power and influence for themselves-are the ones who seem to be pater-
nalizing the voters. In the case of judicial elections, we might also note voter
suspicion that election constraints are merely designed to enforce the upper-
class virtue of politeness, which they may view as hypocritical and designed
to protect a candidate from scrutiny. 28 As the continuing popularity of Bill
ever, elected judiciaries increasingly came to be viewed as incompetent and corrupt,
and criticism of partisan judicial elections mounted"); Phillips, supra note 21, at 140
(noting surprise of reformers that judicial electoral systems also were governed by
patronage).
25. See Dimino, supra note 22, at 311 (quoting Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on
Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an Elected Judiciary, 1846-1860,
45 HISTORIAN 337, 341 (1983)). But see Kyle D. Cheek & Anthony Champagne,
Partisan Judicial Elections: Lessons from a Bellwether State, 38 WILLAMETTE L.
REv. 1357, 1358-59 (2003) (noting that some lawyers championed judicial elections
as a way to provide the judiciary with its own base of legitimacy and protect it from
political patronage).
26. Dimino, supra note 22, at 311 (quoting Hall, supra note 25, at 341). See also
White, 536 U.S. at 791 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Daugherty, supra note 22, at 317
(noting that Roscoe Pound, in his The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice in 1906 expressed his concern that elections had "'almost
destroyed the traditional respect for the bench'). Norman Krivosha tells the story of
the American Judicature Society's move toward merit selection proposals after the
Pound speech. Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit
Selection, 74 JUDICATURE 128, 128-29 (1990) (noting that it was a major sparring
point between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, with Taft urging a
return to pure appointments, and Roosevelt favoring elections).
27. See Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judicial Candidates: How
Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 300-02 (1992) (noting that vot-
ers typically know little about their choices, but that voters who vote in lower-level
contests are typically more informed and interested in politics than others; and their
voting behavior depends on what kind of information they receive. In judicial elec-
tions, the authors argue, voters get very little diverse information unless there is a
particular policy issue on the burner, such as criminal justice or abortion.).
28. See Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L REv. 625, 637, 639 (1999) (noting that "judges' appeals
[Vol. 70
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Clinton29 may evidence, even if voters want their politicians to be paragons,
at the same time, they want direct access to the "real person" of the candidate,
warts and all. Thus, restrictions that seem to be based solely on etiquette are
intuitively suspicious, even when they also result in candidates acting more
"judicially," i.e., like people would want a judge to act.
However, it is not clear that the antidote for lawyer paternalism is to al-
low judicial candidates to take their gloves off and engage in the same tactics
as other candidates, as some commentators have implied.30 There is little
historical evidence that unregulated judicial elections ensure a more account-
able judiciary than political appointment systems. In the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries when judicial elections were in their early bloom, the
evidence suggests that most judges were "party hacks" who owed their seats
on the bench to political friends rather than voter choice. 31 And, as many
cases on judicial election violations illustrate, 32 "elite" objections to voter
judicial selection by general ballot-most centrally that voters will allow
unreflective emotions and single issues to drive their decisions-seem to be
legitimate concerns, if sometimes overblown. Of course, many commentators
have blamed poor judicial election results on the ethical constraints imposed
by the judicial canons, which they claim make information on judicial quality
difficult to gather. 33 However, even those jurisdictions with partisan elections
that have experienced the most robust campaigning on the issues, such as
Texas and New York, do not report promising results on judicial compe-
tence.34 The simple fact is that voters often do not educate themselves on
to the public to respect the importance of judicial independence appear arrogant," and
their unwillingness to debate issues because it is not in keeping with the dignity of the
office "rings of elitism").
29. See Tom Shales, Bill Clinton, Getting the Gang Ready to Rock and Roll,
WASH. POST, July 27, 2004, at Col.
30. See, e.g., Shannon L. Goessling, Stifling Speech Threatens Voter Confidence,
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP. (Atlanta), June 23, 2004, at 4 (arguing that judicial can-
didates should be held to the same campaign standards regarding speech as other
candidates).
31. See Daugherty, supra note 22, at 317; Phillips, supra note 21, at 140.
32. See, e.g., infra notes 60, 86-94, 97-108, 115-117, 123-127 and accompanying
text.
33. See, e.g., Roundtable, Judicial Elections and Free Speech: Ethics and a
Judge's Campaign Rhetoric, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 315, 318 (2002) (remarks of Associ-
ate Justice Harold See, noting that the answer to the problem of an uniformed elector-
ate is increasing the amount of information available through campaign speech rather
than curtailing First Amendment rights).
34. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in
Texas, 40 Sw. L.J. 53, 104-05 (1986) (noting that bar results show a far greater range
of quality among elective judges than Missouri plan judge); Steven Zeidman, To Elect
or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 808-10 (2004) (describing substantially higher incidence
of judicial discipline against elected judges than appointed judges in New York).
2005]
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
judicial candidates, their qualifications, or the most important issues relating
to the judicial office.35 Issues as mundane as burgeoning caseloads or judicial
inefficiencies can easily be overlooked by the voting public, particularly
when more prominent offices that dictate war and peace or influence the state
of the economy occupy their attention.
36
It is possible to say that judges should be accountable to voters, and still
say that it is not a good idea to elect them, at least in a traditional-style elec-
tion. It is certainly not necessary to infer that judges must be chosen in tradi-
tional elections from the premise that they must be accountable. If good
judges are not necessarily good electoral candidates, then alternatives to tradi-
tional elections should be explored, and it is not necessarily anti-democratic
to advocate selection methodologies other than the traditional election. In
reality, voters oversee, and demand accountability from, all kinds of govern-
ment officials without directly electing them, from NASA engineers to
county clerks to ambassadors. Wise voters will not demand that all govern-
ment officials be elected; they will, instead, demand an accountability system
that is suitable to the office being filled.
II. WHY THE SYSTEM MATTERS-CHIEF ELEMENTS IN THE
CURRENT CONTROVERSY ON JUDICIAL SELECTION
As I have suggested, despite the Supreme Court's suggestion that states
choosing judicial elections must, to borrow Justice Rehnquist's earlier meta-
phor, "take the bitter with the sweet,"37 the White case has played an impor-
tant role in reinvigorating a national conversation on the best way to select
judges. However, that conversation can often be confusing. More than half of
all voters express their suspicion of elected candidates and a distaste for elec-
toral politics when it comes to judges. Yet, more than half also want to retain
judicial elections. 38 While nonpartisan elections, proposed to remedy the ill
35. See, e.g., Daugherty, supra note 22, at 323; Hojnacki & Baum, supra note
27, at 300-01 .(noting that voters know little about their judicial choices, possess very
little information, and rely heavily on name recognition).
36. See, e.g., Cafferata, supra note 11, at 1661 (noting that "[m]ost judicial races
do not receive media coverage because they are either too boring or are not high-
visibility races") (footnote omitted); Daugherty, supra note 22, at 323 (noting that
voters thought judicial retention elections were "boring" and failed to vote because
they had inadequate information to make good choices). Daugherty notes, as well,
that in Missouri, the erosion of retention election percentages for judges from 1984
onward to the 57 percent average in 1990 suggests more an erosion of trust in the
judiciary generally than in specific judges. Id. at 320-21.
37. See Amett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 359 (1976) (White, J., dissenting).
38. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 21, at 144-45 (noting that while three-fourths of
Americans believe that judicial outcomes are affected by campaign contributions and
other polls have confirmed public cynicism about the courts, voters in judicial elec-
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effects of party politics on judicial selection, gained ascendancy briefly in the
early 1990s, there has been no significant increase in the use of nonpartisan
elections in recent years, and some states that had used them have since aban-
doned them.
39
The other significant turn away from traditional judicial elections, par-
ticularly noticeable in the 1960s and 70s after widespread disgust with judi-
cial electioneering, has been the American judicature's proposal for "merit
selection," which is believed to be a "compromise between the goals of judi-
cial independence and accountability to the public. ' 4° In the most popular
form of merit selection, the so-called "Missouri Plan," judges are appointed
by an elected official, such as the governor, from a small pool of candidates
selected by a state commission composed of lawyers and laypersons. Once
appointed, the judges must stand for retention on a regular basis. 1 In a Mis-
tion states "prefer to retain [their franchise] by a two to one margin," and support
merit selection only when the retention election aspects are highlighted). See also
Daugherty, supra note 22, at 315.
39. "As of 1993, 12 states employed some form of partisan elections to fill at
least some judicial vacancies (Alabama, Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, Mis-
souri, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas and West Vir-
ginia), while 17 others utilized nonpartisan elections (Arizona, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin)." Neil K. Sethi,
Comment, The Elusive Middle Ground: A Proposed Constitutional Speech Restriction
for Judicial Selection, 145 U. PA L. REV. 711, 713 n.8 (1997). Daugherty notes that
nonpartisan elections were criticized as still vulnerable to the possibility that unquali-
fied candidates could work hard to overcome qualified ones. Daugherty, supra note
22, at 317. There has been some suggestion that nonpartisan elections may be endan-
gered or even that their basic premise of non-endorsement by parties is unconstitu-
tional. See Geary v. Renne, 911 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that prohibition of
party endorsements violated First Amendment right of political parties to free expres-
sion and right of party members to receive information); Roy A. Schotland, To the
Endangered Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L.
REV. 1397, 1397-98, 1416 (2003).
40. See Daugherty, supra note 22, at 317-18, 322 (referring to this system as the
commission plan); see also Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 790
(2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The American Judicature Society started to de-
velop merit selection methods as early as 1913. Daugherty, supra note 22, at 318.
41. Justice O'Connor describes the Missouri Plan as follows:
Under the Missouri Plan, judges are appointed by a high elected official,
generally from a list of nominees put together by a nonpartisan nominat-
ing commission, and then subsequently stand for unopposed retention
elections in which voters are asked whether the judges should be recalled.
If a judge is recalled, the vacancy is filled through a new nomination and
appointment. This system obviously reduces threats to judicial impartial-
ity, even if it does not eliminate all popular pressure on judges.
White, 536 U.S. at 790-91 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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souri Plan state, if a judge is not retained, her seat becomes vacant, and the
42
process begins again.
Yet, while most states that have amended their constitutions since the
1970s have selected a Missouri-plan type of selection process, few other
states have elected this approach.43 And, while some states with unique sys-
tems-such as South Carolina, which originally appointed its judges through
direct legislative election-have undergone merit-based revisions to allow for
more "expert" input into the selection process, even South Carolina's legisla-
ture has resisted attempts to give up their ultimate appointing authority.
44
Only six states employ the federal method, which involves political appoint-
ment for life and removal only by impeachment. 45 This figure hardly suggests
a groundswell for a return to strict appointment systems. Indeed, considering
all kinds of elections, including retention elections, it is estimated that in
thirty-nine of fifty states, judges must face the electorate in some form.46
Of course, judicial selection practices "on the ground" may not neatly
follow one of the four major patterns-the direct appointment system, parti-
san elections, nonpartisan elections, or Missouri appointment/retention plans.
"Merit" selection committees are often composed of political appointees, not
necessarily the best qualified lawyers and judges in a particular state.47 In
addition, it is difficult to imagine that political affiliation and contributions do
not influence which judges are selected in such systems.
Conversely, systems that appear to be exclusively electoral may not be
so in reality. For example, in those states that elect judges, but allow the gov-
ernor to appoint a judge if a seat becomes vacant between elections,
48 ap-
42. The Missouri plan requires a retention vote within a year of appointment, and
requires at least 50 percent of the votes cast to retain. Daugherty, supra note 22, at
319. Circuit judges then are appointed to a six-year term, appellate judges to a twelve-
year term. Id.
43. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 21, at 139 (noting that every new state that
entered the Union after 1846 except Alaska provided for elected judges, and more
than two-thirds of existing states moved to elections between 1846 and the outbreak
of the Civil War). Since the Missouri Plan was formulated, thirty-three states and the
District of Columbia have adopted some form of it. Daugherty, supra note 22, at 319;
Krivosha, supra note 26, at 131.
44. See Driggers, Jr., supra note 6, at 1228-3 1.
45. See Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence
and Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REv. 65, 70 (2001) (noting that six states
use the federal appointment system).
46. See Zeidman, supra note 34, at 791 (noting that of the 8,500 trial judges, 24
percent are appointed, 43 percent are elected in partisan elections and 33 percent are
elected in nonpartisan elections. "Of the ... more than 1200 state appellate judges,
47% are appointed, 40% face partisan elections, and 13% face non-partisan elec-
tions.").
47. See Daugherty, supra note 22, at 340-41.
48. See, e.g., Diemer v. Carlson, 550 N.W.2d 875, 877 (Minn. 1996) (en banc)
(challenge to gubernatorial interim appointment turned back, with the Court noting
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pointed judges will have the advantage of incumbency in the following elec-
tion, thus somewhat mimicking the Missouri Plan in effect if not exactly in
form.49 In some of these states, sitting judges frequently retire before the end
of their terms, sometimes to permit the governor to appoint their successors
rather than leaving the seat open for a contested election without an incum-
bent.5 0 Whether they do so because they believe that the merit selection
commission can better evaluate judicial character than the public, or whether
they hope that the merit selection commission will more likely mimic their
own ideological leanings in selecting the next judge, is less clear. However,
not all judges are successful in smoothing the transition for their successors.
Not long ago, for example, the Minnesota Supreme Court blocked a district
judge's attempt to secure his successor through appointment by stepping
down a couple of days before his term would have ended, and ordered the
seat to go to election.
51
What White has underscored is that the problems that have been associ-
ated with partisan judicial elections need to be addressed in states with non-
partisan and retention elections as well. These problems are twofold: (i) the
virtual impossibility of most candidates standing ethically for election in a
money-driven system of electoral politics, raising concerns about the erosion
of judicial impartiality and independence; and (ii) the concern for electioneer-
ing practices that detract from the dignity of the judicial office.
A. Financing Judicial Elections and Conflicts of Interest
Perhaps foremost on the minds of contemporary jurists, particularly at
the state supreme court level, is how to finance judicial elections in a way that
avoids compromising judicial integrity and independence. Setting aside the
question of these compromises for a moment, we might marvel at the sheer
amount of time and effort it takes to run for judge in many states in the new
century. Elizabeth Amon, a reporter for the National Law Journal, noted that
while most of the 2002 judicial elections "toned down their ugliness from two
that Minnesota Constitution Art VI, § 8, "does not merely authorize, but mandates the
governor to appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy until a successor is elected
and qualified" and to serve until a successor is elected after a general election held at
least one year after appointment).
49. See PATRICK M. MCFADDEN, AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y, ELECTING JUSTICE:
THE LAW AND ETHICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTION CAMPAIGNS 6 (1990); Lawrence H.
Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Selection of Judges:
A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281, 287 n.19 (1995); Cham-
pagne, supra note 34, at 66; Hill, Jr., supra note 22, at 347 (noting that 66 percent of
all Texas judges between 1940-1962 were originally appointed and only ten of forty-
five Supreme Court judges were elected to office from 1874-1962).
50. See W. St. John Garwood, Judicial Revision-An Argument for the Merit
Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure, 5 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1973).
51. See Zettler v. Ventura, 649 N.W.2d 846, 851 (Minn. 2002) (en banc).
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years [earlier] . . . . the cost of judicial elections remains high."'52 Indeed, the
financial reports from the 2000 to 2004 judicial election seasons might make
even judicial incumbents re-consider whether running for office is worth it.
The Brennan Center's Justice at Stake Campaign report noted that in the
2000 campaign, state supreme court candidates raised a total of $45.6 million,
a 100 percent increase over 1994, and 61 percent over 1998.53 On average,
candidates for states' highest courts raised $430,529 each; and sixteen raised
over $1 million to fund their campaigns. 54 In White, Justice O'Connor noted
that the thirteen candidates competing for five seats on the Alabama Supreme
Court spent an average of $1,092,076 in 2000. 55 Anecdotal reports suggest
that judicial candidates in 2002 or 2004 fared little better. In the 2004 elec-
tions, the cost of TV ad campaigns for supreme court races rose to $6 million
by mid-October, over $975,000 in 2002; and total interest-group campaign
finances were at $35 million by the same time, narrowing on the 2000 elec-
tion.56 Meanwhile, in 2002 the four candidates for Ohio's Supreme Court
raised $6.2 million for their election, in addition to $1.83 million spent by
other interest groups in TV advertising and $1 million raised by an Ohio
Chamber of Commerce-backed group.5 7 In 2004, $5 million was raised in
Illinois.
58
52. Elizabeth Amon, State Judicial Races are Less Nasty--But Still Costly, THE
RECORDER (San Francisco), Oct. 29, 2002, at 3.
53. See DEBORAH GOLDBERG ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS:
How 2000 WAS A WATERSHED YEAR FOR BIG MONEY, SPECIAL INTEREST PRESSURE,
AND TV ADVERTISING IN STATE SUPREME COURT CAMPAIGNS 4 (Feb. 2002), available
at http://www.justiceatstake.org/files/JASMoneyReport.pdf; see also JUSTICE IN JEOP-
ARDY, supra note 8, at 29 (noting spending patterns in 2000 and previous years, and
indicating that spending is particularly high in states where tort reform or sensitive
business interests are at stake).
54. See GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 53, at 4; Hill, Jr., supra note 22, at 341
(describing the 250 percent increase in contributions to appellate races in Texas be-
tween 1980-86).
55. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
56. See Associated Press, State Judicial Races See Record Spending, Oct. 22,
2004 [hereinafter State Judicial Races] (noting that the number of states with judicial
TV ads had grown from four to nine in two years and to fifteen states in four years);
Emily Heller, Judge Races Get Meaner; New Litigation Tactics, Hard Cash Mark
Bench Battles, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 25, 2004, at 1. Even trial courts were not immune. In
2002, the Miami Daily Business Review reported that "[a]n entry fee of about
$100,000 has emerged for serious contenders" for circuit court seats in South Florida.
See Steve Ellman, Runoffs Costly in Bids for Five Circuit Seats, MIAMI DAILY BUS.
REV., Nov. 4, 2002, at Al.
57. See Laura Bischoff, Forum Slams High Court Elections, DAYTON DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 7, 2003, at B3, available at 2003 WL 5763751.
58. Heller, supra note 56. Justice O'Connor has also noted "that in 1995, one
candidate for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court raised $1,848,142 in campaign funds,
and that in 1986, $2,700,000 was spent on the race for Chief Justice of the Ohio Su-
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The rise in election costs has been accompanied by campaign finance
ethics problems that are not unlike those in other elections. The American
Judicature Society reports on just some examples:
e One Florida bar association president received a call from a trial
judge's campaign committee, a day before he was supposed to appear before
that judge, thanking him for his endorsement but noting that no check was
enclosed with the letter.
* Another judge, prohibited from attending fundraising events, attended
a "testimonial" dinner and accepted $10,000 for personal expenses and
$2,000 for his re-election campaign from attorneys appearing before him.
* Another trial judge accepted below-market-rate interest loans from a
credit union to finance his judicial campaigns, permitted the loan to be struc-
tured to avoid interest for five years, and then reciprocated by ordering
$250,000 in minors' funds to be deposited with the credit union though credit
unions had never been used for that purpose in this particular court before.
5 9
In fact, judicial elections in some states have become so expensive and
suspect in the mind of the public that there are rising calls for public financ-
ing of judicial campaigns. In fall 2002, former Harvard president and law
school dean Derek Bok called for public financing of judicial elections, not-
ing the fact that over half of judges' campaign funds come from lawyers and
law firms, raising the spectre of at least the appearance of corruption. 60 He
noted that 75 percent of all cases coming before Wisconsin's Supreme Court
in the decade ending in 1999 involved a lawyer, firm, or company that had
contributed to one or more of its justices. His call has been echoed by Chief
Justice Tom Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court, who has also argued that a
better substitute for educating voters than traditional political advertising
would be voters' guides prepared with free franking privileges by Congress.
6 2
preme Court." White, 536 U.S. at 789 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Michigan's state
Supreme Court justices who won re-election in 2002 together raised more than
$800,000. Court Elections: Use Tax Dollars to Finance Statewide Judicial Cam-
paigns, LANSING ST. J., Nov. 29, 2002, at 12A, available at 2002 WL 103552732
[hereinafter Court Elections].
59. See SARA MATHIAS, AM. JUDICATURE SoC'Y, ELECTING JUSTICE: A
HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 47, 54 (1990).
60. See Derek Bok, Too Many Beholden Judges, 26 NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 2002, at
A8.
61. Id. But see JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 31 (noting that in some
states, there is little correlation between donors and those who come before state ap-
pellate courts). The ABA Report also notes that 29 percent of contributions in 1989-
2000 judicial campaigns came from lawyers, and almost 20 percent from business. Id.
at 30. But see Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
273, 296-97 (2002) (noting that public financing can be too little for effective cam-
paigning).
62. See Phillips, supra note 21, at 146.
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Some states have reacted to financing problems by going directly to the
perceived source of the problem: money. North Carolina became the first
state in the nation to provide appellate candidates public funding if they agree
to fundraising and spending limits.63 The Michigan state bar has similarly
called for publicly funded judicial elections,64 and there are other proposals
underway for changing the financing system for judicial elections. 65 More
tellingly, even elected judges have gotten on the bandwagon for more drastic
changes to their states' judicial selection systems. For example, in November
2002, Justice Phillips, the survivor of several judicial elections in a state
known for $1 million war-chests for supreme court justices,66 called for Texas
to turn to an appointment system, expressing his belief that partisan elections
are "embarrassing and wrong-headed.,
67
The anecdotal evidence on judicial elections spotlights four sorts of con-
flicts of interest that may occur in the course of judicial elections: quid pro
quo conflicts, judicial punishment for non-support, the creation of "soft" ob-
ligations on behalf of litigants and lawyers, and the public appearance of im-
propriety. Direct quid pro quo conflicts where judges promise specific liti-
gants specific results in cases that come before them are perhaps the easiest
concerns to dismiss. The White case suggests, without deciding, that such
conflicts will continue to be sanctionable under any reading of the First
63. See Governor Mike Easley Signs Judicial Campaign Reform Act, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 10, 2002, available at 2002 WL 22072620.
64. See Court Elections, supra note 58, at 12. An additional concern in elections
involves fundraising violations. See, e.g., JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL
CONDUCT AND ETHICS 348, 356 (1990) (noting ethics violations for contribution so-
licitations, and using campaign contributions for personal expenses).
65. See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Over-
view, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1467, 1467, 1481 (2001) (noting that public financing
programs had been introduced in over twenty states as of 2001, and enacted in Ari-
zona, Massachusetts, Maine, and Vermont, but that "only Wisconsin had made a
serious effort to fund judicial races"). See also MCFADDEN, supra note 49, at 122-24
(describing public financing, pooled funding, and race-by-race funding agreements);
Behrens & Silverman, supra note 61, at 296 (noting calls by the American Bar Asso-
ciation and others for campaign finance reform).
66. See, e.g., Chuck Lindell, Judge: Throw Politics Out of the Court; Texas
Chief Justice Goes National in Longtime Campaign to Change State Judicial Elec-
tions, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Aug. 10, 2002, at B I, available at 2002 WL
24076020.
67. See David Pasztor, Should Texas Elect its Judges? No, Says Chief Justice,
Who's Leading Push to Cut Partisan Politics, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Dec.
2, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 101146481; see also Hill, Jr., supra note 22, at




Amendment, because they violate the state's legitimate interest in impartial-
ity.
68
However, judicial promise-for-benefit cases are not the only quid pro
quo-like cases that should concern the public, and they are certainly not the
ones that most concern the bar. The second sort of conflict is illustrated by a
dispute that arose in a Nevada district court race, where the defeated incum-
bent, Judge Jeffrey Sobel, charged that his successor was pressuring Sobel's
supporters who would be appearing before the new judge for money to pay
off her campaign debt.69 Or we might consider the case of Magistrate Judge
Dan Tennant, who was disciplined for approaching two litigant attorneys in a
bar, letting them know that five hundred dollars was considered the "going
rate" for lawyer contributions to his campaign, and threatening one repeatedly
with negative rulings if he did not "pay up."'70 These cases illustrate that sit-
ting judges may use the implied threat of negative rulings as a means of
squeezing money out of lawyers who come before them on a regular basis, or
successful judicial candidates may "punish" lawyers who support an oppo-
nent by later adverse rulings.
While blatant quid pro quo may seem an unusual occurrence that should
not drive electioneering rules, the threat of judicial retaliation is perhaps not
so ill-founded when one considers how careful many attorneys are to cater to
judges' prejudices and preferences in order to "stay on the good side" of the
judge. Moreover, it may be easier to find direct evidence that contributions
positively influenced a judge's actions on a case than to prove that failure to
contribute to a judge's campaign resulted in his negative action against a law-
yer or opponent, unless there is a pattern of rulings that are inexplicable on
any other basis. Such a pattern will be difficult to make in many of the cases
in the trial courts where judicial discretion is the order of the day. Judges
themselves may not be aware that in a close case, they are harboring resent-
ments about lawyers because of their election year decisions. Indeed, even if
the judge is herself actually beyond reproach on these matters, lawyers may
well think that they have to "pay to play.,
71
68. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 769-77 (2002) (not-
ing that the "announce clause" does not further a state interest in impartiality read as
bias toward individual parties because it does not restrict speech about parties, just
about issues).
69. See Judy Odierna, Judge Alleges That Successor Going After His Supporters,
LAS VEGAS SUN, Nov. 20, 2002, at 1, available at 2002 WL 101211300.
70. See In re Tennant, 516 S.E.2d 496, 498-99 (W. Va. 1999).
71. "Pay to play" technically refers to quid pro quo contributions given by attor-
neys in hopes of getting legal work from a government attorney or judge. See In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 270 (3d Cir. 2001). The ABA recommended
prohibition of such activity in a new proposed Rule 7.6 to the ABA Model Code of
Professional Conduct. See ABA Votes to Prohibit "Pay to Play", MISCELLANEOUS
MEMO (ABA Div. for Bar Servs.), Apr. 12, 2000, at 2, available at
http://www.abanet.org/barserv/mm/memo86.pdf. However, it may also refer to attor-
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A third, and more common, sort of conflict arises when a litigant's or
lawyer's assistance to a judicial candidate may create an unspoken sense of
obligation on the part of the judge, even if no directTromise is made. Since it
is difficult enough to prosecute quid pro quo cases, one might imagine that
it would be very hard for a state to write a specific enough ethics code to de-
fine when creating an unspoken sense of obligation may unethically influence
a judge's opinion in specific cases.
73
More to the point, the current electoral remedy to prevent the creation of
such unspoken obligations-financial disclosure accompanied by public pres-
sure on candidates who take "special interest money" to avoid catering to
special interests-would not seem to work as well for judges. For one thing,
given the low level of voter interest in judicial elections, it is unclear whether,
in the past, judicial campaign finance disclosures have been seriously scruti-
nized by anyone except the judges' opponents. 4 Second, the usual remedy
available to deal with influence-buying-public pressure on candidates not to
vote for contributors' pet projects-would seem inappropriate as applied to a
judge. We should not have more confidence in the independence of the judi-
ciary if a judge were pressured by the public to vote against an attorney's
neys' views that if they are going to be taken seriously in court, they must contribute
to the incumbent judge's campaign. See TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAY TO PLAY:
How BIG MONEY BUYS ACCESS TO THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT 8, 10, 13 (Apr.
2001), available at http://www.tpj.org/docs/2001/04/reports/paytoplay/index.htm
(noting that Texas Supreme Court justices were four times more likely to accept an
appeal filed by a campaign contributor, 7.5 times more likely to accept appeals from
$100,000 contributors and ten times more likely for $250,000 or more contributors.
Chief Justice Phillips' former firm, which contributed more than $250,000, had 74
percent of its appeals accepted.).
72. For example, only the direct promise of performance of a public duty in
exchange for a benefit gives rise to an actionable criminal complaint under the Hobbs
Act. Wurster v. State, 708 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
73. Justice O'Connor, for example, cites California Justice Grodin's admission
that he was not sure whether his "votes in 'critical cases' during 1986 were not influ-
enced subconsciously by his awareness that the outcomes could affect his chances in
the retention elections being conducted that year." White, 536 U.S. at 791-92
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Con-
straint: A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
1969, 1980 (1988)).
74. See also Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 669 N.W.2d. 265 (Mich. 2003)
(justice denying recusal motion because of a contribution he received, excoriated
judicial elections). There are a few judicial elections cases involving failure to prop-
erly disclose financial contributions. In State Board of Ethics v. Ourso, 842 So. 2d
346 (La. 2003), a judicial candidate was disciplined for receiving loans in excess of
judicial campaign contribution limits. Id. at 352. See also In re Hughes, 874 So.2d
746, 752-58 (La. 2004) (judge sanctioned for numerous ethical violations, including
failing to file required campaign disclosure reports as well as numerous failures as an




client because the attorney contributed to his campaign; and a judge's deci-
sion to bend over backwards not to rule for a contributing attorney or client so
it would not later appear that he had been influenced by money would serve
justice no better.
Hence, the broad prophylactic rules governing judicial financing of
campaigns seem to make significant sense. They include provisions that dras-
tically limit contributions, 75 which, although controversial, have been held to
be constitutional in at least some challenges, unlike expenditure limits, which
have not.76 More controversially, some financing rules provide that certain
entities cannot contribute to judicial campaigns.77 And perhaps the most con-
stitutionally suspect rule is commonly employed in nonpartisan election
states, and modeled on the ABA Code. It requires that judicial campaigns
erect a screen so that judges do not know where their election contributions
are coming from. 78
The final sort of conflict problem, which the Supreme Court purported
to take seriously but declined to resolve, 79 is that suggested by the national
survey on judges' impartiality cited by Bok. That survey showed that 77 per-
cent of members of the public believed that "'elected judges are influenced by
having to raise campaign funds.' 80 Norman Krivosha has noted that the pro-
75. See MATHIAS, supra note 59, at 51 (noting general caps on campaign
contributions that apply also to judges); SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 353 (noting
that Michigan committees are limited to $100 contributions per person and that other
states limit amounts of contributions).
76. See, e.g., Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 700 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (strik-
ing down $75,000 campaign expenditure limit for judicial campaigns while noting
that under Supreme Court precedent, limiting contributions may be permissible),
aft'd, 149 F3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998).
77. See SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 353 (noting that Ohio limits persons
who can contribute to campaigns).
78. However, the "screen" may be defeated by legislation designed to further
open government by requiring judicial candidates to file public statements of the
source of their contributions. Moreover, Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir.
2002), may have put campaign fund screen provisions in question by holding uncon-
stitutional ethics rules forbidding judicial candidates from personally soliciting cam-
paign contributions and public support, but permitting the candidate's election com-
mittee to do so. However, the Weaver court based its decision on the argument that
the risk that fundraising will influence a judge's contributions is not lessened by as-
signing the fundraising role to supporters, since the candidate will still know who
helped them get elected. Id. at 1322-23.
79. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 789-92 (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (noting the substantial funds needed for judicial campaigning and the
problem that reliance on donations "may leave judges feeling indebted to certain
parties or interest groups").
80. Bok, supra note 60; see also White, 536 U.S. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting that "[e]ven if judges were able to refrain from favoring donors, the
mere possibility that judges' decisions may be motivated by the desire to repay cam-
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ject of getting enough votes to be elected inevitably results in voter identifica-
tion of judges with special interest groups.8 1 As judicial election codes start
mimicking federal and state codes governing other elections, with their heavy
emphasis on public disclosure of campaign contributions, 82 press and public
attention is more likely to focus on who has contributed to certain judges, and
which judges are sitting on cases involving these litigants. A public that sees
the same fundraising patterns emerging in judicial elections as in other elec-
tions, where favors are more traditionally exchanged, is likely to assume that
there is corruption, even when there is none. Thus, more spotlighting of what
really goes on may serve to reinforce, rather than diminish, feelings of re-
sentment and suspicion on the part of the electorate.
When lawyers are the chief source of election funds for judicial candi-
dates, the most clearcut solution to the appearance of impropriety-judicial
recusal-is not always a viable option. Parties can sometimes change venue
in trial courts if they fear retaliation or favoritism by a particular judge, but
that option creates significant burdens for lawyers and litigants if the feared
judge is the only one in a particular county or on a single district bench.
Moreover, in state appellate courts, on some cases involving major state busi-
ness issues, for example, it would be very difficult to find a full bench of jus-
tices if everyone who took campaign contributions from either of the litigants
or one of their lawyers had to recuse herself.
83
B. Judicial Independence and Catering to Voter Community Wishes
Closely aligned with the problem of these direct conflicts of interests is
the question of judicial independence, i.e., the ability to make a decision
based on the law and not on community wishes or party preferences. White
paign contributors is likely to undermine the public's confidence in the judiciary" and
describing surveys indicating that between 66 and 76 percent of voters believe that
campaign contributions buy favorable treatment for litigants and lawyers.) Justice
O'Connor also referenced stories of lawyers who felt that their contributions influ-
enced their success. Id. (citing David Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding
and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 361, 379 (2001));
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 31-32 (citing numerous national and state stud-
ies of voters that showed that between 72 and 90 percent of voters assume that cam-
paign contributions exerted influence on judicial decisions). See also Hill, supra note
22, at 343 (noting Texas attorneys' beliefs that some attorneys were engaging in
"quasi-bribery" to influence elections).
81. Krivosha, supra note 26, at 132.
82. See, e.g., Implementing Recommendations, supra note 11, at 946 (recom-
mending centralization of campaign finance disclosure information).
83. See, e.g., MATHIAS, supra note 59, at 47.(noting Texaco-Pennzoil litigation
in which both parties and their attorneys, by the time their case reached the Texas
Supreme Court, had contributed over $388,000 to Supreme Court justices, including




muddies the waters about how stringent judicial election codes can be in pre-
venting candidates from making "pledges or promises" or restricting candi-
dates' relationships with political parties and supporters without running
afoul of the Constitution.
84
Of great concern among judicial election-watchers after White is that ju-
dicial candidates may run on issues in ways that may compromise their judi-
cial independence, suggesting, if not outright stating, that they will rule on
certain issues in certain ways. The cases to date suggest that the only option
framers of judicial elections codes may have is to ban results that are clearly
within their mandate, e.g., direct promises on specific issues made to get
84. See White, 536 U.S. at 788 (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 349
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) for the proposition that "'[T]he greater power to
dispense with elections altogether does not include the lesser power to conduct elec-
tions under conditions of state-imposed voter ignorance. If the State chooses to tap the
energy and the legitimizing power of the democratic process, it must accord the
participants in that process.., the First Amendment rights that attach to their roles.')
(alterations in original). See also Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek, 354
F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (invalidating Kentucky's pledges or promises canon,
citing White, but upholding its recusal canon); Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judi-
cial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72 (N.D.N.Y 2003) (invalidating canons prohibiting
judicial candidates from endorsing other candidates, making political speeches, at-
tending political meetings, and assisting in political campaigns), vacated on other
grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004). But see In
re Raab, 793 N.E.2d 1287 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam) (holding White distinguishable in
constitutional challenge to judicial ethics canons prohibiting candidates from contrib-
uting to joint candidate expenditure accounts, serving on a phone bank for a legisla-
tive candidate, and participating in a meeting screening other judicial and non-judicial
candidates). In Raab, the court noted that New York permits judicial candidates to
participate in and contribute to their own campaigns for nine months before the pri-
mary, including attending political gatherings and speaking, campaigning, and attend-
ing political function. Id. at 1292. Because the limitation against cross-campaign
contributions was intended to ensure that political parties could not extract money
from judicial candidates seeking endorsement and thus "buy and sell" judicial nomi-
nations, it furthered the state's interest against both corruption and the appearance of
corruption. Id. See also In re Dunleavy, 838 A.2d 338, 348 (Me. 2003) (holding that
judge could be sanctioned for soliciting funds for the Maine Clean Elections Fund to
qualify for public financing of a non-judicial office in violation of Canon
5(A)(a)(I)(e), which seeks to prevent the corruption or appearance of corruption of
the judicial process by preventing political solicitations). Dunleavy rejected a White
challenge because the non-solicitation provision was narrowly tailored to prevent the
riskiest conduct, e.g., solicitation of support for political candidates and organizations,
including through purchase of tickets to political functions. Id. at 351. In the court's
view, this kind of activity created bias, or the appearance of bias, for parties in law-
suits, because of the appearance that the judge would favor the contributor or punish
the non-contributor. Id. The court noted that this provision only applied to sitting
judges, not political candidates. Id.
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votes followed by consonant rulings in such cases.85 It is also inevitable, as
candidates push the envelope, that the higher courts will be embroiled in the
minutae of distinguishing valid "announcements" from invalid "commit-
ments" or "promises," involving many context-specific decisions about when
a candidate has acted improperly.
A portent for the future is In re Watson,86 decided after White. In that
case, the court essentially had to determine whether a candidate's statements
that he would "assist" the police, and "work with the police, not against them.
... as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city streets" to help the
city "establish a reputation for zero tolerance" for criminals constituted an
"announcement" of views protected under White, or a "pledge or promise" to
which the White opinion did not extend. 87 The court held that, unlike a previ-
ous candidate's statement that he was a "law and order candidate" that was
protected by White, Judge Watson's statements were "pledges or promises"
that could constitutionally be prohibited by the rules.
88
In some cases, the problem facing courts is whether "pledges or prom-
ises" are even relevant to the state's interests in judicial independence and
85. See, e.g., Suster v. Marshall, 951 F. Supp. 693, 700 (N.D. Ohio 1996), affid,
149 F.3d 523 (6th Cir. 1998); Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n of Ky., 873
S.W.2d 200, 201 (Ky. 1994). But see Family Trust Found. of Ky., Inc. v. Wolnitzek,
345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004) (invalidating Kentucky's "pledges or promises"
canon).
86. 794 N.E.2d I (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam).
87. Id. at 2-5.
88. Id. at 4-5; see also In re Spencer, 759 N.E.2d 1064 (Ind. 2001) (finding that a
judge's advertisement of his fulfillment of a previous campaign promise to send more
people to jail violated the clause); In re Haan, 676 N.E.2d 740 (Ind. 1997) (holding
that statements that a candidate would stop suspending sentences or putting defen-
dants on probation were a violation of the pledges/promises clause); GASS, supra note
3, at 11-12 (describing cases where there were difficulties in distinguishes pledges
from statements). But see In re Shanley, 774 N.E.2d 735, 737 (N.Y. 2002) (where the
court held that Shanley did not commit judicial misconduct because a single phrase
such as "law and order candidate" did not promise "stem treatment of criminal defen-
dants," but rather was "widely and indiscriminately used in everyday parlance and
election campaigns" and did not carry "a representation that compromises judicial
impartiality"). Compare In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Burick, 705 N.E.
2d 422, 425, 429 (Ohio 1999) (holding that judge who said she favored the death
penalty and "isn't afraid to use it" violated Canon 7's "pledges or promises" provi-
sion) with J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Ky. 1991) (holding that judge's
criticism of "the firemen's rule," laws prohibiting felons from carrying firearms, and
the existing judicial review standard for worker's compensation case, did not consti-
tute a "pledge or promise" violating the code). Pledges to better administer courts, use
computers to increase efficiency, reduce court costs, ensure effective discipline for
juveniles in the system, and hear case matters oneself have been held permissible,
while pledges to favor specific groups, employ a strict sentencing philosophy for
drunk drivers, or not allow plea bargaining have been held improper. Cafferata, supra
note 11, at 1643.
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thus sanctionable. For example, in Deters, a trial court judicial candidate was
charged with violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct provision against
announcing his position on issues because he had advertised himself to be
pro-life.89 Debate ensued about whether this was an announcement on an
issue "likely to come before" him under the rules. 90 Deters pointed out that he
was unlikely ever to have to rule on whether abortion restrictions were consti-
tutional,9' so that his announcement was irrelevant to the state's interests. The
Court held that the candidate's announcement did implicate issues "likely to
come before the court," pointing out that his pro-life attitude would surely
influence some of his judicial tasks, including juvenile abortion by-pass
cases, abortion protest cases and other matters such as the removal of respira-
tors from dying patients.
92
Indeed, the lack of clarity on the difference between announcements and
pledges or promises also makes it possible for candidates to use the canons
aggressively to file complaints against judges who make the slightest mistake
in describing their views, or even those who are careful to make nuanced
statements. Imagine the surprise of candidate Runyon, who had to defend a
complaint because a reporter revised his statement that "I would run a court
that views convicted felons from the standpoint that they are going to be in-
carcerated. The penalty is the best and first way of dealings with felons" to
read "Runyon vows to uphold Henderson's tradition, saying he would put all
convicted felons in prison," thus making him liable to a "pledges or prom-
ises" charge.
93
An additional concern for judicial campaigners in a situation where ro-
bust free speech is permitted is that third-party partisan groups may succeed
in exerting pressure on judges to answer questions even when they believe it
is improper, for fear that they will be characterized as non-responsive or not
forthright. A chilling portent is Family Trust Foundation of Kentucky, Inc. v.
89. See, e.g., Deters v. Judicial Ret. & Removal Comm'n, 873 S.W.2d 200, 201
(Ky. 1994).
90. Id. at 203.
91. Id. Deters unsuccessfully argued that because the only two hospitals in the
county were Catholic, there had been no abortion-related cases in the county for over
a decade, and no private physicians would have hospital backup for an office proce-
dure, abortion was not a case that was likely to come before him, especially given the
strongly Catholic composition of the county and the availability of abortion services
in nearby Cincinnati. Id.
92. Id.
93. In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Runyan, 707 N.E.2d 580, 581-83
(Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999) (holding that the statements differed and that the
original statement was not a pledge or promise). See also In re Miller, 759 A.2d 455,
463 (Pa. Ct. Judicial Discipline 2000) (holding that a part-time district judge's refer-
ence to himself as a "judge" in campaign literature was not a misrepresentation be-




Wolznitzek,94 in which a conservative organization was granted an injunction
permitting judges to answer its questionnaire asking judicial candidates to
name the President and Supreme Court Justice most analogous to their views,
and to give their views on same-sex marriage, human embryo experimenta-
tion, the Ten Commandments in public spaces, and the raising of the mini-
mum age to work in a strip club.95
C.Judicial Advertising and Misleading Voters
"Attack advertising" reached new lows in 2004. Among the claims that
popped up in an "unprecedented" fifteen states were the following: A West
Virginia Supreme Court judge was accused in TV advertising of being a lib-
eral and letting a sex offender go free because he voted to uphold an appeal
by a sex offender who was seeking another chance at probation. In Ohio,
voters received phone calls implying that a supreme court candidate, Judge
Nancy Fuerst, had freed rapists and murderers after only six months in jail, a
claim the judge asked her opponent to denounce.
96
Cases such as Judge Patricia Kinsey's attempts to smear her opponent
suggest a concern beyond improper pressure on judges to take positions at all:
they raise the worry that judicial candidates will adopt standard campaign
practices that distort their opponents' views or rulings in order to get
elected. 97 Even some judicial advertising that focuses on issues relevant to
judicial character and competence often inflates or even deceitfully distorts
the facts. For example, while a judge's penchant for hard work is clearly an
important consideration in re-electing him, a campaign ad that accused a sit-
ting judge of treating crime "like a part-time problem" because he had "aver-
aged only 14 hours a week on the bench" and took "84 days off from court"
was properly determined misleading because it suggested that the judge's in-
94. 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
95. Id. (holding the "pledges or promises" canon unconstitutional). Although the
case was decided on mootness grounds, another such case was Christian Coalition of
Alabama v. Cole, 355 F.3d 1288 (1 1th Cir. 2004), in which the Coalition attempted to
seek an injunction of a judicial commission's ethics opinion that candidates should
not answer the CCA's survey, which covered issues such as the candidates' views on
abortion, gun control, and the role of religion in judicial decisions. Id. at 1292-93. See
also Goessling, supra note 30, at 4 (arguing that judges should answer Christian Coa-
litions' survey asking them to comment upon Supreme Court opinions dealing with
prayer at graduation, homosexual conduct, and education-related matters).
96. State Judicial Races, supra note 56. The Brennan Center termed the West
Virginia ads "the nastiest in the nation." Id. The ABA has noted the dramatic rise in
misleading "attack" advertising, particularly by third party groups. See JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 34-35 (citing high amount of third-party advertising and
numerous attack ads by third-party groups).
97. See In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003).
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chambers work was "time off."98 By contrast, even misleading ads can end up
being protected: as an example, one might see the ad in Chmura, where the
investigation of a single court employee for illegal kickbacks was portrayed
in the following way: "Federal officers are looking into charges that the 37th
District Court Probation department was running a scam under which court
employees were receiving kickbacks, making big money off people's mis-
ery."99
Simplifications of court processes and law are a standard form of cam-
paign advertising misrepresentation. In Riley, the Arizona Supreme Court
disciplined a candidate for criticizing an incumbent's decision, even though
the incumbent judge had no discretion to decide the opposite way under ap-
pellate court rulings.1°° Similarly, in Burick, a candidate misrepresented the
standard process of criminal plea bargaining by implying that a judge had
himself decided to sentence a convicted repeat rapist to a lenient term instead
of explaining that he had accepted a plea bargain to a lesser charge.' O' Other
candidates have criticized an incumbent judge for the high costs of the local
court, which the incumbent had no real control over, or suggested that a judge
was a political appointee when he was appointed by a merit selection proc-
ess. 10 2 Still another problem is candidates who overstate their endorsements,
98. See In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 567-68 (Fla. 2001); In re Judicial Cam-
paign Complaint Against Hildebrandt, 675 N.E.2d 889, 890-91 (Ohio Comm'n of
Judges 1997) (holding that an advertisement stating that a candidate had voted to end
the death penalty and "ran for judge, then dropped out, then ran for Congress and
lost" was misleading and sanctionable).
99. In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d 876, 896 (Mich. 2001). Interestingly, the Court
did not think this charge was punishable. In the court's view, the substance of the
charge was not made false because the representation extended to more than the one
person actually being investigated. Id. at 891. The court also rejected allegedly mis-
leading statements against Mayor Coleman Young because they were not false state-
ments of fact. Id. at 888-90.
100. MCFADDEN, supra note 49, at 78 (citing In re Riley, 691 P.2d 695, 704 (Ariz.
1984)).
101. See In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Burick, 705 N.E.2d 422, 427
(Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999). Burick made this claim despite knowing that the
defendant in question had plea-bargained to only one count of sexual battery and had
received the maximum sentence for this crime. Id. The court held that Burick's state-
ments were misleading and sanctionable. Id.
102. See Bundlie v. Christensen, 276 N.W.2d 69, 70 (Minn. 1979); Burick, 705
N.E.2d at 425 (candidate who said that an incumbent judge was appointed by "politi-
cal bosses" rather than by the governor pursuant to a statutory process was disciplined
for misrepresentation); MCFADDEN, supra note 49, at 77-78 (citing In re Baker, 542
P.2d 701, 706 (Kan. 1975)); see also In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against
Kienzle, 708 N.E.2d 800, 800-02 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999) (holding that can-
didate could be sanctioned for the false or deceiving statement that a judge had "im-
posed $430,000 in taxes" on county residents because of a court ruling he had issued
on a government case).
2005]
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
indicating that they are endorsed by "the legal community" or the police
when only one such local organization has endorsed them.
10 3
Moreover, given the current trend toward single-issue campaigning by
third-party interest groups documented in the ABA report, Justice in Jeop-
ardy,' 4 a candidate's focus on one or two hot-button political issues may
mislead voters in another way. Single-issue voting for a candidate may be
counterproductive if the candidate is otherwise incompetent or has flaky or
naive views on other issues that will constitute the bulk of his job. For exam-
ple, a decision to vote for a judicial candidate based on his stand on the death
penalty is unlikely to be a good placeholder for a judge's real qualifications,
e.g., his legal and trial experience, personal characteristics which exhibit a
"judicial demeanor," his ability to run a courtroom well, and what he knows
about issues that are likely to come before him every day.
Bar attempts to clamp down on false or misleading advertising may
prove to be little more successful than attempts to prevent candidates from
"announcing." In Weaver v. Bonner,10 5 the 1 th Circuit Court of Appeals
recently employed White's First Amendment strict scrutiny test to invalidate
as overbroad an ethics canon on misrepresentations by judicial candidates.1
6
Weaver claimed in brochures and TV ads, in a way that the lower court held
clearly stretched the truth, that his incumbent opponent "would require the
State to license same-sex marriages," "has referred to traditional moral stan-
dards as 'pathetic and disgraceful,"' "has called the electric chair 'silly,"' and
"questioned the constitutionality of laws prohibiting sex with children under
103. See, e.g., In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Grunda, 798 N.E.2d
402 (Ohio 2003) (table) (holding that a candidate violated Canon 7 by identifying
himself as a member of a political party by advertising stating "Endorsed Democrat,"
even though he could have legally used the phrase, "endorsed by the Democratic
party"); Burick, 705 N.E.2d at 426-27 (holding that it was a Canon 7 violation to
overstate a candidate's endorsements by claiming that the Fraternal Order of Police
endorsed the candidate, when in fact only one local union branch had done so); In re
Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Roberts, 675 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Comm'n of
Judges 1996) (holding that candidate's claim of endorsement by "the legal commu-
nity" was false when only one county bar of the eight in the judicial district had en-
dorsed him).
104. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 24 (reciting one Tennessee gover-
nor's post-judicial election comment, "[s]hould a judge look over his shoulder [when
making decisions] about whether they're going to be thrown out of office? I hope
so.") (second alteration in original).
105. 309 F.3d 1312 (1 1th Cir. 2002).
106. Id. at 1319. See also Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207,
215 (Ala. 2001) (similar holding); In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Mich. 2001)
(utilizing similar standard, the Court held that statements must be either literally true,
or if they are inaccurate in some respects, they must be analyzed as a whole "to de-
termine whether 'the substance, the gist, the sting' of the communication is true de-
spite the inaccuracy," i.e., "whether the communication is substantially true." In either
case, a judicial candidate cannot be sanctioned.).
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fourteen."' 10 7 The court held that the canon, which prohibited "false state-
ments negligently made and true statements that are misleading or deceptive
or contain a material misrepresentation or omit a material fact or create an
unjustified expectation about results," needed to be more narrowly tailored. 08
Instead, the court employed the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan "actual mal-
ice" standard 0 9 that shields the press from civil damage claims in libel cases,
as the constitutional standard for state judicial rules on false advertising." 
0
While the Weaver holding that the state's rule lumping false and mis-
leading statements with omissions and "created expectations" was overbroad
as well as vague may make sense, the court's antidote-requiring an actual
malice standard-seems ill-conceived despite owing its pedigree to another
elections case, Brown v. Hartledge. The purpose of the Sullivan standard is to
encourage a robust press by giving ample room to good reporters to make
occasional mistakes in the compelling public interest of receiving complete
and varied versions of the news they need to make decisions as citizens and
free persons."' Brown suggests that candidates need similar breathing room,
and that factual blunders can be rectified by opponents. 12 However, it is not
so clear that this will happen, or happen successfully, in judicial elections
given how little attention voters pay to them. It is unclear what purpose is
served by giving judicial candidates the room to make factual errors, even
negligently, about their own record or their opponent's. Indeed, one might be
particularly concerned about the competence of a judge who is not careful to
learn the truth or to distinguish what is fact from fiction.
Nevertheless, the Weaver case, along with other cases that have ques-
tioned or invalidated judicial canons limiting candidates' right to associate
with political parties and causes, 1 3 raises the likelihood that judicial elec-
tions, whether they are nominally partisan, nonpartisan or retention-only
evaluations, are likely to become more rowdy and divisive in years to come, a
final concern of the bar.
107. See Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1316-17.
108. Id. at 1319-20. The Court adopted the actual malice standard from New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) and Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982),
which requires proof of knowledge that the campaign statements were false or that
they were made in reckless disregard of the truth. But see In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77
(Fla. 2003) (imposing discipline on a judicial candidate who was engaged in "conduct
unbecoming a candidate for a judicial post" and upholding rules prohibiting judicial
commitments on cases or issues).
109. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.
110. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1318-19.
111. New York Times Co, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
112. Weaver, 309 F.3d at 1319-20 (citing Brown, 456 U.S. at 60-61).
113. See, e.g., Unger v. Superior Court of S.F., 209 Cal. Rptr. 474 (Cal. 1984)
(holding that prohibition against parties endorsing judicial candidates does not violate
the First Amendment); GASS, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that in some cases, such as in
North Carolina, canons are being amended under political pressure).
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D. Judicial Elections and Judicial Decorum: An Oxymoron?
The cost of elections, with their potential for creating conflicts of inter-
est or misleading voters, is only part of the problem. Concerns about the im-
age of judges that candidates create in their campaigns have also begun to
come to the fore. Few judges may try something as colorful as Town Justice
Thomas Spargo did to win his seat: handing out coupons for free coffee,
doughnuts, and gasoline; buying a round of drinks at a local bar after an-
nouncing that he was a candidate for judicial office; and supplying cider and
donuts to citizens using the town dump and pizzas to local teachers and pub-
lic employees. 14 However, that is not to say that other judicial electioneering
practices are not as hair-raising. In a disciplinary proceeding brought against
Associate Justice Harold See for his campaign practices, dissenting Justice
Houston referenced TV and mail political accusations in the 1994 and 1996
Alabama judicial elections, which variously claimed that one judicial candi-
date "was a co-conspirator to murder; that another was looking and acting
like a skunk; and that one was an adulterer and had engaged in licentious
conduct."' 15 One Nevada judge was charged but never disciplined for por-
traying his opponent as "an animal" and a "monster." 
116
114. Spargo v. N.Y. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79
(N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert denied,
124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004). Spargo was also charged with failure to disclose an election
contribution by one party in a contested case, making a ruckus while he supervised
the 2000 presidential recount as a Republican observer, serving as a speaker at a Con-
servative Party fundraiser, and improperly paying consultants to his campaign. Id. at
80-81. The Spargo court struck down the canons preventing his political activity. See
Dimino, supra note 22, at 328.
115. Butler v. Ala. Judicial Inquiry Comm'n, 802 So. 2d 207, 224 (Ala. 2001)
(answering questions certified by federal court, which later dismissed the federal
case). Interestingly, Justice See was the subject of a complaint for questioning Judge
Roy Moore's sentencing record in drug cases. Id. at 210. In later developments, then-
Justice Moore was himself unseated for refusing to follow a federal court order re-
quiring him to take down a monument of the Ten Commandments he had surrepti-
tiously placed in the Alabama courthouse. See Lyle Denniston, 'Ten Commandments
Judge' Ousted, Defied US Order to Remove Display, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 2003,
at A3, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2003/11/
14/tencommandments_judge ousted/.
116. In re Davis, 946 P.2d 1033, 1052 (Nev. 1997) (Springer, J., dissenting). In-
terestingly enough, Justice Springer objected to the fact that this judge was not disci-
plined at all while Judge Davis was removed from office for, inter alia, borrowing
money from court employees, endorsing another judicial candidate, borrowing money
from the court fine account, playing songs such as "Jail House Rock" during arraign-
ments, intimidating a car dealer who was late on delivering publicly ordered cars,
asking his employees to provide personal services, violating zoning restrictions in the
use of his property, and ordering criminal defendants to contribute to charities rather
than paying court fines. Id. at 1036-37.
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These cases graphically illustrate the concern of election foes that the
decorum of the office will be impugned by traditional election tactics. If one
of the dynamics in elections is voters' simultaneous need to adulate and re-
sent their public officials, judicial candidates will always be subjected to the
"double-bind" on electoral behavior: if they act "too judicially" they may not
win the election because "clean" tactics don't win elections, but if they do not
act "judicially enough" they may not win either. It is said of President Hard-
ing that he was elected because he "looked like a President," even though his
administration turned out to be perhaps the most corrupt in history. 1 7 So
judges are expected to look the part even if that is inimical to robust cam-
paigning.
Similarly, judges are expected to act decorously because of the nature of
their office-to display little concern for self-interest, including their interest
in being elected. Judges are expected to hold themselves somewhat above and
aloof from the public, standing on their records rather than kissing babies or
giving out doughnuts in a sycophantic attempt to win votes. As if they under-
stand the expectations at work in this need to hold judges on a pedestal, most
judicial candidates don't tend to campaign with their sleeves rolled up or
display pictures of themselves digging in the dirt or coaching Little League as
other politicians might, even if they find more indirect and seemingly more
decorous ways of letting the public know that they have been active in the
community. Similarly, symbols for all that is rational and detached in our
society, they are not expected to display emotion in public by, for example,
crying when their character is impeached by an opponent or responding
vengefully to an aggressive campaign tactic. Yet, if all of these practices are
the best way for politicians to get votes, judicial candidates who try to act
"judicially" will lose elections.
Perhaps because of the increasing power of the broadcast media, the
largest number of judicial elections conduct cases in the courts today 1 8 seem
to involve judicial advertising that uses "general inflammatory terms or
'buzzwords."' 1 9 Anthony Champagne describes how effective TV advertis-
117. See, e.g., Warren G. Harding, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/histor
y/presidents/wh29.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2004) (describing Harding's chief sup-
porter's reason for backing him, and ensuing scandal).
118. See Anthony Champagne, Television Ads in Judicial Campaigns, 35 IND. L.
REv. 669, 669 (2002) (noting that judicial campaigns have undergone "dramatic
transformation in recent years" due in part to advertising).
119. See In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Hein, 706 N.E.2d 34, 36-37
(Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1999) (holding that an opponent's statement that a judge
was "liberal" and "soft on crime" was a misrepresentation in violation of Canon
7(B)(2)(f) despite the opponent's claim that he did not knowingly make a misrepre-
sentation since that as his opinion). An unusual exception to the conservative bias in
advertising claims is Stretton v. Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court, 944 F.2d
137 (1991), in which the candidate wished to announce his views on, inter alia, the
need for election of "activist" judges, the importance of the right to privacy, the need
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ing has encouraged the use of dramatic and eye-catching political advertise-
ments, that include "the use of talking trees, exploded tires and overturned
vehicles, accusations that a candidate ... is soft on pedophiles[,] and accusa-
tions that judges are corrupted by campaign money." 120 Studies as well as
anecdotal evidence suggest that the direction of television advertising is to-
ward "hard-hitting and negative" ads, particularly those that are put out by
third-party interest groups, since their candidate does not suffer any backlash
from their negativity.
12 1
Cases and anecdotal reports seem to amply illustrate the worst fears of
election opponents that voters will be swayed by irrational appeals to bias that
have nothing to do with actual judicial responsibilities or character. For ex-
ample, it appears that the primary method for challengers to successfully un-
seat an incumbent is by playing the "law-and-order" card, alleging that Judge
So-and-so is "soft on crime" and that the advertiser will support law enforce-
ment as a judge. 122 Some illustrations of election ads geared to painting the
advertiser as tough on crime:
e A campaign brochure that stated that incumbent judge "George Brown
Gives Criminals a Good Deal," and that he "gives criminals such light sen-
tences that of 91,000 cases, only 300 people have asked for a jury trial," thus
(in the ethics commission's view) misleading the public about the effect of
negotiated pleas on the number of cases actually tried. 1
23
* Misleading pamphlets accusing a judge of threatening to put a defen-
dant's parents, who were victims of his harassing phone calls, in jail for com-
ing to court to ask for justice while releasing the defendant; and accusing the
for greater focus on racism in the courts, and the necessary of hiring women and mi-
norities among judicial personnel. Id. at 139.
120. See Champagne, supra note 118, at 672.
121. Id. at 673.
122. See, e.g., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 25-26 (documenting several
campaigns where judges were challenged because they were "soft on crime," "cod-
dling criminals," voted against the death penalty, or were portrayed as easy on child
molesters); Champagne, supra note 118, at 677-78 (noting that of fifty-five ads stud-
ied, twenty-three presented a crime control message, and describing candidate ads
suggesting that courts favor criminals over victims, that justices should not use tech-
nicalities to keep criminals on the streets, and that police officers are the champions of
society); see also Beshear v. Butt, 773 F. Supp. 1229 (E.D. Ark. 1991), rev'd on other
grounds, 966 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1992) (in which a judge stated that plea bargains
would not be allowed in his court was considered a violation of Canon 7(B)(1)(c) of
the Code of Judicial Conduct, held to be a First Amendment problem on remand);
Hein, 706 N.E.2d at 37; In re Kaiser, 759 P.2d 392, 396 (Wash. 1988) (en banc) (de-
scribing judge's tough record for DWI defendants, in violation of the "pledge or
promise" clause). By contrast, courts have permitted candidates to announce them-
selves as "tough, no-nonsense judges," id.; or "law and order" types, In re Shanley,
774 N.E.2d 735, 736-37 (N.Y. 2002) (per curiam).
123. In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 564, 569 (Fla. 2001).
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same Judge "Let 'em Go" Green of releasing a defendant on bond after he
had attempted to strangle his wife.'
24
* A not atypical prosecutor-judicial candidate's letter to law enforce-
ment officials asking them to elect him to "put a real prosecutor on the
bench," because "[w]e are in desperate need of a Judge who will work with
the police, not against them. We need a judge who will assist our law en-
forcement officers as they aggressively work towards cleaning up our city
streets." 125
As one might expect if one were assuming that judicial elections mimic
other elections, the next two most frequent categories of single-issue advertis-
ing emphasize "family values" and civil litigation cases where big business is
played off against "the little guy."' 126 However, although they may be less
frequent, judicial advertising campaigns also have misleadingly alleged that
opponents back "ultra-liberal" issues such as same-sex marriage, and pushed
the theme that judges are improperly "activist."'
27
124. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 2003). In fact, in the first case, after defen-
dant Grover Heller was released on bond after a battering charge, and the parents
returned to Judge Green to complain that he was harassing them with phone calls,
Judge Green revoked the defendant's bond. Id. at 90. In the second case, a defendant
who was out on bond later violated a restraining order by kicking down his wife's
door and attempting to strangle her; Judge Green did not let defendant out on bond
first as claimed. Id.
125. In re Watson, 794 N.E.2d 1, 2 (N.Y. 2003) (per curiam). An interesting ex-
ception involved two women candidates for judge, in which the advertiser alleged that
her opponent, an incumbent judge, did not deserve to sit on the bench because she had
said that a child in the juvenile system was "a loser." See In re Judicial Campaign
Complaint Against Morris, 765 N.E.2d 580, 583 (Ohio Comm'n of Judges 1997)
(holding that candidate's campaign broadcast was a knowing falsehood in violation of
the canons). In fact, this statement was made by the judge when she was a lawyer of
the child's parent in an emancipation hearing, not in her part-time judicial capacity.
Id. It is particularly interesting that the two women both seemed to assume that de-
monizing the child was a sign of judicial incompetence, whereas all of the cases in-
volving male candidates portray stigmatizing criminal defendants as a sign of judicial
strength.
126. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 26-28 (describing campaigns
where third parties campaigned for or against candidates based on their "pro-
business" or tort reform stance); Champagne, supra note 118, at 678-81 (noting that
numerous ads focused on the advertiser's fighting for individuals or families against
big corporations, or challengers being "for sale" to business or insurance industries).
Champagne notes that family values themes, the third most important theme, featured
ads for judges who were religious, who had been youth leaders, emphasizing that they
would protect the state's families, or would make safer communities for families and
children. Id. at 678-80. Two graphic ads featured three justices dancing in a business
person's pocket, and two men with defective baby carriers, blaming Supreme Court
justices who had decided a products liability case. Id. at 680-81.
127. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 28 (describing campaigns waged
against judges for their rulings on abortion, federal water rights, and school funding
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These and other judicial ethics cases also sometimes raise questions
about the integrity of a judge who seeks votes by pandering to one or both
sides of a divisive issue that is not likely to come before him (or to be influ-
enced by the way he votes). Judicial candidates may increasingly attempt to
score points with voters by aligning their public personae with issues that are
completely irrelevant to their qualifications for the job. It is not clear, for
example, what to make of a judge who, immediately after his swearing-in,
joins a pro-life rally and praises those who are lobbying the legislature on
pro-life bills.128 Should the voters assume that, since he is bound by Roe v.
Wade, this personal affirmation of his views will not affect his decisions? Or
should they assume that in abortion cases where the extension of Roe is in-
volved, e.g., partial birth abortion or waiting period legislation cases, he will
be influenced by his personal stands?
Similarly, an appellate judge who, representing himself as a Christian
but not a judge, writes into a local paper opposing gay marriage on religious
grounds 29 may be representing his legal views on the subject, or he may be
well aware of the difference between what his moral beliefs entail and what
his office requires. Or, take the case of Judge Wendell Griffin, who appeared
before the Arkansas Legislative Black Caucus to denounce the firing of an
African American coach and urge black legislators to "punish" the university
formulas); Maute, supra note 14, at 1213 (noting voters' demand to limit perceived
activism). For examples, see In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80 (Fla. 2003) (judicial
advertising that promised the protection of victim's rights and "putting criminals
behind bars, not back on our streets"); Driggers, Jr., supra note 6, at 1217-18 (describ-
ing 1995 judicial election in the state legislature, in which the incumbent was charged
with being "out of touch with the taxpayer," and someone who "sought to advance her
[liberal] 'agenda' against the will of the people"). Maute notes that "[w]ith increased
frequency, voters in judicial retention elections have voiced their demands to limit
perceived, illegitimate activism by state courts." Maute, supra note 14, at 1213. Mark
C. Miller has shown that nations such as England, France, and Japan, as well as Can-
ada, which appoint their judges and/or have a relatively low level of articulation (e.g.,
the fewest actors involved in selecting judges) have fewer activist judges than coun-
tries like the U.S. that elect their judges and/or have high articulation systems (e.g.,
many actors who are involved in the selection of judges), a fact which appears to hold
true among the different states in the U.S. as well. Mark C. Miller, A Comparison of
the Judicial Role in the United States and in Canada, 22 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REv. 1, 23-25 (1998).
128. In re Sanders, 955 P.2d 369, 374-75 (Wash. 1998) (holding that the judicial
commission did not show by the requisite clear and convincing evidence that the
justice threatened the integrity of the court or displayed the appearance of impropriety
since he did not himself lobby on the bills or suggest that his judicial vote would be
cast in a certain way).
129. Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006
(Miss. 2004) (holding that under the First Amendment, this judge could not be sanc-




for its racism.' 30 Should the electorate take, on face value, his statement that
he was appearing in his own capacity as an Arkansas alum and not as a
judge?
Yet, especially after White, it is not clear exactly how detailed judicial
election codes must be to pass constitutional muster while sparing the system
from the robust sort of politicking that people expect of average politicians as
well as more manipulative and borderline dishonest electioneering tactics. For
example, in Spargo, the court struck down, as void for vagueness, ethics code
provisions requiring judges to "uphold the integrity and independence of the
judiciary," to "participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high
standards of conduct, and [to] personally observe those standards so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved.' 131 The Spargo
court also held that provisions prohibiting partisan activity by judges, includ-
ing other candidate endorsements, participation in others' campaigns, appear-
ances at political gatherings, and political speechmaking were overbroad and
impermissible prior restraints. 
132
III. WHY JUDGES SHOULD NOT BE ELECTED: A VIRTUE APPROACH
Commentators have advanced a steady stream of public policy justifica-
tions for why judges should not be elected, at least in the traditional way.
Many tout the virtues of Missouri-style appointment systems that seat judges
130. See, e.g., Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n, 130
S.W.3d 524, 525-27 (Ark. 2003). The complainant in Judge Griffen's case accused
him of turning the firing into a "racist situation" and expressing "racist views" inline,
as well as voting "in line [with] his racist views" in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 527.
The court did not rule on the validity of the complaint, finding Canon 4C(1) constitu-
tionally vague. Id. at 533-35. That Canon prohibits a judge from appearing at a public
hearing "except on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration
of justice." Id. at 528. Arkansas' Canon was first modeled after the 1972 ABA Model
Code Canon 4B. Id. at 531. It was adopted in 1973 and readopted in 1988 with minor
amendments. Id. at 531-32. In 1993, the Arkansas court adopted a new code, modeled
after the ABA's 1990 code, with an exception permitting consultation with executive
branch members or legislators "on pro se matters involving the judge's interests." Id.
at 532.
131. Spargo v. N.Y. St. Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 244 F. Supp. 2d 72, 81, 90-
91 (N.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 351 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2003), cert de-
nied, 124 S. Ct. 2812 (2004).
132. Id. at 88-89. But see In re Angel, 867 So. 2d 379, 381-83 (Fla. 2004) (hold-
ing that a judge who attended numerous Republican and Democratic gatherings, or
had his family members attend, violated Canon 7, and could be disciplined; constitu-
tional problems were not discussed in that case); In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 87 (Fla.
2003) (holding that the "pledges or promises" clause of Canon 7 was constitutional);
In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Keys, 671 N.E.2d 1124, 1125 (Ohio
Comm'n of Judges 1996) (holding that judges violated canons for lending their names
once to the county recorder running for re-election).
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of higher quality who are removed from political influence and tend to be
more stable on the bench, while still permitting some democratic accountabil-
ity. 
133
I want to take a somewhat different tack: I want to suggest that most
good judicial candidates do not have the virtues of good electoral candidates,
and therefore, it is probably not a good idea to elect them. Of course, almost
all election practices acts, as well as judicial canons about the cohduct of
judicial elections, begin with the usually unstated premise that there are some
virtues we expect our public leaders to have. They should be honest, not liars.
They should make their decisions based on the public good, not sell the
power of their office to the highest bidder or distort their public actions for
personal gain or based on private biases. Public leaders should be people of
courage, trying to strike a proper balance between the immediate demands
and concerns of the public and the long-range public good. These virtues are
more likely to be directly spelled out in judicial codes than in election laws,
but they underlie both.
However, the arguments against judicial elections, including those on
impartiality and independence, usually come down to the view that judges
running for office will sink to the level of other distasteful candidates-that
is, they will engage in the vices of electoral politics just like other candidates
do, and this will be especially hazardous to the proper performance of their
office. We might want to ask a harder but better question: if judges have the
abilities and moral character of good (or at least good enough) electoral can-
didates, will they also make good judges? I argue that they will not, that good
electoral candidates do not make good judges.
A. Starting with a Full Account of the Importance of Virtues
In making my argument that good campaigners do not make good
judges, I return with some modification to Alasdair Maclntyre's work on the
role of the virtues in ensuring the excellent performance of vital social prac-
tices like judging. Maclntyre argues that virtues are important not in them-
selves, but because they are fitting for some particular practice which is
aimed at a telos or end, here, the telos of justice. He has given one of the most
well-known modem accounts of why the cultivation of virtue in public lead-
ers is an important aspect of a healthy public culture. According to MacIn-
tyre:
Every activity, every enquiry, every practice aims at some good ....
[h]uman beings move by nature towards a specific telos.
... [In Aristotle's account, the good for a man turns out to be] eudae-
monia ... blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being
133. See Daugherty, supra note 22, at 319.
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well and doing well in being well, of a man's being well-favored him-
self and in relation to the divine.
• . .[T]he exercise of the virtues is not ... a means to the end of the
good for man.... [it] is a necessary and central part of such a life.
... [Those founding a community or trying to achieve a common pro-
ject] would need to value-to praise as excellences-those qualities of
mind and character which would contribute to the realization of their
common good or goods. That is, they would need to recognize a cer-
tain set of qualities as virtues and the corresponding set of defects as
vices. They would also need however to identify certain types of ac-
tion as [so harmful that] they destroy the bonds of community [and
thus] render the.., achieving of good impossible .... 134
MacIntyre's account enumerates many important facets of a search for
the most important virtues of public leaders like judges. First, the virtues we
seek in public servants, including judges, are defined by and focused on the
good we seek in our community, and are not simply a prized abstraction. In
this case, the legal system cannot function toward the telos of justice unless
those who participate in it possess the virtues appropriate to that telos. The
Biblical story of the unjust judge demonstrates how justice can be perverted if
the person who is charged with the responsibility for doing justice does not
himself have the character of justice.1
35
This reality means that, while some virtues may have resonance for hu-
man community in virtually all times and places-Kant's experiment on
truth-telling' 36 is one attempt to demonstrate this-the priority of these vir-
tues, and even their precise definition, will still be driven to some extent by
context. As Maclntyre points out, how we exercise the virtues varies because
"what it is to live the good life concretely varies from circumstance to cir-
cumstance even when it is one and the same conception of the good life and
one and the same set of virtues which are being embodied in a human life.' 137
This is not to say virtues are defined solely by a cost-benefit analysis, or on
the theory that the ends justify the means.' 38 Aristotle's and Maclntyre's con-
ception assumes that the existence of virtuous persons in a society is a good,
134. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 148-51.
135. Luke 18:1-8.
136. See Amitai Etzioni, The Good Society, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 83, 94-95
(2002); Bailey Kuklin, Evolution, Politics and Law, 38 VAL. U. L. REv. 1129, 1145-
46 (2004).




because it is a mark of the eudemonia, the state of living as a good person,
that is critical in the good society.'
39
To take one relevant illustration of the context-specific nature of the vir-
tues, we might think about how commentators have remarked on the very
different value Americans have placed on the virtue of honesty in politicians
than Europeans or other cultures. 140 Indeed, foreign commentators were
dumbfounded when President Bill Clinton was impeached, ostensibly for
lying, because the ability to lie well is considered a sign of cleverness in some
cultures, if not virtue. 141 Yet, perhaps we should not be surprised that in a
political culture that is essentially based on the need for complete and accu-
rate information if every citizen is going to participate in politics, the virtue of
honesty would be highly prized, as it clearly is in modem Supreme Court
cases on freedom of speech.
142
Second, the virtues appropriate to any professional person are the virtues
shaped by the practice in which he is engaged, which MacIntyre defines as
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excel-
lence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of
activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and
human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically
extended. 143
Thus, the virtues of a person involved in the practice of painting may
well be different than the virtues of a person who is a judge. Or, more to the
point of this Article, the virtues of a person who is attempting to achieve ex-
cellence in the practice of politics may be, and probably are, different from
the virtues of a person who is attempting to achieve excellence in the practice
of judging, even though both practices are necessary contributors to justice
itself, and to the commonweal as a whole. And similarly, the vices or defects
that are tolerable in a politician may not be tolerable in a judge, not because
139. Id. at 148, 151-52 (noting that eudaimonia means "blessedness, happiness,
prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing well in being well, of a man's being
well-favored himself and in relation to the divine.").
140. This insight came from Prof. Robert Cover, who taught one of my ethics
classes in 1985. He discussed how the founding myth of George Washington and the
cherry tree has shaped Americans' perception of the importance of honesty.
141. See Fehmi Koru, New York Observations: America Impeaching its President,
TURKISH DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 1999; Martin Walker, What Europeans Think of Amer-
ica, WORLD POLICY J., Summer 2000, at 26.
142. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Va. State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
143. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 187.
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judges are held to a "higher" standard, but because judges and politicians
need to be measured by different standards.
Thus, the social role that the public official plays and the relationships in
which her office is daily engaged form the basis for identifying the virtues
appropriate to that role. In Homer's account, for example, virtues are what
"enable[] someone to do exactly what their well-defined social role re-
quires. ' ' 44 More generally, "virtues are those goods by reference to which,
whether we like it or not, we define our relationships to those other people
with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which inform prac-
tices. ' 145 Thus, for example,
[w]e hold courage to be a virtue because the care and concern for in-
dividuals, communities and causes which is so crucial to so much in
practices requires the existence of such a virtue. If someone says that
he cares for some individual, community or cause, but is unwilling to
risk harm or danger on his, her or its own behalf, he puts in question
the genuineness of his care and concern.
1 46
Maclntyre borrows from the dramatic to explain how situation and relation-
ships are related: in Maclntyre's language, virtues are those qualities which
allow us to enact a personal narrative that is part of a larger social story that is
also ours, a concept which he calls "narrative selfhood."'
147
In the Aristotelian account, virtues are relational and situation-
dependent in yet another sense, for they are conceived of as a sort of equilib-
rium or moderation between the extremes in human character, and their iden-
tification is dependent upon where and on what terms they are exercised. As
Maclntyre suggests,
Aristotle tries to use the notion of a mean between the more or less to
give a general characterization of the virtues: courage lies between
rashness and timidity, justice between doing injustice and suffering in-
justice, liberality between prodigality and meanness. For each virtue
therefore there are two corresponding vices. And what it is to fall into
a vice cannot be adequately specified independently of circumstances:
the very same action which would in one situation be liberality could
in another be prodigality and in a third meanness.
148
Again, therefore, the judgment that a person is virtuous is largely de-
pendent upon the practice that the person engages in149 Because of this real-
144. Id. at 183-84.
145. Id. at 191.
146. Id. at 192.
147. Id. at 216-18.
148. Id. at 154.
149. Id. at 148, 154.
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ity that the exercise of virtues is so situation-dependent, for Aristotle the cen-
tral virtue is phronesis, which "characterizes someone who knows what is due
to him ... who knows how to exercise judgment in particular cases," which is
necessary for other such virtues to exist. °50 This account is the basis for my
argument that because there are different forms of the virtue that are appro-
priate to different settings, the forms of even common virtues that make a
person a good judge are not necessarily the same "versions" of these same
virtues which make a person a good politician.
In any account of virtues true to the human condition, however, it is im-
portant to be honest about human limitation, something that virtue ethicists
have not always paid attention to.' 5 1 First, being honest about human limita-
tion means that we must recognize that real people have distinctive charac-
ters. For our purposes, that means that virtuous people are not likely to be
virtuous in all respects. Instead, they may exhibit particular virtues in particu-
larly strong ways that allow them to effectively engage in specific practices of
our culture. This claim is perhaps the most underemphasized in general ac-
counts of the virtues, which tend to suggest that a good person will be good in
all respects. For our purposes, as we identify what virtues judges and politi-
cians need to possess, it must be emphasized that "comprehensive virtue" is
not likely to be within the grasp of any single individual. Just as some indi-
viduals are by nature excellent musicians or carpenters, and become better
with experience and training, so good judges or politicians will tend to be
"wired" with some moral and intellectual virtues that can be strengthened
with education and experience, and will similarly exhibit some deficits or
"vices" that can be ameliorated, but are not likely to be eradicated.
Human limitations do not only implicate the sorts of virtues and vices
that one might inherently possess or develop over time as a maturing person.
They also influence the ability of persons to change the essential outlines of
their virtues and vices as they grow older. MacIntyrean and other accounts of
the virtues suggest that it is important that virtues become habitual so that
individuals will act virtuously on a routine basis, almost without a second
thought. A virtuous person is one for whom the virtues have become so much
a part of herself that it would be "out of character" for her to act in a different
way; indeed, such a person might experience not just moral but psychological
tension if she attempted to act non-virtuously. If this account is correct, it
would also suggest that it might be very difficult for individuals who have
formed habits of "judicial" character or virtues to re-shape themselves into
"virtuous" politicians, particularly if they are middle-aged before they are
called upon to learn and exercise political virtues for the first 
time.' 52
150. Id. at 154.
151. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN
BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 2-4 (1999).
152. Elizabeth Neff, Judges Getting Younger as Low Pay Scares Off Older Attor-
neys, Critics Say, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 29, 2003, at C1, available at 2003 WL
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As Maclntyre has recently pointed out, any honest account of virtues
must also account for our human condition as highly dependent and vulner-
able creatures. Every individual must have the virtue of acknowledging his
personal vulnerability, refusing to claim that as an isolated, rational virtuous
actor, he is "objectively" choosing to make a habit of virtue uninfluenced by
his surroundings.' 53 Maclntyre names this through the Lakota virtue of wan-
cantognaka, a virtue of recognizing that one is responsible to one's family
and tribe through acts of giving and thanksgiving.154 As such, in all of the
various communities in which we move, we must act responsively, both out
of feeling and out of a sense of what the other is due, both as a giver and an
acknowledging recipient of the gifts of others.'
55
However, because of human complexity, there is a dark side to such re-
lational dependency and reciprocity that must be accounted for as well, what
Christians term "temptation." Because even good and strongly autonomous
persons live relationally, they will be tempted by others' actions to stray from
those virtues, and some temptations will be harder to resist than others.' 56
Indeed, the stronger the sense of relationship, of dependency and reciprocity,
the stronger the temptation to act unethically will be. More concretely, even a
virtuous judge can and will be influenced by the people that surround her and
the events of which she is a part; and the more any particular situation such as
electoral politics is infected with opportunities for vice, the more decisions
for vice we can expect even an otherwise virtuous person to make. To use a
graphic example, a virtuous security guard will be tempted to make very dif-
ferent decisions about how to treat prisoners under his command in a Nazi
death camp or an Abu Ghraib prison than he might in a white collar federal
prison. The public responsibility in any such situation is to order the institu-
tion, whether it is politics or judging, in a way that balances a healthy respect
for human autonomy and the possibility of good moral choice with the reality
of temptation and pressure to make poor moral choices.
It is with these characteristics in mind-virtues as necessary to the good
the community seeks, virtues as defined by the particular and varied practices
that sustain those community goods, and virtues as practices of human limita-
tion shaped in a crucible of environmental moral demands on the individ-
3701039 (noting that the average age of judges is 54, but that younger people are
applying for these positions).
153. See MACINTYRE, supra note 151, at x (noting Maclntyre's error in failing to
account for the fact of biological or "animal" limitation in providing for a moral ac-
count of the virtues, and second, his failure to understand "the nature and extent of
human vulnerability and disability").
154. Id. at 120-21.
155. Id. at 116-17.
156. See MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 219 (noting virtues as sustaining us in do-
ing good as we encounter "harms, dangers, temptations and distractions"). Maclntyre
makes the more secular point that virtuous people are less apt to commit grave of-
fenses, but to do a specific wrong is not necessarily to be unvirtuous. Id. at 152.
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ual-that I turn to the problem of why elections may not be a good way of
identifying judicial virtues and why judges, in the main, do not make good
electoral politicians. Again, following MacIntyre, my argument is not just
that judges might, like all politicians, stray from the proper moral path, but
rather that judges' moral virtues do not well match the specific virtues re-
quired in electoral politics.
B. Why Elections Cannot Easily Identify Virtues
Following the Maclntyrean argument, we might first ask whether elec-
tions are good vehicles to identify virtues in general; and if not, whether it is
more important to identify judicial virtues than to determine what judges'
platforms would be. If we take Maclntyre's account of the virtues seriously, it
would not seem that elections are good vehicles for identifying virtues unless
three conditions are met. First, we would want to be convinced that the elec-
torate has reached a clear idea about the goods toward which this social prac-
tice of judging (or politicking) aims. Second, the theory depends on the no-
tion that those who select people for their judicial virtues have a full under-
standing of the practice within which the virtues are exercised. Third, they
must be able to clearly identify the nature of those moderating "virtues" that
virtuous judicial officeholders are supposed to embody.
The first step in identifying what constitutes judicial (or political) virtues
is some public consensus about the good to be achieved by the practice in
question. In this case, the good is justice. However, in the case of judging, we
might see a curious inversion of Maclntyre's argument that it is likely impos-
sible to identify what practices are necessary to the achievement of a good
unless we identify the nature of the good to be achieved.
157 Experience tells
me that we could find a higher level of consensus about what the legal system
and its substantive and procedural rules require-that is, about the practice
that is law-than about what constitutes justice. In a sense, we beg the Aristo-
telian question, for we trust the practice (the legal system) to achieve the good
(justice) absent much dispositive evidence that the practice is an effective
means to do so.
One might argue that those experienced lawyers who still participate in
the legal system and serve on merit selection commissions have come to be-
lieve that the law more often than not achieves justice. Or at least they have
concluded that the current practice of judging is the least dangerous choice.
While their conclusions may be attacked as self-interested, self-justifying, or
just plain self-deluded, at least they have some basis in experience to trust or
distrust the system. The average voter, by contrast, has very little experience
on which to base a judgment that the practice, as a whole, achieves the good
it is "designed" for-justice. Indeed, any one non-lawyer voter's experience
is apt to skew his perception-individual litigants will tend to come away
157. See id. at 148, 154.
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with a strong sense that the system produces more justice than it probably
does, or that it is profoundly unjust, no matter how detached they feel them-
selves to be.
The deeper problem with this difficulty in matching the practice with its
telos is the voter's general inability to articulate the telos toward which the
practice of judging is aimed, a problem which is compounded in a pluralistic
democracy. It is, I believe, a safe bet that fewer voters than lawyers will be
able to explicate their own views about justice in a sufficiently detailed man-
ner that they can make reasoned judgments about why, to cut to the chase,
one judge is more likely to "do justice" than another. The nature of a plural-
istic democratic society is that the trajectory between practice and its targeted
good will not be linear or arrow-like, as MacIntyre's account of a tradition in
After Virtue might lead one to assume. Rather, as Maclntyre himself ac-
knowledges, any number of such traditions, from those represented by Aris-
totle and Augustine to others represented by Islam and Confucianism,
have survived so as to become not only possible, but actual, forms of
practical life within the domain of modernity. Even when marginal-
ized by the dominant modem social, cultural, and political order, such
traditions have retained the allegiance of the members of a variety of
types of community and enterprise, not all of whom are aware of
whence their conceptions of'justice and practical rationality derive.158
In any one pluralistic democracy, then, unstated and unrecognized cultural
conceptions of'justice will be competing for ascendancy.
In my experience, most law students-who I believe are at least no
worse off than an average voter in terms of moral reasoning experience and
skills--can only with difficulty describe with any complexity the religious
and familial sources that inform their views about justice. It is not unfair to
speculate that the average voter would have even more difficulty doing so.
Indeed, more voters than lawyers are likely to take an intuitive approach to
the subject of justice, and therefore be unaware of the plurality of views and
traditions on the subject. They may well assume that their own unarticulated
community tradition of justice is shared by their fellows, and, as a result,
become angry and confused when they discover that their fellow voters make
different conclusions about who is the best candidate for political office. On
the other extreme, voters who are unaware of their disagreement on such a
profound issue as the nature of the tradition in which they are voting may
tend to symbolically "expel" from the tradition those who disagree, demoniz-
ing them, e.g., calling them "un-American." And, even if voters were fully
aware of the fact that they imagine a radically different tradition than their
fellow voters, the fact of plurality means that their conception of how a par-




ticular practice like judging fits into a telos will more resemble a web of con-
flicting arrows, each with a different starting point and aiming in a different
direction, than a single straight arrow between the practice of virtues and the
telos of a human life that Aristotle envisioned.
If it is virtually impossible for voters to identify the "justice" toward
which the practice of judging is aimed, achieving consensus with other voters
about either the good or the practice would seem difficult in an election set-
ting. Of course, I am not suggesting that there is anything wrong with intui-
tive judgments about justice, or that the existence of contested understandings
of justice means that a practice is impossible. Maclntyre suggests that it is
precisely in the contest over understandings of the good that a practice is
shaped and, if you will, "moves forward." He calls a tradition "an historically
extended, socially embodied argument... in part about the goods which con-
stitute that tradition."'159 However, the Maclntyrean world of the practice is
one that assumes significant paideic attention to a vision of a shared com-
monweal, a much more republican than democratic understanding of the for-
mation of citizen-activism.160 That expectation is, perhaps for good reasons,
subverted by modem morals education that focuses on autonomy, tolerance,
and similar values that tend to undercut a teleological understanding of politi-
cal community.
161
The second condition for a successful identification of "judicial virtues"
is to understand the real-live practice of judging. One usual argument for
opposing judicial elections is that common citizens are not fully equipped to
understand the practice of judging, including an understanding of the legal
tradition, the legal system, and the daily practice of judicial decision-
making.162 This claim is both partly wrong and partly right. It is wrong in the
sense that increasing numbers of the electorate have more awareness about or
connection to the legal and judicial systems, either directly as litigants or
indirectly through television shows, family members, and acquaintances. We
should not be too quick to overstate voter experience with the judicial system,
however, as studies show that these numbers are still low.
163
159. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 222.
160. Id. at 148, 216; MACINTYRE, supra note 151, at 74, 121-22.
161. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 229 (discussing the turn from a shared good to
individual good, and Hume's identification of "artificial virtues" which limit our self-
interested desires, such as justice).
162. See, e.g., Maute, supra note 14, at 1234 (noting reformers' views that merit
systems are better able to weed out bad candidates, objectively evaluate qualifications
and identify most qualified persons).
163. See, e.g., Daugherty, supra note 22, at 324-25 (noting that two-thirds of judi-
cial voters had not served on a jury, 75 percent had never been a party to litigation,
half had never watched a trial, two-thirds did not know any judge, 80 percent could
not recall any case they had read about, and two-thirds couldn't recall reading about
any judge in the news). Daugherty argues that the lack of familiarity with judicial
candidates is evidenced by the fact that Missouri percentages for retention of judges
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Yet, in some respects, it would be hard to argue that any particular law-
yer's experience of a courtroom is in some way superior to a litigant's experi-
ence in understanding what the practice of judging actually looks like. True,
some lawyers' repeated exposure to the courtroom might provide them more
insight into whether an individual litigant's experience was standard or atypi-
cal. However, if each voter exercised the vote according to his own experi-
ence with the system and its judges, presumably the sum of those experiences
would significantly exceed the experience that any particular lawyer sitting
on a judicial merit board could possibly have. Although a cited danger in
judicial elections is the paucity of voters who know much about the judicial
candidates, it may be that many of those voters who do bother to vote for a
judge may have some experiential basis for casting their votes, though they
certainly do not report that when they are asked in polls.1
64
Indeed, to the extent that we might be concerned about the impact of the
justice system on average folks, their collective experience in the legal system
would seem on the surface to be a more important bellwether for judging a
judge than any collective group of lawyers' experience. An appropriate test of
judicial competence takes into consideration whether litigants are afforded
full access to tell their stories, fair and impartial treatment, and respect due
them as citizens. If these are at least one test of judicial virtue, lawyers who
experience the courtroom as (relatively speaking) equals of the judge should
have less legitimate experience to rely on than litigants or courtroom staff. At
the least, their view of litigants' experiences will be second-hand. No lawyer,
for example, can fully experience the humiliation felt by a single mother as
she is berated in juvenile court for her child's behavior or conditions in her
life over which she experiences little sense of control. Even the most empa-
thetic lawyer cannot fully enter into her experience of the courtroom, much
less the experience of the first-time litigant who does not understand what is
happening and is not instructed by the judge about what to expect and what
his rights as a citizen are.
In the Maclntyrean sense of law as a practice that requires people to un-
derstand why lawyers and judges hold on to certain ways of doing things,
however, it is probably true that the average citizen's understanding will be
necessarily more innocent or superficial than the average lawyer's. And an
average voter's understanding will certainly be more limited than the under-
tend to be similar across the board, implying that voters vote based on their overall
trust level in the courts rather than their perceptions of individual judges. Id. at 323-
24.
164. See, e.g., id. at 327 (noting that a survey of voters in a 1992 Missouri election
disclosed that their primary information came from the media, personal experiences,
or conversations with others). See also JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 36 (not-
ing that only about 20 percent of the electorate votes for judges, and as many as 80%
percent do not know what candidates are on the ballot). The report also notes many
voters respond to lack of knowledge by only voting for those high offices at the top of
the ballot and neglecting to vote for judicial offices. Id.
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standing of the kind of seasoned lawyer who is usually selected to serve on a
judicial merit commission. In an article about why laypeople are not as com-
petent as lawyers to be appellate judges, Larry Solum suggests that the prob-
lem with laypeople is that they do not tend to possess three virtues that law-
yers, by virtue of their legal training, do tend to possess., 65 First, they do not
know the law-to use his term, they do not have the intellectual virtue of
judicial intelligence necessary for understanding the limits of judging, for
applying the law to particular fact situations, or for integrating legal and non-
legal arguments into an opinion that fits within the confines of doctrine and
remedy as it stands. 166 Second, they do not have the experience of applying
the law repeatedly to particular fact situations, experience that is necessary in
order to inculcate the habit of legal phronesis, or practical wisdom. 167 A third
virtue Solum proposes, to which I will later return, is what he describes as
judicial integrity.
168
The problem with non-lawyers choosing judges goes at least slightly
deeper than their deficits in the intellectual virtues of judicial intelligence and
judicial phronesis in the narrow sense of those terms. We might take popular
discussion of the rules against hearsay and the exclusionary rule as examples.
Most laypeople, when they come across such rules in a particular case, regard
the rules as foolish at best, and perverse at worse, in that they allow criminals
and other wrongdoers to be judged on the basis of incomplete information.
169
They might be able to learn, relatively quickly, the outlines of the hearsay
rule and the exclusionary rule and grasp an abstract explanation for why the
rules are necessary, if they cared to do so in order to make an intelligent vot-
ing decision. Yet, what even the most serious lay voters will not possess that
every new law school graduate has is an insight into the actual experience of
the litigants from whose lives these rules have been shaped. It is no accident
that law school students read cases: without understanding how legal rules (or
the lack of them) affect real people's lives, it is difficult to imagine how any-
one could reach a sensible conclusion about whether, on balance, a rule like
the exclusionary rule is more likely to remedy injustice or to cause it. If the
exclusionary rule were posed as an abstract "thought experiment" to law stu-
dents, as it would necessarily be to a voter, law students would be no more
likely to embrace it than the average voter. We might surmise that lawyers
165. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian
Guide to Judicial Selection, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1737-38 (1988).
166. Id. at 1740, 1746-49.
167. Id. at 1752-54.
168. Id. at 1752.
169. Roger C. Park, Character at the Crossroads, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 756
(1998); Thomas Weigend, Is The Criminal Process About Truth?: A German Per-
spective, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 157, 165-66 (2003).
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can embrace such a rule partly because they have heard the story of Danny
Escobedo or Ernest Miranda.1
70
This is not to say that standard law casebooks are above reproach in
their treatment of the lives represented in the pages of legal opinions. In addi-
tion to the standard criticism that individual appellate opinions "bleach out"
much of the human element from the real controversies, 171 the fact is that
most law students do not read nearly enough cases about the exclusionary
rule or the hearsay rule to make a fully informed judgment about how real
people are actually affected by the law, with and without these rules. Even so,
at a minimum, law students will have had to confront at least several lives
affected by these rules (or their absence) and will have a somewhat more
profound and less abstract sense of what is at stake for real people. Seasoned
lawyers who participate in judicial selection and run as candidates will have
even more human encounters to help them see the value (or disutility) of such
rules. Thus, there is a vast gulf between what even a motivated layperson can
170. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 479-83 (1964). In Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), a seminal case read by most law students in the standard Crimi-
nal Procedure course, the story of the Escobedo case is recited as follows:
[In Escobedo], as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials
took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station
for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively
advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his
attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who ac-
cused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the
accusation and said 'I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it,' they handcuffed
him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and
standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this
interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and
they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station,
from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, intro-
duced the confession against him.
Id. at 440. The Miranda case also goes into extensive detail into deceitful, manipulat-
ive and abusive tactics police are instructed to use in training manuals to secure con-
fessions from suspects, id. at 449-54, as well as reciting other stories designed to
evoke students' and others' sense of injustice about police tactics, e.g., stories in
which "defendant was a 19-year-old heroin addict, described as a 'near mental defec-
tive,' "a woman who confessed to the arresting officer after being importuned to
'cooperate' in order to prevent her children from being taken by relief authorities,"
and a defendant "whose persistent request during his interrogation was to phone his
wife or attorney," id. at 456 (citations omitted).
171. See M. Cathleen Kaveny, Listening for the Future in the Voices of the Past:
John T. Noonan, Jr. on Love and Power in Human History, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 203,
211 (1994-95) (describing Judge Noonan's critique of the masks of the law that dis-
avow the humanity of persons); see also Sanford Levinson, Diversity, 2 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 573, 584 (2000) (using the term "bleach[ing] out" to describe how lawyers




learn about the law and what a lawyer knows, somewhat like the difference
between learning only the maxims of Aesop's fables and learning the narra-
tives that precede them.
If voters cannot have any deep historical perspective into the stories that
craft law as a practice into a particular form, it is difficult to see how they
could come to judge the characteristics of that practice-for example, a
prosecutor's election claim that he will vigorously oppose any extension of
the exclusionary rule. Moreover, it is difficult to discern how even an in-
formed lay voter would be able to identify the virtues necessary to such a
practice which is so inherently complex that the trend is increasingly toward
practice specialization for lawyers (i.e., learning a "sub-practice" in MacIn-
tyre's term). The reality of the complexity of the practice of judging, as I have
suggested, does not militate exclusively in favor of a lawyer-led merit selec-
tion system. It simply suggests that the lay electorate may be better at detect-
ing some virtues of judges, and that experienced legal professionals may be
better at detecting others.
A third requirement in determining who would make the best judge
from a virtue perspective is the ability to identify those who possess traits of
character, formed by habits, that enable a practitioner to judge excellently on
a consistent basis, or at least to identify those chasms of vice that lie on either
side of the summit of a particular virtue.172 In the MacIntyrean account, the
virtuous judge will exercise her virtues out of habit, will usually be able to do
good intuitively, and will be more easily able to overcome those temptations
to do wrong that come her way. 73 The MacIntyrean account also assumes
that occasionally a virtuous judge will fail (albeit rarely) to exercise virtue, so
that our judgment or her virtue should be based on the course of a life and not
solely on some aberrant moment.' 
74
However, it is very difficult to imagine how, in a typical democratic set-
ting, the electorate is supposed to figure out whether a particular candidate
has virtuous habits of character. For one thing, even if voters have the ability
to accurately criticize candidate virtues and vices, the information available
for that task will be limited and unevenly distributed. Even lawyers who see a
judge more often than laypeople will witness a different side of a judge than
court personnel or law enforcement officials. Whether a judge acts virtuously
and consistently toward all of the individuals with which she interacts may be
172. See ANDRt COMTE-SPONVILLE, A SMALL TREATISE ON THE GREAT VIRTUES:
THE USES OF PHILOSOPHY IN EVERYDAY LIFE 39 (Catherine Temerson trans., 1996).
173. See, e.g., PHILIPPA FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 8 (2002) (noting that the vir-
tues are a corrective, "each one standing at a point at which there is some temptation
to be resisted or deficiency of motivation to be made good").
174. See MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 152 (noting that a brave and modest man
may occasionally commit murder, but to do wrong is "not the same as to be defective
in doing or being good").
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difficult for most people to ferret out. 7 5 In a small town, voters will know the
general virtues and vices of candidates because they will have encountered
them in other settings, such as church, nonprofit organizations from Boy
Scouts to charities, or even bowling on a Saturday night. Even in these cases,
however, there is no guarantee that these voters will have any experience to
draw on about a potential candidate's judicial virtues. They will still have to
translate analogous virtues they experience when a candidate acts as parent,
volunteer, or lawyer, to the task of judging. Indeed, judicial character might
be particularly hard to ferret out from a lawyer's professional activities be-
cause values such as confidentiality and circumspection may hide much of a
lawyer's work from the general public.
Moreover, because electoral information is necessarily so media-driven,
the focus of electoral information is singularly on the most extreme negative
events and not on lawyers' histories, so that single episodes can easily over-
take routine habits of character as the test of whether a judge is suitable. We
might all agree that even one instance of bribe-taking should be enough to
disqualify a candidate for judicial office, even though, as Judge Noonan
points out, even so profligate a bribe-taker as Sir Francis Bacon possibly had
other judicial virtues to commend him.' 76 However, it is not clear that one
judicial outburst in court at a particularly trying litigant, or one moment of
judicial disrespect of a vulnerable defendant, is sufficient evidence of a judi-
cial candidate's character-as the saying goes, we all have a bad day, and
judges are no exception. Yet, these individual instances are the stories that
circulate among lawyers, judges' staffs, and ultimately the public, not the
ninety-nine other cases in a hundred in which a particular judge exercised
patience and respect for the litigants before her. Whereas lawyers may have
sufficient experience with the judge in many other cases to distinguish be-
tween a character defect and a "bad day," voters may never have any basis for
making such a distinction. During elections, the media does not generally
report either run-of-the-mill "good news" events like the ninety-nine cases, or
even any evaluative consensus, like "most lawyers think Judge X is respectful
175. In a Missouri-style system, it is at least conceivably possible for a very inter-
ested and informed voter to determine this: he might be able to either experience for
himself, or to take account of others' summaries, of the ways in which sitting judges
habitually did or did not exercise some particular virtue or vice required of a judge.
But in an electoral system in which any lawyer can run, the only candidates about
which any particular voter is likely to have enough information about their habits are
those candidates who have held some other publicly visible office, as prosecutors,
legislators, or on visible government boards.
176. See John T. Noonan, Jr., Education, Intelligence, and Character in Judges,




to litigants."'17 7 And, we can certainly not count on judicial opponents to
distinguish fairly between an aberrant episode of unjudicial behavior and a
trait of character suggesting that a sitting judge is not virtuous.
Finally, in any account of judicial and political virtues, we must reckon
with the temptations caused by human relationality and the limitations of
personal self-awareness. If I am correct that virtuous individuals are strongly
shaped by reaction to their surroundings, we might want to ask whether the
surroundings of a judicial campaign reinforce judicial virtues or damage
them. The current advice given to judges running for office is to form cam-
paign committees and seek campaign consultants. 17 If, however, the judge is
facing continuous pressure from those committees, consultants, and family
members to do whatever it takes to win, along with pressures from opponents
that might bring out self-defensive instincts and pressures from financial con-
tributors to align the candidates' views with their own, even the most virtuous
judge may be tempted to depart from previous "virtuous" conduct in order to
win. These departures may signal a long-term change in a judge's moral hab-
its as well, if the judge comes to believe he must continue to behave unvirtu-
ously in order to stay in office.
The reality of human interdependence can, of course, be tempered with
a strong dose of self-criticism. Yet many, if not most, human beings have a
very difficult time being objectively critical of their own strengths and weak-
nesses, virtues and vices. The rush of a campaign, the multiplicity of skills
that lawyers usually possess, and their common experience that their ambi-
tions are within their grasp can easily reinforce candidates' self-delusions that
they can be effective and virtuous campaigners as well as good judges. Con-
versely, potentially good judicial candidates who are truly self-critical may
shy away from elections because they realize that they do not have the best
skills for the job of politicking, even if they accurately assess their judicial
abilities. Justice Phillips, among others, has remarked about the large number
of highly qualified people who present themselves for appointment to the
federal bench in Texas but never run for state court offices. 17 9 Presumably,
177. See, e.g., Joseph R. Cerrell & Hal Cash, Issues in Judicial Election Cam-
paigns, in STATE JUDICIARIES AND IMPARTIALITY: JUDGING THE JUDGES 39 (Roger
Clegg & James D. Miller eds., 1996).
178. Id. at 48 (noting that candidates in outlying areas or without opponents will
not be reported on by the press).
179. See Phillips, supra note 21, at 143 (noting that dozens of qualified lawyers
offer to serve on the federal bench, while open seats on the state bench "seldom draw
a crowd," even open supreme court seats in 1993 drew only six candidates to fill two
seats of retiring justices); see also Krivosha, supra note 26, at 132 (noting that free
senior partners of large firms are generally not willing to sacrifice a year of campaign-
ing, or to cause alarm among their clients by seeking office); Jeffrey D. Jackson, The
Selection of Judges in Kansas: A Comparison of Systems, J. KAN. BAR ASS'N, Jan.
2000, at 32 (noting that campaigning takes candidates away from their practice, where
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some of them recognize that they don't have the gift for politics even if they
have the gift for judging. One conclusion we might draw from this paradox is
that voters should be suspicious of any judicial candidate who thinks he is
also the best electoral candidate. However, such reasoning doesn't elect a
judge.
C. Why We Might Want to Know More About the Virtues of Judges
Than About Their Platforms
We might give up this argument and admit that elections are not good
vehicles for determining character, at least of judges. Instead, we might argue
that judicial elections are just like other elections, and it is more important
that we know judges' positions or "platforms" than that we know their char-
acter. Although too much can be made of the distinction between judicial and
other offices, I would contend that such a turn would be misplaced. First,
many, if not most, judges are embedded in their communities in a way that
politicians may not be, particularly politicians for higher office. As lawyers
who have generally had lengthy experience in local communities where they
become judges, judicial candidates have been embedded in the ethos and
practice of those communities, and are sought as judicial candidates precisely
because they have developed a historical bond with those communities.
Moreover, judges even more than politicians are likely to be "lifers"'I "-they
are likely to be judging in the community long after Politician X or the latest
political hot-button, whether it's the war in Iraq or a local abortion clinic pro-
test, has come and gone.
As trusted lifelong participants in the community, rather than temporary
leaders, judges may be more adequately evaluated on their habits of charac-
ter, which are more likely to shape their reactions to long-term shifts in politi-
cal and legal winds, than on any particular position they hold about a current
issue. Perhaps the most common reason given for eschewing judicial elec-
tions is that we do not want judges feeling forced to decide cases in a particu-
lar way. We want them to retain a sense of integrity. For Solum, the virtue of
judicial integrity is a three-fold moral ability: the ability to choose to suppress
one's personal political or moral preferences and make a decision on the basis
of the law; to treat like cases alike; and to apply the law consistently, so that
the costs of participation are high and results uncertain); Maute, supra note 14, at
1205.
180. Compare Stephen G. Bronars & John R. Lott, Jr, Do Campaign Donations
Alter How a Politician Votes? Or, Do Donors Support Candidates Who Value the
Same Things that They Do?, 40 J.L. & ECON. 317, 321 n.8 (1997) (noting tenure of
sampled Congressmen from 1977-90 was approximately 122 years) with Albert
Yoon, Love's Labor's Lost? Judicial Tenure Among Federal Court Judges: 1945-
2000, 91 CAL. L. REv. 1029, 1047 (2003) (noting that federal judges currently serve
an average of over twenty years).
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justifications for particular decisions constitute "a seamless web."18' We
might more singly define judicial integrity in the more common ethical sense
of the word, the self-respect from knowing that one has acted consistently
over time.' 82 Similarly, since judging is a community practice, judicial integ-
rity means having a healthy respect for a community's traditions. For a judge
to act with integrity means that her actions and decisions over time will con-
sistently reflect a personal pattern of honor as well as the community's tradi-
tion of justice.
At the same time, focusing on judicial integrity rather than judicial plat-
forms underscores two ways in which judges necessarily "buck" the immedi-
ate sentiments of the community in a particular election. Advocates of unfet-
tered judicial candidate speech seem to posit that a good judge is one who
does not hide his past commitments by pretending, for the sake of impartial-
ity, that he does not have any such commitments.' 8 3 They consider it dissem-
bling for a pro-choice judicial candidate, for example, to suggest that he
should not give his views on abortion bypass cases in a campaign. s 4 What
they do not take into consideration is that a good judge must be sufficiently in
tune with his community to intuitively adapt as the community changes,
something that a firm commitment on the eve of his election will make it
difficult for a person of integrity to do. Indeed, we should want judges to
change their minds as conditions in a community change, if they are going to
reflect the community's intuitive sense of justice that gives judicial decisions
their imprimatur of authority.
This notion that it is a good thing for judges to be able to change their
minds, not only when they are confronted with the facts of a specific case but
as they reflect on the mores and assumptions of their local communities, is
largely behind the "announce clause" concern. That concern suggests that
judicial candidates who "announce" may find themselves bound to positions
that they will disagree with once they assume judicial office and understand
181. See Solum, supra note 165, at 1751-52.
182. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 9, 217-19 (discussing integrity as related
to a narrative unity of a human life).
183. See, e.g., Miss. Comm'n on Jud. Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006,
1015-16 (Miss. 2004) (noting that, while having impartial judges is a compelling
interest, there is "no compelling state interest in requiring a partial judge to keep quiet
about his prejudice so that he or she will appear impartial." The Court colorfully
notes, "There is an old Malayan proverb which states: 'Don't think there are no croco-
diles because the water is calm.' . .. [The] Commission urges us to 'calm the waters'
when, as guardians of this state's judicial system, we should be helping our citizens to
spot the crocodiles.").
184. See Nelson, supra note 11, at 1634 (noting that "words don't make a partisan
judge, a partisan judge makes a partisan judge. The bottom line is that a false appear-
ance with no underlying truth can only harm the judiciary and the voters.").
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the real "lay of the land" of their work.18 5 Free speech proponents under-
standably retort that any judge worth his salt will not be so prideful as to re-
fuse to change his opinion when necessities of a case dictate, simply because
he has "announced" as a candidate.' 8 6 Yet, if we really wanted to know
whether a judge has the common sense to change his mind when either the
case or the needs of the community dictate, taking the measure of a judicial
candidate's character habits over time is probably a better means of figuring
that out than asking his position about some issue during the few months of
the electoral cycle.
Second, the traditional focus on judicial integrity is designed to remind
the public that sometimes judges, more than other political figures, are re-
quired to hold up a mirror to the community and ask it to confront its worst
behavior measured against its highest aspirations. 8 7 It is no accident that
Atticus Finch is both a popular hero and a paragon for law students and law-
yers. Among his virtues is the willingness to confront his community with
the disparity between their professed values of community, gentility, and
fairness and their actual practice of scapegoating an innocent man for racial
sins they cannot bear to face. Similarly, by judicial integrity, we often mean
that judges should decide cases according to the laws or constitution that the
voters have adopted in their best moments, rather than bowing to the worst
instincts of fear and hatred that they exhibit in the wake of a murder or other
community tragedy. It is difficult to imagine how a "platform" of judicial
integrity, conceived in this way, could be constructed.
Finally, political leaders, unlike judicial candidates, are selected for the
purpose of directing government toward particular ends. 1 9 We choose a
president so that he will turn around the economy or pass legislation on a
particular moral issue or engage in a certain style of foreign relations. We
grant these political leaders the authority to engage in steps to accomplish
185. This is a somewhat different concern than that expressed by Justice Gins-
burg, who worried that litigants would pressure a candidate to renounce her campaign
pledges. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 763, 816 (2002) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
186. Justice Scalia, for example, argued that judges will not feel any great com-
pulsion to be consistent with nonpromissory statements in a campaign. Id. at 780-81.
187. See id. at 798 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that "in litigation, issues of
law or fact should not be determined by popular vote; it is the business of judges to be
indifferent to unpopularity," and noting that "countless judges in countless cases rou-
tinely make rulings that are unpopular and surely disliked by at least 50 percent of the
litigants who appear before them"); Maute, supra note 14, at 1211-12 (noting that
judges need independence when they are confronted with community passion or
prejudice).
188. Note, Being Atticus Finch: The Professional Role of Empathy in To Kill a
Mockingbird, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1682, 1688 (2004).
189. See White, 536 U.S. at 805-06 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that the pri-
mary function of legislative officers is to advance the interests of constituents).
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those ends, including hierarchical authority over a legion of government offi-
cials who have to take the actions necessary to accomplish these goals.
By contrast, the democratic system we have chosen does not direct
judges' actions toward particular ends: as a collective, voters do not select
judges so that they will join forces to get rid of the PATRIOT Act or partial-
birth abortion, in the same way that they might elect legislators to do. If the
purpose of a governmental branch is to achieve particular ends, voters will
want to be well-informed about how a politician defines those ends (to ensure
that they are in agreement) and how skillfully that politician can form vehi-
cles and harness resources to achieve those ends. A platform is a necessity in
such an assessment.
By contrast, if a judge is expected to do justice in the particular case, it
is hard to imagine what kind of general platform about ends and means she
could offer that could explain how justice in the particular could be done. Of
course, as judges are also administrators, there are some limited forms of
"platform" that might be useful for voters to know. For example, voters might
wish to know what steps a judge is going to take to streamline the courtroom
process so that cases can be heard more efficiently, or what a judge is going
to do about the rise in non-English-speaking litigants in the courtroom. But,
by and large, these sorts of "platforms" geared to issues on which a judge
exercises traditional ends-seeking leadership are currently not prohibited by
the rules. 190
IV. WHY VIRTUOUS JUDGES MAKE POOR ELECTORAL CANDIDATES
Beyond this general account of the virtues and the difficulty of identify-
ing them in elections, my thesis is that virtuous judges do not make good
electoral candidates, because they do not-and should not-possess the vir-
tues of an electoral candidate. Rather than providing a complete catalogue of
the virtues of a good judge, I intend to focus on those virtues that are particu-
larly unsuitable in the electoral arena. First, I will argue that elections are a
poor venue in which to test virtues somewhat unique to judging: the judicial
virtue of impartiality, as variously described by Justices Scalia, O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Ginsburg in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White;19I the
virtue of judicial reflectiveness; and the virtue of judicial carefulness. In the
next Section, I will also argue that common virtues like fidelity, humility, and
honesty take on a particular hue in the practice of judging that makes them
unlikely candidates to be identified in electoral politics.
190. For example, Canon 5 does not prohibit judges from talking about their
views on court administration. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5
commentary (1990) (amended 2003); Cafferata, supra note 11, at 1644-45.
191. White, 536 U.S. at 775-83 (majority opinion written by Scalia), 789-92




A. The Virtue(s) of Impartiality and Judicial Elections
In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Justice Scalia, writing for
the majority, spends considerable space attempting to define the virtue of
"impartiality," which was the state's proffered compelling interest for its "an-
nounce" restriction on judicial candidates.1 92 In Justice Scalia's view, the
virtue of impartiality could mean one of three things: "lack of bias for or
against either party to the proceeding"; or "lack of preconception in favor of
or against a particular legal view"; or open-mindedness, the willingness "to
consider views that oppose [the judge's] preconceptions, and remain open to• • ,"93
persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending case. By contrast, the con-
curring and dissenting opinions focus on broader definitions of impartiality
that go to the heart of the concerns with judicial elections that I previously
described: quid pro quo conflicts and judicial punishment for non-support,
the creation of "soft" obligations on behalf of litigants and lawyers, and the
public appearance of impropriety. Initially, Justice Ginsburg and Stevens are
particularly concerned about the first two problems, which might be defined
as the problem of judges acting in self-interested ways in elections,' 94 while
Justice O'Connor's primary focus is on judges who act out of a sense of be-
holdenness to those who helped them get elected. 195 However, all three of
these opinions also focus on the related virtue of judicial independence-the
ability of a judge to decide matters according to the law rather than on the
basis of popular pressure.' 
96
Justice Scalia is so quick to dismiss concerns about self-interestedness
and beholdenness that animate both the literature and the cases on judicial
selection that one might wonder if he is living within the same practice of
judging described in the voluminous work on this issue. 197 To borrow from
192. Id. at 775-80.
193. Id. at 775, 777-78.
194. See, e.g, id. at 799-800 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and 814-19 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
195. See, e.g., id. at 790 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 817-18 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (focusing on the appearance of impropriety, or in Ginsburg's
words, the public perception of judicial integrity).
196. See, e.g., id. at 791 (O'Connor, J., concurring), 797-99 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing), 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. Justice Scalia treats the concerns about self-interestedness very briefly, argu-
ing variously that virtually all judicial candidates, even federal bench appointees,
make statements seeking to enhance their chances for office and thus would be ruled
unfit by Justice Stevens, id. at 781 n.8; and that all sitting judges who face election
have a "'direct, personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest' in their jobs which is
potentially influenced by every single ruling that they make, id. at 782. He indirectly
answers Justice O'Connor's concern about beholdennness by suggesting that the
Canons' "pledges or promises" clause is much more closely geared to avoiding the
problem of judges feeling obliged to carry through with their commitments than the
"announce" clause. Id. at 780-81.
20051
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW
the Maclntyrean historical conceit, it is as if Justice Scalia has made his peace
with living in the judicial world of Sparta while the other Justices are hoping
for something more resembling Athens.1
98
Yet, playing Justice Scalia's dictionary game for a moment, 199 it is easy
to see why his notion of impartiality as a lack of bias for or against a party is
too small to encompass the concerns that have brought states to care about the
impartiality of judges, and is, indeed, somewhat misleading. Justice Scalia's
first argument, that announcing one's views about a contested legal issue is
not usually a demonstration of bias about particular parties before the
court,200 seems credible at first blush. Lack of bias or (according to the dic-
tionary) of "personal and sometimes unreasoned judgment" 20 1 has tradition-
ally been expressed as part of the judge's repertoire of virtues in the two ways
suggested by the definition. First, judges should not make "personal" judg-
ments, that is, they should decide cases based on the facts and the law202 and
not based on their own views of the litigants.20 3 Second, as the dictionary
suggests, and as I will touch on later, impartiality can imply that judges
should make judgments based on "reason" instead of "emotion."
While the distinction between personal and "fact-based" judgment has a
certain ring of authenticity to it, it can be somewhat disingenuous if taken to
198. In the Politics Book II, chapter 9, Aristotle criticizes the Spartan ephors or
public judges, who are chosen from among the people. He argues that this method of
selection results in decisionmakers who have little wealth, making them open to brib-
ery, and causing them to act dictatorially in the exercise of their powers. Moreover,
the ephors live a life of ease. However, he notes, the people like it because it gives
them a share in an office of power. Yet, he argues that because the ephors can be
chosen from among the people, e.g. considering that anybody at all may hold the
office, they should not be given judicial discretion but only the power to decide ac-
cording to stated rules and regulations. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book II, ch. 9,
available at http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.2.two.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2005).
199. See Merriam-Webster Online, at http://www.m-w.com/ (last visited Apr. 24,
2005) (noting the definition of "impartial" as "not partial or biased: treating or affect-
ing all equally," "fair," "marked by impartiality and honesty: free from self-interest,
prejudice, or favoritism"); see also definition for "bias:" "bent, tendency" "an inclina-
tion of temperament or outlook; especially: a personal and sometimes unreasoned
judgment: prejudice." Id.
200. White, 536 U.S. at 775-77. Justice Scalia does seem to concede Justice Ste-
vens' point that sometimes judicial speech will exhibit a bias against parties, e.g.,
when an election speech suggests an "unbroken record of affirming convictions for
rape," suggesting a bias for the prosecution and against the class of rape defendants.
Compare id. at 800-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) with id. at 777 n.7 (conceding that the
"announce clause is barely tailored" to serve the interest against bias because of this
possibility).
201. See Merriam-Webster Online, supra note 199.
202. White, 535 U.S. at 775-76 (Justice Scalia suggests that in this sense, imparti-
ality is a species of equality doctrine).
203. See Solum, supra note 165.
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its logical extreme. First, we might take the notion that judges should decide
based on "facts" and "law," and not on the "person" of the litigant based on
the judge's "personal" evaluation of her. Should a judge discount the person
of the litigants in making his decision, in many cases he would have to dis-
count a critical part of the facts. For example, where the facts are contested
and the evidence evenly weighted (e.g., there are only two opposing eyewit-
nesses and no circumstantial evidence to support either witness's version of
the facts), the only basis on which a judge can make a decision about what
version is more likely to be true is to weigh the apparent character of the wit-
nesses. This process indeed requires a "personal" judgment, a judgment about
the person of the witnesses. As another example, only an incompetent
judge--or perhaps one bound by sentencing guidelines-would fail to con-
sider the "person" of the defendant in making a decision on his punishment,
whether she was a retributivist or an advocate of deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation. All of these theories require an evaluation or prediction about
human nature in general and about the defendant in particular.204 And it
would be difficult to imagine how a judge could grant custody of a small
child to one parent or another without considering the "person" of the parties.
The maxim about deciding the cases based on the facts and the law,
rather than on the person of the litigants, must ultimately mean that character
must play a role, but only a (usually) minor role, in the judge's decision. A
three-time criminal cannot be convicted of a fourth crime without evidence
that he actually committed it, whatever his character. A mother who does not
meet the judge's personal views on motherhood nevertheless must be able to
keep her child unless the judge can justifiably find that she actually acted in
ways that meet the legal standard for neglect or abuse.
Yet, it is difficult to see how a traditional election contest can test the
nuanced phronesis that is necessary to decide when and to what extent it is
proper to consider the litigants "as persons" and when a judge should focus
only on the other "facts" of their case and the law. One could hardly even
imagine a news story in an election cycle that tried to capture a candidate's
judicial phronesis, or the lack thereof, on paper, much less explained to voters
how Candidate A demonstrated that phronesis through years of judging,
while Candidate B did not.
However, neither Justice Scalia's focus on impartiality in the bias sense
nor impartiality in the rationality sense was apparently the kind of "bias" that
the Minnesota Supreme Court was worried about in promulgating its rule
204. One possible exception is pure assaultive retribution theory. In some ac-
counts, this theory is premised on the notion that all acts of a particular genre, such as
murders, have a precise punishment which is "due" them irrespective of circum-
stances or the character of the actor. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CRIMINAL LAW 39-40 (2d ed. 1999) (excerpting 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 80-82 (1883) (noting that punishment
properly gives expression to social hatred)).
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about "impartiality." 20 5 The dictionary defines impartiality also as fairness,
i.e., "free from self-interest, prejudice or favoritism. ' 2° 6 Setting aside the
question of prejudice for a moment, we must consider what judicial virtue is
suggested by the concept of being free from "self-interest ... or favoritism."
The judicial election canons and the other opinions in White really identify
two concerns that militate against finding "impartial" judges: the problem of
self-interestedness and the problem of beholdenness.
20 7
In common parlance, and in Justice Scalia's view,20 8 to discuss self-
interest is to describe a fact of life: true altruism, the ability to consider eve-
ryone's interests excluding one's own in making a moral judgment,
20 9 while
often praised, has been honored more often in the breach. To be sure, we
might not wish to ground any theory of judicial ethics on the extreme oppo-
site moral theory, ethical egoism, which suggests that because we do consider
our own self-interest in real life, it is wrong to consider anyone's interests but
our own in making a moral decision. But most standard ethical theories
such as ethical universalism or utilitarianism do not require moral persons to
exclude their own interests from moral consideration; they only require that
the moral actor not count himself as excessively more important than others
whose actions he might affect.
211
In the case of judges, however, "self-interest" takes on a particular
meaning which is described more specifically in both judicial and lawyer
canons: the judge should not use the power of her office to secure tangible
benefits, such as money and property, for herself or her immediate family or
close friends.212 Indeed, she should not place herself in a situation where she
would have to choose between her own tangible interests and the interests of
a person who comes before her.213
205. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F2d 854, 864 (8th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (discussing state interest in applying the law neu-
trally rather than on the basis of any implied or express commitments or prejudices).
206. See supra note 200.
207. See Zeidman, supra note 34, at 819-20 (noting that judges may become be-
holden to those who contribute to their campaign); supra notes 193-96 and accompa-
nying text (on White opinions).
208. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 781 n.8 (2002) (im-
plying that every federal judge makes statements "with the hope of enhancing" his
chances of confirmation).
209. See TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MORAL PHILOSOPHY 42-45 (3d ed. 2001).
210. Id. at 48.
211. Id. at49.
212. SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 64, at 137-43 (discussing requirements of dis-
qualification when a judge or family member has an interest to be benefited in a case).
213. See White, 536 U.S. at 816 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (discussing psychologi-
cal egoism's challenge to altruism).
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However, the seeming vice of self-interestedness, or if you will, the vir-
tue of disinterestedness, takes on particular meaning during elections,
whether judicial or not. As the Supreme Court at least implies, communities
have a plentitude of interests in stemming direct corruption--e.g., the act of a
candidate who takes some benefit such as money or property in exchange for
a vote or other use of public power to secure the financer's private advan-
tage. 214 What would in private business in a capitalist economy be considered
virtuous 2 15 becomes a problem in government employment. For one thing,
practiced self-interest by public officials undercuts the notion of the political
equality of citizens. In democratic theory, citizens gain personal advantage in
the public sphere by political participation (voting, political advocacy, sup-
porting candidates, etc.) rather than by purchasing public advantage. More-
over, corruption has the potential to harm the notion of democratic govern-
ment as visible government-if people can use their resources to secure back-
door advantages, citizens will not know the real reasons that laws were
passed, and will have little real way to influence the process.
But some judicial election codes have taken a radical, and I believe
exemplary, path to eliminate the crudest forms of self-interested dealing, i.e.,
the quid pro quo corruption that is problematic for all elected officials. In
many states employing the Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, fundraising for
judicial campaigns must be conducted by a separate committee that cannot
include the judge or members of his family. 216 In some states, such as Minne-
sota, that committee must erect a fundraising "screen": judges are not permit-
ted to know who gave money to their election campaigns or other causes that
the judge champions or directs, or how much any individual or organization
gave.
2 17
Screens not only deter people with money from trying to bribe or indi-
rectly purchase the votes of candidates; they also reduce the temptation for
candidates and staffers to offer a quid pro quo, indirectly or directly, to the
214. Id. at 776 (noting the need for impartiality by citing to bribery cases).
215. Capitalism assumes that it is a good for people to offer their resources in a
bargain exchange which is more optimal for themselves as well as others. In a pure
market system, then, a judge should be permitted to offer his power to make judg-
ments in exchange for consideration to the highest bidder. See Joseph R. Grodin,
Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge 's Perspective on Judicial Retention
Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1969, 1981-82 (1988) (noting a Texas professor's ar-
gument that using resources to elect judges favorable to each position is the same as
doing so for legislators).
216. See ABA MODEL RULES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(2) (1990)
(amended 2003); MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 5B(2) (2004).
217. See MINNESOTA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5B(2) ("Such commit-
tees shall not disclose to the candidate the identity of campaign contributors nor shall
the committee disclose to the candidate the identity of those who were solicited for
contribution or stated public support and refused such solicitation.").
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wealthy or special interest groups to obtain needed campaign funds.218 If the
field of givers were reduced to those who care only about the general posi-
tions on which a candidate runs, not only would election campaigns be less
expensive, but candidates would be required to appeal to the interests of a
broader spectrum of the population in order to get the funds to be elected.
Current challenges to judicial election codes, claiming that non-
solicitation rules violate the First Amendment, attempt to wipe out the bene-
fits of separate fundraising committees. 2 19 If they are successful, we are back
to the specter of direct corruption and the appearance of corruption that so
concerns commentators on judicial elections.
220
Moreover, the problem of self-interestedness takes on a particularly dark
hue in judicial elections. A legislative candidate may not be permitted to
work in her own self-interest in the narrow, "corruption" sense of the word;
but it can hardly be said that she is not pursuing her self-interest in the larger
sense. Apart from the fact that politics gives one access to power, prestige,
and a job, legislative office-holders by and large pursue political and ideo-
logical interests which are "self-interests" though not exclusively so. This is
true whether they run for office because of some specific agenda based on
their own past experience, or whether they are motivated to improve the
community in which they live. The democratic system suggests that those
"self-interests" which prevail will be those shared by a majority of voters,
even though we might expect a virtuous lawmaker to hear out those who do
not share such interests before she votes on a bill.
While in the broadest sense of the word judicial candidates also seek of-
fice to improve communities of which they are a part, things become more
complicated when they purport to represent the interests of themselves and
some limited segment of their communities, such as by pronouncing that they
are "pro-life" candidates or support the death penalty wherever possible.
218. Indeed, were judicial financing screens realistic in traditional legislative and
executive campaigns-and there is good reason to believe they would not be when the
economic and political stakes for telling candidates where their money comes from
are so high-such prophylactic measures would be a better cure for the appearance as
well as the reality of political corruption than existing campaign finance laws. How-
ever, screens were not adopted by the 1990 Model Code of Judicial Conduct because
of jurisdictions' requirements that candidates disclose their contributor list, and be-
cause screens would make it difficult for judges to recuse themselves in particular
cases. See Maura Anne Shoshinski, Towards an Independent, Fair, and Competent
Judiciary: An Argument for Improving Judicial Elections, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
839, 852 (1994).
219. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 145-46 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that judicial election rules which allow judges to participate in many aspects
of fundraising except directly soliciting gifts themselves are not unconstitutional); In
re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40-41 (Or. 1990) (per curiam) (holding that prohibition
against direct solicitation by judges does not violate First Amendment right to free
expression).
220. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
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Even beyond the power to recall legislators through election and other means,
citizens who do not share the "self-interest" of particular legislators will have
resort to other legislators and, indeed, other branches of government to press
their cases and gain reinforcements for their causes.221 A citizen who does not
like a controversial gun law may attempt to challenge it in court, seeking to
have it narrowly interpreted or struck down as unconstitutional. Or, he may
ask the executive branch to interpret or enforce the law more to his liking, or
to wield its veto power or political power to prod legislators to change their
views.
In the judicial sphere, by contrast, most litigants have nowhere else to go
to gain adherents for their "self-interest" in having a law narrowed or over-
turned. By the time they arrive in litigation, it is usually too late to change the
law through legislation or executive action, at least for their own case given
the number of legal rules that cut against retroactivity. 222 Moreover, because
of the relatively narrow view American jurisprudence takes with respect to
the judge's ability to "make law" or to overturn laws on constitutional
223grounds, the opportunity for judges to support the "interest" of the litigant
is quite circumscribed. Indeed, by the time litigants arrive in court, they are
usually at a place of "last resort," having exhausted all other political and
practical options for achieving their own "self-interest."
Finally, as Justice Stevens opines, we continue to harbor the notion that
judges should not represent community interests so much as they should rep-
resent the law, and ultimately, justice. 224 As he notes, this distinction is criti-
cal to understanding the difference between legislative and judicial elec-
tions.225 A legislator in a democratic system may legitimately say that he is
trying to represent the immediate concerns of the community, or the majority
of a community, when he votes for a particular law. However, his job is not to
enforce the law or the Constitution, and so his concern about how his action
will comport with existing law is often minimal. Indeed, legislators rarely
vote against laws based on their unconstitutionality, even though there is no
reason to believe that the Framers meant for legislators, any more than
221. See Daniel Burke, Colloquy, Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 7B (1)(c):
Toward the Proper Regulation of Speech in Judicial Campaigns, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 181, 203 (1993) (noting that judges are not constrained by the need to get
additional legislators' votes).
222. See, e.g., John Bernard Corr, Retroactivity: A Study in Supreme Court Doc-
trine "As Applied", 61 N.C. L. REV. 745, 746-47 (1983) (describing the rise of consti-
tutional retroactivity analysis after 1965).
223. See Behrens & Silverman, supra note 61, at 288 (noting that judges do not
have the job of formulating policy).
224. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 798-99 (2002) (Stevens,
J. dissenting) (describing duty ofjudges to uphold law, not public opinion).
225. Id. at 798 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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judges, to flout the letter and spirit of the Constitution.226 Judges, by contrast,
are expected to uphold a much longer community tradition that is embodied
in the common law, statutes, and constitutions, particularly in those cases
where the long-held community tradition comes into conflict with short-term
community "passions" and interests.
Judges who represent "interests" in their election campaigns, even if
these interests are seemingly intangible ones, cannot represent this long tradi-
tion against short-term miscarriages of justice, a concern Justice Stevens ex-
presses strongly.227 It is not simply a problem of improper appearance if judi-
cial candidates consider only part of the community as deserving of justice
when they announce how they will rule on particular issues. By signaling
their views in this manner, there is the reality that they cannot represent the
larger and more diverse traditions embodied in the law.
The second concern raised by judicial elections "impartiality," is that
electoral candidates will feel beholden to those who make their election pos-
sible.228 The quality of beholdenness reaches toward the past rather than the
future, and it is more often a virtue than a vice. It is a moral human being's
recognition of what has been done for her by others, an acknowledgement
that her life is dependent upon other persons, as Maclntyre suggests, 
229 and an
attitude of gratitude toward those who have given her gifts.
One aspect of the concern with judicial beholdenness is the debate over
provisions of the judicial canons dealing with whether candidates can affiliate
with parties and attend party functions where they solicit donations. This
debate evinces the fear that a judicial candidate may feel a sense of beholden-
ness to parties with which she is affiliated, to donors, or to those who other-
wise helped her get into office.
In post-White cases, challengers have objected to canons preventing
them from appearing at political events or from being endorsed by a political
party, in some cases successfully. 230 While these canons do not directly hin-
226. See Vic Snyder, You've Taken an Oath to Support the Constitution, Now
What? The Constitutional Requirement for a Congressional Oath of Office, 23 U.
ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 897, 916-17 (2001) (noting that while legislators are sen-
sitive to constitutional concerns, they are not judges).
227. See White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
229. See MACINTYRE, supra note 151, at 116-17.
230. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 361 F.3d 1035, 1044 n.6 (2000)
(8th Cir. 2004) (remand considering Canon 5 restrictions on partisan activity), va-
cated by and reh 'g en banc granted, No. 99-4021/4025/4029, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
10232 (8th Cir. May 25, 2004); GASS, supra note 3, at 3-4; T.C. Brown, Judicial
Candidates Free to Reveal Their Politics: Restrictions Ruled Unconstitutional, THE
PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 15, 2004, (noting apparently unreported federal court decision
declaring unconstitutional Ohio canons restricting candidates' abilities to declare their
political affiliations and restricting how they can use the term "judge" if they are
running for a different office than the one they hold).
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der the possibility of corruption, they deter, if not eliminate, the interest of
political parties in demanding adherence to party platforms from judges as a
condition of their receipt of campaign funds. Even when there is not a direct
demand by the party to get in line with its views, in those states that have
partisan elections, judges may feel indirect obligations to "announce" on is-
sues that follow the party platform because of the assistance they have re-
231ceived. And, to the extent that political events are places where support
money traditionally changes hands, judicial candidates are tempted to feel
that something is expected from those who link them with donors, as much as
from the donors themselves. In addition to curbing direct self-interest by sti-
fling many possibilities for direct payoffs, financing screens focus on this
concern that judges will feel beholden to donors, as do clauses in the canons
that concern pledges or promises, an issue to which I will later return.
It might seem immediately obvious that judges should not be beholden
to others for their livelihood. But this claim really cuts against two basic
moral principles. First, when someone has provided us with an advantage,
unless that advantage is clearly given as a gift, we consider it only right to
repay the giver-basic contractual notions such as implied contract, quantum
meruit, and others are the legal embodiment of that principle. Second, in the
case of a gift, we may well have the moral duty to demonstrate our beholden-
ness and gratitude to those who have made it possible for us to be where we
are today-parents, teachers, employers, spouses, friends, and those who
have provided specific resources such as opportunities and money.232 To be
sure, this is a "softer" duty-unlike quidpro quo, the giver does not have the
same right to demand enforcement-but it is a moral duty nonetheless. In-
deed, we would consider a person who repaid others' support for his efforts
with inaction or indifference as an ungrateful person, or one who takes advan-
tage of the generosity of others. A moral person generally feels beholden to
those who have helped him achieve professional success.
Elections tend to create beholdenness. Virtually no candidate gets
elected on her own efforts, and virtually every elected candidate should prop-
erly acknowledge help from supporters, family members, friends, volunteers,
donors, and the media. Again, however, there is a substantial difference be-
tween the virtue of recognizing our beholdenness in legislative elections and
in judicial selection, one that cuts against the value of elections for choosing
judges. While we discourage vote-buying, that is, beholdenness to individual
voters or supporters based solely on money, to a certain extent we do expect
legislators to feel a sense of obligation to those who put them into office.233 A
231. See MATHIAS, supra note 59, at 40 (noting appearance of cross-endorsement
and of bias on issues that attends partisan involvement); Behrens & Silverman, supra
note 61, at 281-82.
232. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE
HEALER IN MEDICAL ETHICS 116-17, 121-24 (2000).
233. See, e.g., Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd., 944 F.2d 137, 142 (3d Cir. 1991) (not-
ing that "the public has the right to know the details of the programs that [non-
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legislator who turned his back on the constituents who helped get him
elected, who did not feel responsible for caring for their interests as he prom-
ised to do during the election, would probably be a one-term legislator be-
cause voters would consider him without integrity.234 A legislator who did not
reward those who worked for him with staff employment or other legitimate
perks of office would, at the least, be considered unusually straight-laced, and
in some circles, positively immoral or anti-democratic.
235
By contrast, we have not traditionally wanted judges to feel beholden to
those who put them into office, with the possible exception of rewarding a
few faithful helpers with the small number of "perks" the judge has available,
such as clerkships and court reporter jobs.2 36 The most important power the
judge has is to render justice, to seal a legal decision for a particular litigant.
If the judge felt beholden to particular supporters for their gifts, and believed
that he was morally obliged to rule in their favor (i.e., to exercise favoritism)
whenever they appeared before him, we would accuse him of bias or partial-
ity. Not only can justice not be sold, it cannot be recompense for what a judge
has received from others.
Thus, we might argue, what is a "virtue" in a legislator, his moral in-
stinct to take account of those who have supported him in his bid for election,
quickly turns into a "vice" in a judge. It is difficult enough for judges to go
against their moral instinct to acknowledge their dependency on others and
their beholdenness to those who have helped them achieve their office in an
appointment setting. If we make judges run for election as well, we are asking
them to display a sense of beholdenness during the electoral process, enough
to inspire supporters to rally behind them, and then to abruptly abandon that
judicial] candidates propose to enact into law and administer. Pledges to follow cer-
tain paths are not only expected, but are desirable so that voters may make a choice
between proposed agendas that affect the public. By contrast, the judicial system is
based on the concept of individualized decisions ...."); ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F.
Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that political candidates are expected to
announce programs, expect results and advance political group interests, unlike
judges).
234. Justice Ginsburg makes the same point about judges who rule inconsistently
with their "announcements" on issues. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 816 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
235. For a discussion of the alleged impact of patronage on democratic politics,
see, for example, Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 467 U.S. 62, 103-06 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing perceived necessity of patronage as reward for
faithful party service); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 530-32 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting).
236. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 789-90 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Kate Tho-
mas, Are Justices in Texas Getting Bought?, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1998, at A8 (report-
ing that a study by the public interest group Texans for Public Justice found that 40
percent of the $9,200,000 in contributions of $100 or more raised by seven of Texas'
nine Supreme Court justices for their 1994 and 1996 elections "came from parties and
lawyers with cases before the court or contributors closely linked to these parties").
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attitude once they have been elected. Or, conversely, we tempt judges to con-
tinue to act after election as persons beholden to others despite the harm that
such behavior can cause. The threat to a judge's personal sense of integrity
caused by these conflicting demands cannot be overstated.
B. Impartiality as a Lack of Preconception, and Judicial Reasoning
Justice Scalia proposes a second definition of judicial impartiality: lack
of preconception about a particular legal view.237 As he quite fairly notes, it is
difficult to imagine a competent judge who had so little knowledge of, or
experience in, the law that he would not have come to at least some initial
thoughts about how it should fairly be read or applied.238 Indeed, we might
suspect that such a judge was amoral, i.e., did not think in moral categories as
he considered how the law is applied and enforced in his own communities.
Inability to think in moral categories at all would seem to be a significant
character flaw in a position that requires the exercise of moral and ethical
judgment on a constant basis, albeit consistently with the legal norms set out
by the broader community.
Elections, like it or not, do not tend to test well the virtue of impartiality
defined as a lack of preconception. 239 Because of the need for versatile law-
makers and executives, electoral politics are good at identifying strong candi-
dates who yet do not have "actual knowledge or experience" on many of the
issues on which they will lead the nation or a particular local community. In
fact, if anything, a virtuous electoral politician is one who has the gift of re-
acting, deciding, and leading quickly in the face of even the most unimagin-
able set of facts, when little is known about the actual state of affairs. There is
a reason that Michael Moore was able to successfully mock President Bush
for continuing to read to schoolchildren for seven minutes after he was in-
formed that the country was under attack on September 11 th.24 ° Moore tapped
into the intuition that we are much better off with a political leader who acts
quickly and decisively in the face of little information in order to reassure the
public that we are not vulnerable to the unknown-even if he is later proven
wrong-than with a leader who delays action until he is very sure of all of the
facts.
237. White, 536 U.S. at 777.
238. Id. at 777-78.
239. In Merriam-Webster Online, supra note 199, "preconception" is defined as"prejudice," to "preconceive" is "to form (as an opinion) prior to actual knowledge or
experience." "Prejudice" is defined as a "preconceived judgment or opinion," "an
adverse opinion or leaning formed without just grounds or before sufficient knowl-
edge," or "an irrational attitude of hostility directed against an individual, a group, a
race, or their supposed characteristics." Id.
240. See Scott Shepard, Election 2004: Kerry Says Bush Slow to React to Terror
Attacks, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Aug. 6, 2004, at AIO (noting that
Moore's film depicts Bush as unprepared to respond to the attacks).
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But another concern may well lurk in the background-the view that
judges should rule "without bias." As I have previously suggested, there is
some implication in the use of these terms that bias constitutes an emotional
reaction and impartiality a rational reaction, that the former is illegitimate for
a judge and the latter necessary. Justice Stevens' opinion adopts this view, at
least implicitly, by stressing the importance of a judge following "the prece-
dent of that court, not his personal views,"
24 1 while Justice Scalia seems un-
troubled with a judge following his personal views so long as he applies the
same views to everyone.
242
Yet, the notion of impartiality as pure rationality has been debunked as
representing an extreme and unhealthy understanding of the practice of judg-
ing.243 Moreover, this distinction between impartiality as reason and bias as
emotion displays a modem ideology that all of life can be separated into a
public sphere (including judging) where cool, logical, or empirical rationality
reigns and a private sphere where warm, illogical, value-laden emotions reign
supreme. 2 " As Justice Scalia might even say, it is disingenuous to suggest
that a judge can separate herself from her emotions when she assumes the
bench; only an automaton or a computer could do so.
In probing the definition of impartiality as "open-mindedness," how-
ever, Justice Scalia does capture the grain of truth in the claim that judges
should make "reasoned" judgments. In Justice Scalia's view, open-
mindedness would mean that judges are required to "consider views that op-
pose [their] preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when issues arise
in a pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each litigant,
not an equal chance to win the legal points in a case, but at least some chance
of doing so.
' 245
241. See, e.g., White, 536 U.S. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 776-77 (noting that if a judge has a view about the law, anyone
who comes before him is likely to lose or win).
243. Professor Martha Minow, for one, has argued that to take a strict view about
the separation of rationality and emotion is to exclude very important judicial virtues
from the public process of reasoning, such as the virtues of compassion and under-
standing. Martha L. Minow & Elizabeth V. Spelman, Passion for Justice, 10
CARDOZO L. REv. 37, 50-51 (1998).
244. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT 13-
19 (1974) (discussing scientismic and irrationalist views of the world). Yet as oppo-
nents of the modem dogma have shown, very little of importance in life is demonstra-
ble by rationality, so narrowly defined-virtually any "fact" can be shown not to be
true "without doubt," and virtually any factual regime is pervaded by assumption and
valuation, even so-called "hard" sciences such as physics and biology, since the mere
fact of classification must be based on some idea about what is valuable to know and
to distinguish. Id. at 93-95, 103-04. See also Daugherty, supra note 22, at 317-18
(discussing the formalism-realism debate as influencing judicial selection mecha-
nisms at the turn of the century).
245. White, 536 U.S. at 778.
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Aristotelian rhetoric understood that to give a "reasoned judgment" to an
audience required the reason-giver to take into account the character of the
speaker himself (ethos), the reality of the subject matter about which he
speaks (logos), and the character of the audience focusing on how they will
respond to what he says (pathos).246 A key virtue ofjudges is that they wait to
get a complete picture of the facts and applicable law before they decide.
They should have reasons for their judgments, and they should have good
reasons, that is, reasons which would persuade any fair-minded person or any
fair-minded community that the judgment they have come to is the right one
or at least one of the possible right ones. These reasons not only display that
the judge has waited to hear all of the evidence, but also that she has "rea-
soned" in a way that considers her own voice as well as the concerns of her
multiple audiences, both litigants and community, and the limits of the law
that she is to apply (logos). That ability to give reasons which a community
can accept as good, whether she personally agrees, is the cornerstone of the
judge's ability to command respect for the legal process and for the law itself.
Again, we run into a significant problem when we think about elections
providing voters with sufficient information to know whether a candidate can
make "reasoned" judgments. For appellate judges, this might be possible if
voters cared to read judicial opinions. They can tell whether the judge is exer-
cising good (read as competent as well as morally worthy) rhetorical skills.
For appellate challengers, and most trial bench candidates, however, we
might well wonder where the evidence would come from to make these kinds
of judgments. With the exception of the federal bench, virtually no trial
judges will have full enough written records to be judged on how well they
reason about a case in this broader sense, and except in those states with a
full-blown judicial watch program, there will likely not be good enough oral
records either. By contrast, a selection commission that is able to demand
recommendation letters and references from judicial candidates, or even sur-
vey lawyers familiar with the candidates, may at least get some handle on
whether a judge can give good reasons for his decisions.
C.Judicial Reflectiveness with Independence
One judicial virtue closely related to the virtue of holistic engagement in
considering a case might be termed the virtue of reflectiveness with inde-
pendence. By reflectiveness, I mean to capture two necessary traits in a judge:
first, the ability of a judge to wait until she has received sufficient evidence
and information about the law to make a good decision, which Justice Gins-
burg tries to capture in the notion of due process. Second, I mean the judge's
willingness to habitually think through what she must do in a timely yet de-
246. Marie A. Failinger, Not Mere Rhetoric: On Wasting or Claiming Your Leg-
acy, Justice Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REv. 425, 435, 468 (2003).
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liberative fashion.24 7 That is, there is a temporal dimension to the virtue of
reflectiveness: a judge must have a good instinct for how much time she
needs to fully think through a problem, and advise the parties accordingly,
being neither too hasty nor too dilatory.
There are any number of character dimensions that are embraced in the
virtue of reflectiveness. For example, a good judge must be able to be deci-
sive after an appropriate time, a virtue which apparently some judges must
lack, given the evidence that judicial delay in rendering decisions is one of
the most frequent complaints to state judicial accountability boards.
248 She
must be capable of performing the lawyerly task of balancing the information
she has to reach a wise resolution, both in terms of who will win and in terms
of a remedy. This need imposes on her the duty of examining the pros and
cons of various alternatives thoughtfully and wisely, the skill of phronesis.
Similarly, the virtue of reflectiveness demands that she exercise the virtues of
patience and perseverance, that she be capable of waiting until the appropriate
solution becomes clear, and that she be willing to continue to work on the
problem until she comes to that solution.
And the judge must be capable of doing so "independently" for the most
part, a virtue that transcends even as it is necessarily linked to impartiality, as
the White concurring and dissenting opinions suggest. That is, a judge must
have the gift and willingness to sort through the evidence, the law, and the
alternatives by herself, deciding a difficult abortion by-pass or sentencing
case without the benefit of consulting the community or even trusted advisers
about what to do, unless those advisers are fellow members of the judiciary or
perhaps an occasional law clerk or staff member.
The virtue of independence requires not only the self-confidence to
make a lone judgment and the courage to bear the consequences of commu-
nity disapproval, '249 but also the ability to think through something by oneself.
This is true for both trial and appellate judges even after they have exhausted
the lawyers briefing the issues in the case, and even when they have col-
leagues who will be part of the decision-making team on appellate benches.
The good half of the lawyer population
250 that is used to working out prob-
247. See Noonan, Jr., supra note 176, at 1130 (noting true fortitude is resolve,
determination, firmness and patience in waiting until the end of the inquiry the mean
between stubbornness and vacillation).
248. See, e.g., MINN. BD. OF JUDICIAL STANDARDS, ANNUAL REPORT 2004, at 6
(noting that delay was third on the list of complaints against Minnesota judges in
2004, trailing only discrimination and decorum).
249. See White, 536 U.S. at 806 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (noting that "'[I]t is the
business of judges to be indifferent to popularity.' . .. They must strive to do what is
legally right, all the more so when the result is not the one 'the home crowd' wants.")
(quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 401 n.29 (1991)) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
250. See Lawrence R. Richard, Psychological Type and Job Satisfaction Among
Practicing Lawyers in the United States, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 979, 1015 (2002) (noting
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lems in their heads rather than in conversation with others has a strong head-
start at making good judges. Such "hard-wiring" is a gift for judges as well as
many lawyers, but it is a gift not easy to cultivate, or to get rid of.
By contrast, as I previously alluded to, electoral politics neither favors
nor rewards individuals who have the gifts of judicial reflectivity and
independence. As earlier suggested, good-one might say virtuous-
politicians are those capable of responding quickly and reflexively to new
demands, questions, and problems, not necessarily thoughtfully and
methodically by taking the necessary time to think through a problem. A
campaigner who responded to press questions or constituent entreaties by
saying, as a judge might say, "let me take that under advisement and I'll get
back to you when I've thoroughly read the record" would be not long for the
political world. That is not to say we do not expect traditional politicians to
act only on the basis of incomplete information, but only that we do not-
properly, to my mind-expect them to do that work themselves. Rather, for
complex systemic problems or social issues, they employ campaign managers
or staffers to do the work for them and to present the results of such careful
thought to the campaigner. Those results may appear as a complete "package"
for the candidate to accept or reject, or as an "options" paper which describes
what choices the candidate might have in a "bullet" memo suggesting the
potential consequences of each choice.
A traditional politician can continue to operate in this fashion even after
he is elected, utilizing aides or staff from the executive or legislative branch,
or even lobbyists, to do the methodical reflective work of thinking through a
problem and the available solutions. By contrast, if we begin to elect (or cur-
rently elect) judges who are not skilled in the task of methodical reflection,
two traditionally "unjudicial" phenomena might become more prevalent.
First, we might see an increase in the number of judges who pretend to have
no intellectual interest or ability in the law and legal judgment and who are
impatient with learning or reflecting on what the law might require in a par-
ticular case. As a result, we may see an increase in judges who operate their
courtrooms through instinctive "seat of the pants" judgments that have little
relationship to "the law" as described in statutes and their legislative histories,
or common law precedent. While intuitive judging has its merits, a potential
demerit of such judging is that judges will increasingly utilize erroneous fac-
tual assumptions or prejudices unknown even to themselves to decide cases,
assumptions and prejudices which cannot be even mildly checked by the legal
rules that challenge them.
Or, conversely, if judges follow the political practice of delegating the
reflective work to their staff, we might see a very different relationship
emerging between judges and their clerks and other staff. Instead of supply-
that 56.4 percent of respondents in a lawyer satisfaction study preferred introversion,
while in the original Meyers study of introversion/extraversion in the American popu-
lation, 64.9 percent of the high school student sample she studied were extraverts).
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ing legal research and legal options to the judge, we might find that the clerk
or staff members constituted the real "power behind the throne," the people
whose reflection and advocacy really made the decision happen, like the poli-
tician's staff. While this would not necessarily subvert judicial accountability,
for elected judges would be just as ultimately beholden to voters as any poli-
ticians and would have to ratify the views of their clerks, it would certainly
change the public view of what judges do. Even today, judges who are
thought to be puppets of their clerks, or whose clerks are thought to do all of
the work of arriving at as well as writing opinions, are looked down upon in
the legal profession.2
Similarly, the ability--one might say virtue--of being able to think
through a problem and come to a solution in isolation, as an introverted law-
yer is capable of doing, is very much contrary to the virtue of openness that
we expect in our politicians. Politicians are considered good-indeed, one
might say virtuous-when they seek out the advice and concerns of others,
both voters and experts, as they work through their position on issues with
others. They are beholden directly to other human beings, expected to "cater"
to their needs and desires, rather than standing apart from those demands and
trying to come up with a just solution, comporting with some abstract princi-
ple of law. Indeed, we need politicians who, if you will, need the rest of us in
order to decide what they should do, in order to preserve both the appearance
and reality of democratic decision-making. It is thus no surprise that extra-
verts make good politicians.
By contrast, most litigants would undoubtedly-and I believe prop-
erly-be shocked if a judge took their case out to a series of community
meetings to solicit advice on how to resolve it, and made a judgment based on
what seemed to please most of those with whom he met. First, there is the
obvious question of the judge's higher fidelity. In a handful of judicial elec-
tion violation cases, where judges have been disciplined for advertising in
their campaigns that they would "help" the police or decide cases according
to the community's views on a particular issue such as law-and-order, courts
have found violations on the basis that the judge's higher duty is to the writ-
ten law and not to the immediate community sentiment.
252 Of course, these
statements are, it seems to me, somewhat disingenuous in that no sensible
judge can or should entirely ignore community sentiment on various issues.
However, they do suggest that a judge needs to be capable of divorcing him-
self from immediate sentiments that might arise especially in controversial
cases, and trust the long-term and more balanced judgments that the elector-
251. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and
the New Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
273, 288-89 (1996) (discussing the diminishing quality of opinions as clerks do more
writing).
252. See supra notes 87-89, 123-126 and accompanying text.
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ate has made in (hopefully) carefully considered laws, as Justice Stevens sug-
gests.253
Second, a trial judge who ran around the community asking for people's
opinions on cases might well be accused of bringing individual litigants into
disrepute, unduly publicizing their conflicts by "airing their dirty laundry in
public." While court cases are generally public, most litigants do not expect
to find themselves the subject of gossip in community centers and organiza-
tions unless their cases involve some "hot-button" issue for the community,
such as public safety or morals. It is not clear that raising the visibility of
court cases is likely to result in better justice, better relationships between the
parties, or a better understanding of the decisions and process in these cases
than the current system of maintaining public but low profiles for most cases.
Third, to return to the issue of judicial independence, as we can see from
several of the elections violation cases, 2 54 trial judges who consult with and
are responsive to communities might well signal that they have already pre-
judged the merits of the case in the sense that they are willing to side with the
litigant who is most liked and favored by the community. In Judge Kinsey's
case, for example, her pervasive references to her ties with the police and her
willingness to "bend over backward for them," and her stated interest in re-
flecting the community's wishes in her decisions sent the message: there will
be no fair-minded evaluation of your case by this judge.255
Fourth, judges who frequently consult the community on specific cases
might be thought to be indecisive, or worse, unwilling to be courageous in the
face of public opposition. So long as courts provide any majority-checking
functions at all, the lack of courage in judges constitutes a major disability in
the administration of justice. Electoral politics, in fact, test the ability of po-
litical leaders to think on their feet and react plausibly and confidently with a
limited set of information. Virtually any visible national candidate will be
required to come up with a response to the media within hours, if not minutes,
of a historical surprise, such as the al-Qaeda attack on the Spanish trains, or a
Supreme Court decision on affirmative action. To be electable, virtually any
politician will need to have the capacity to modify his views about political
subjects from gay marriage to the means of war as it becomes apparent that a
majority disagrees with those views, while giving the impression that these
modifications represented his views all along.
While such modifications of positions are often treated as pandering by
the press and opposition parties, it is hard to see why we wouldn't want a
political leader to be willing to quickly modify his views if he becomes con-
vinced that the majority opposes his original position-he is, after all, sup-
253. White, 536 U.S. at 803 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
254. See, e.g., supra notes 87-89, 123-128 and accompanying text.
255. In re Kinsey, 842 So. 2d 77, 80, 87-89 (Fla. 2003) (holding that judge made
unethical "promises and pledges" to support officers and to "bend over backward" to
give favorable treatment for law enforcement parties and witnesses).
2005)
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
posedly elected to represent their views, not his own. The willingness to adapt
to shifting political winds is at least arguably a political virtue, though like all
virtues, it can be distorted by an imbalance with others, such as political in-
tegrity of the kind just discussed with judges.
By contrast, the whole point of due process as we conceive it in this
country is to afford litigants a full and fair opportunity to be heard, and judges
"do" nothing if not affording due process. A judge who attempts to react con-
fidently to limited information by making a decision halfway through the
presentation of the facts in a trial is not considered a good leader; she is con-
sidered hasty, unfair, and perhaps even rude. A judge who gives the impres-
sion that he is modifying his views about the requirements of justice as he
encounters strong opposition from litigants to his proposed course is not con-
sidered adaptable; he is considered weak and indecisive. What we mean by
"open-minded ' 256 is, then, precisely the patience to listen to the views and
stories of other people until it is no longer prudent to do so-that is, until
those views and stories provide no new information reasonably useful in
making a decision.
It is easy to see, then, why elections would be a very good way to test
the qualities of a state official whom we wanted to be decisive in the face of
limited information and adaptable to voter preferences. It is not so easy to see
why we would want to use elections to test whether judges can make quick
judgments that change with voter preferences. Judges should have the virtue
of reflectiveness; that is, they should take their time to hear all of the evi-
dence before deciding a case, not jump to hasty conclusions to reassure the
public. They should be willing to recognize the effects of their rulings on the
community, but not simply to mimic community sentiments, as politicians are
expected to do.
D. The "Vision" Thing and the Judicial Virtue of Being Methodical
An additional virtue that good political candidates tend to possess is the
ability to understand and translate the "big picture" into concepts that can be
understood by virtually every voter, no matter what his background, intellect,
or educational level. That is, the best politicians can inspire voters with a
vision of the future that encourages them to give their money, their time, or
their votes. By creating a common vision for a future, whether within their
own party, local community, or the country as a whole, good politicians can
use persuasion to marshal human resources and good will in a particular di-
rection to make an alternate future possible.
However, here the realities of human limitation and "hard-wiring" once
again come into play. Politicians who are charismatic in this sense-able to
inspire voters to join together to work toward a common destiny-are not
256. See, e.g., Merriam-Webster Online, supra note 199 (defining "open-minded"
as "receptive to arguments or ideas").
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usually gifted with the skills of careful and methodical follow-through neces-
sary to get the job accomplished. To illustrate this point, we might look at the
debate about the relative success of Presidents Jimmy Carter and Ronald
Reagan, both of whom are widely regarded as personally virtuous and yet
whose political platforms and roots were dramatically different. The common
political wisdom, at least, is that Ronald Reagan was a better politician be-
cause he was skilled at creating a simple, clear, and optimistic vision of the
future while handing off the details of accomplishing that vision to others. By
contrast, President Carter is faulted because he was detailed-oriented and
micromanaged many aspects of his administration.
257
Similarly, judicial candidates who have the charismatic presence, vision,
and translation powers to describe to voters, with passion, the nature of jus-
tice in their community, are unlikely to also have a detail-oriented, methodi-
cal mind. Yet, particularly in the trial courts, not having a judge who delights
in, is patient with, and is well-suited to handling detail would strike most
lawyers as alarming. It is difficult to imagine how a judge who was good at
"the vision thing" but not at processing details and information methodically
and efficiently could ever preside over a lengthy trial. Much less, in an era of
shrinking judicial budgets, could such a judge competently handle the ex-
panding array of administrative responsibilities delegated to trial court judges,
ranging from technological innovation and human resources policies to state
commission reports on juvenile justice or proposed rules of evidence.
If traditional electoral politics becomes the standard way of selecting
judges, and if the only people who can be successful candidates in that system
are the charismatic and extraverted candidates who can "do" the "vision
thing," then we can expect to have many fewer introspective and methodical
judges on the bench. Any lawyer wise enough to know that his skills are in
the careful pursuit of detail, and not in "the vision thing," will be unlikely to
throw his hat in the ring, realizing that he has no chance of winning.
V. THE COMMON VIRTUES IN THE JUDICIAL OFFICE
In addition to those traits of character that are perhaps somewhat unique
to the business of judging, we might identify other virtues that any person
who occupies a public office should have, but that take on a particular cast in
the office of judge. In this Section, I will briefly highlight three that pertain to
257. See, e.g., Michael Eric Siegel, Probation and Pretrial Chiefs Can Learn from
the Leadership Styles of American Presidents, 64 FED. PROBATION 27, 30 (2000)
(describing public impression of Carter as micromanaging and indecisive compared to
Reagan's appearance of decisiveness, and his focus on policy and vision while dele-
gating major responsibility to staff); Elliot E. Slotnick, Presidents and Their Judges,
81 JUDICATURE 172, 175-76 (Jan.-Feb. 1998) (reviewing SHELDON GOLDMAN,
PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH
REAGAN (1997)) (describing Carter's micromanagement of the judicial selection
process compared to Reagan's lack of personal involvement in the process).
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the problems I have been discussing with judicial elections: the virtues of
fidelity, humility, and honesty.
A. Fidelity as Faithfulness to a Past
For judges, as with other political figures, fidelity is a key virtue. But the
judicial virtue of fidelity is distinctive. From a MacIntyrean perspective, we
can easily see why fidelity is important to carrying on any tradition, but I
would suggest that the need for fidelity in judges runs even deeper. Among
the first things new students of the law learn is the importance of precedent
and stare decisis, that is, the need to not only account for the past, but to ac-
cord it presumptive weight in reaching a decision. Even though their sway
over the course of judicially made law has clearly eroded in the past half-
century, precedent and stare decisis still exercise a profound impact on judi-
cial reasoning. In a common law system, MacIntyre would argue that the
exercise of precedential reasoning is a good that is internal to the practice of
judging, and, as such, is a necessary skill as well as an intellectual 
virtue.258
But in a more profound sense, precedential reasoning, and its companion
virtue, fidelity, are profound challenges to the assumptions of modernity and
more broadly, to the practices of political decision-making. Comte-Sponville
suggests how counter-natural the virtue of fidelity appears to the modem
mind:
[r]eality, from moment to moment, is always new; and this complete,
this perennial newness, is the world. Nature forgets, and it is in forget-
ting that its materality resides. Matter is forgetfulness itself; only
where there is mind is there memory. Oblivion, therefore, will have
the last word, just as it had and always will have the first 
word.25 9
As Comte-Sponville describes it, "[fjidelity is the virtue of memory; it is
memory itself as a virtue .... Fidelity is neither fickle nor 
stubborn ...."260
By contrast, in Comte-Sponville's description, modernity is profoundly natu-
ral, profoundly material, profoundly anti-memorial in its orientation. The idea
of progress, a key modem category, is dependent on the superiority of the
new over the old.26' The modem emphasis on choice as a critical category for
human flourishing depends on the value of the new and unique. Those who
have the means to do so choose clothes and cars, build houses, and shape
careers based on an attempt to construct a unique self that cannot be repli-
cated by any other person now or in the future.
258. MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 90-91.
259. COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 172, at 17.
260. Id. at 19.
261. I owe this insight to Prof. Patrick R. Keifert.
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In this way, modernity emphasizes a profoundly different relationship
between tradition and the future than Arendt's account, in which those who
distinguish themselves in the process of natality are firmly embedded in a
culture. 262 Arendt's heroism, the display of the self through distinctive actions
and speech, is grounded in and depends on the tradition to make sense of
those distinctive actions and speech.263 When one demonstrates one's excel-
lence through speech, for example, the content of that speech (as Arendt my-
thologizes) is often traditional-one gives a great speech about the past deeds
of one's countrymen or the values that one's society has held dear.264
Similarly, today's electoral politics is profoundly modern. Even so-
called conservative politics tends to be boldly ahistorical, wanting to reach
back and capture particular historical moments and graft them onto a future,
as if certain parts of history had not intervened. Perhaps a powerful set of"era-recovery" examples are found in the so-called "religious right's" conser-
vative desire to "recover" the nuclear family and the Taliban's attempt to
return Afghanistan to an "Islamic" culture. The focus on recovery of the nu-
clear family is often captured in a media image from the 1940s or 50s, such as
Father Knows Best or Leave it to Beaver, two TV families in which a Cauca-
sian middle class mother and father exercised wisdom and firmness in devel-
oping the character of their young children. 265 Both the Taliban's attempt to
recover a culture that has not existed for more than several hundred years266
and the nostalgic reach to an American past by conservative commentators
are profoundly ahistorical because they depend on wiping out of memory
those changes in human culture that have occurred since the historical mo-
ment to be recreated. In quite a "modem" vein, these movements assume that
we can simply "choose" a tradition or cultural period to replicate without any
recognition that intervening history has constrained as well as freed the pos-
sibilities for recreating human culture. For examples, to go back to a time
before the Enlightenment or before the advent of human rights is culturally
impossible.
By contrast, the judicial task, particularly as focused on precedential
reasoning, is a task of memory. To be sure, as Comte-Sponville suggests, not
262. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 177-78, 183-85, 204 (1958)
(discussing action as the process of beginning and as a disclosure within the web of
human relationships, and noting the necessity of memorializing great deeds of the
past).
263. See id. at 185.
264. Id. at 17-21 (discussing the immortality of action).
265. See Cynthia C. Siebel, Ph.D., Comment, Defining Fatherhood: Emerging
Case Law Reflections of Changing Societal Realities, 2 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 125, 140 (2003); Leave it to Beaver (CBS & ABC television broadcast, 1957-
63); Father Knows Best (CBS & NBC television broadcast, 1954-60).
266. Lynn N. Hughes, Realism Intrudes: Law, Politics, and War, 25 Hous. J.
INT'L L. 415, 425-26 (2003) (noting Taliban's mixture of nostalgia for the thirteenth
century and use of modem technology and institutions).
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all remembering is virtuous. For example, if we bear a grudge against some-
one our whole lives because of a remembered slight, that does not constitute
virtue.267 Similarly, any law student understands the problem with "too much
remembering" and too literal a reliance on precedent and stare decisis to re-
spond to modem problems.
Yet, the task of memory in faithfulness to the law that we find in virtu-
ous judging is in the nature of promise-keeping. It is the task of keeping the
promise of the law as a constant for individual citizens, worthy of being
counted on, despite the fickleness of political fads that the majority may find
attractive from time to time. That task is not simply in remembering the past
ahistorically, selecting some particular historical moment as idyllic and at-
tempting to replicate it in the contemporary situation. Rather, it is the task of
taking the body of law, warts and all, its high points and its low points, and
accepting that entire history as "the law and the precedent," even if part of the
job of accepting the history is to critique and modify it. To make a dangerous
analogy, it is much like the difference between remembering a marriage
through its "highlights" and remembering a marriage through its ups and
downs.
On this account, it is easy to see why democratic elections are not par-
ticularly useful vehicles for testing the virtue of fidelity, so understood. De-
spite President Reagan's query, "Are you better off than you were four years
ago?, 268 elections are not well-designed for testing whether government offi-
cials have exercised faithfulness to our traditions. Virtually no politician is
electable primarily on the explicit premise that, "I understand what happened
in the past, and how it should apply to the present." Instead, politicians want
to promise some imagined future where things will be better than they are
today, some "new and improved" scheme for rectifying a social problem,
even if it rests upon old notions-e.g., the "new" welfare programs that rest
upon old saws like work requirements.
Although this is a matter of debate among judicial review theorists, the
standard wisdom is that we do not want judges to be primarily driven by what
some have called "social engineering" and others "law reform," because of
the imagined place of judges in the constitutional scheme. 269 It is a rare judge
who will not be criticized if his opinions take no account of tradition, remem-
bered not selectively, but thoroughly. It is not clear, however, how a standard
267. See COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 172, at 20 (citing Vladimir Jank~l~vitch,
Les Vertues et L 'amour, 2 TRAITE DES VERTUES 140-42 (1986)).
268. Gerald Owen, 'You Never Had it So Good' and Other Slogans: The Trick is
to Find a Political Phrase That Sticks, NAT'L POST, May 29, 2004, at RB2, available
at 2004 WL 79303838.
269. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U..S. 765, 799 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (noting that judges have a duty to uphold the law and follow the dic-




electoral "platform" will properly "test" for a judge's fidelity to the tradition
and practice ofjustice in any meaningful sense.
B. Humility as Sympathetic Self-effacement
Brett Scharffs has argued that the real problem for judges is that they are
charged with the responsibility to exercise both justice and mercy, and that
the only way they can accomplish both is by exercising the virtue of humil-
ity. 27° In doing so, he takes issue with Anthony Kronman's understanding of
"impartial" judging, which Kronman argues must involve two contrasting
virtues, sympathy and detachment.271 Sympathy is a midway point between
what Kronman calls completely detached "observation and identification or
endorsement," i.e., outright acceptance. 272 Detachment, judging's other pole,
is also a mean: it is to "withdraw [from possible forays into the future] to the
standpoint of decision, the position [a judge] occupies at present."273 For
Scharffs, Kronman's account may put the judge into the "ballpark" of right
behavior, allowing her to avoid these two damaging extremes. 274 However,
that account does not help the judge actually decide between justice, identi-
fied with the detachment "pole," and mercy, identified with the sympathy
"pole. , 275
Scharffs finds at least a partial resolution in the use of the virtue of hu-
mility to adjudicate between the demands of justice and mercy, following
Micah's command to "do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with
thy God., 276 For Scharffs, perhaps the most important role of the virtue of
humility is as a mean between the extremes of pride and a sense of one's own
worthlessness. 277 Pride, perhaps most tempting for a judge who is constantly
treated as someone more important and valuable than others, can result in the
abusive exercise of power, silencing and punishing people who challenge the
judge's control or his inflated sense of self.278 But being convinced of one's
worthlessness could be an equal liability in a judge. Scharffs notes that abus-
270. Brett Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 127, 148 (1998) (noting that "humility may play an important
role in synthesizing, or at least mediating, the tension between justice and mercy").
271. Id. at 141-42 (referring to ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER:
FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)).
272. Id. at 142.
273. Id. at 143 (citing KRONMAN, supra note 271, at 72).
274. Id. at 143-44.
275. Id. at 145-47.
276. Id. at 148-57.
277. Id. at 161-63.
278. See id. at 163, 173-75 (noting that "[p]ride demands the establishment and
maintenance of vertical relationships, with oneself or one's group in some way supe-




ers or victims who have a sense of their own worthlessness may act just as
unjustly as those who are proud, wielding violence against others as they lash
out, or humiliating others to bring them "down" to the inferior plane where
the abuser/victim locates himself.279 Certainly, judges are not immune from
280
these temptations.
Humility in its first aspect is a virtue we recognize as quite appropriate
for a judge: if a judge gives up her pride and realizes that she is not God-
acknowledging her role in the constitutional scheme and recognizing her lim-
ited ability to know and perfectly judge all human behavior-the judge has
some chance at crafting a solution that meets the demands of justice and
mercy. 28 1 In its second, or egalitarian aspect, humility acts as an equalizer,
allowing the judge to extend fellow-feeling to the litigants in the room rather
than treating them as inferior objects to be manipulated according to the
law.
282
As such, humility dovetails with the virtue of compassion toward or suf-
fering with another. Yet compassion is checked from becoming full empathy
by the judge's need for objectivity and dispassionate consideration of the
case.28 3 This allows both sides to have the opportunity to persuade the judge
284
of their cause.
The ability to recognize one's own limitations and thus to extend a sense
of fellow-feeling or equality to litigants makes it possible for the judge to
exercise the duties due process requires-listening to voices other than her
own in an effort to understand the problem, being willing to consider solu-
tions proposed by others that she might not have considered, and showing
respect to the complaints and concerns of others. We might argue that a good
judge effaces herself in the process of adjudication-not in the sense that she
becomes less than human, but that her sense of self recedes, so that she can be
fully attentive to the situations of those before her and fully occupied with the
task of crafting a fair solution.
It is difficult, however, to imagine how electoral politics is compatible
with a virtuously self-effacing and humble judge. George McGovern, recently
interviewed about why he was not on the Democratic Party speaker list at the
279. Id. at 175-76. Scharffs notes that abusers can vacillate between feeling pride-
ful and inferior, without being able to find an equilibrium or mean between the two
states. Id.
280. Id. at 192-93, 195-96 (noting judges who are corrupted by deference to them,
and act as bullies in wielding their power).
281. See id. at 186-87, 190-91 (noting that prideful judges want to be prophets
rather than priests, and act as if they are the source of their own authority rather than
respecting the sources of authority).
282. See id. at 195-96 (noting that humble judges are more likely to be respectful
and patient with advocates).
283. Id. at 168-70.
284. COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 172, at 105 (defining compassion as "partici-
pation in the suffering of others").
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convention, noted, "all of us have an ego. You've got to be an egomaniac
even to run for president." 285 Electoral politics is a sales job that requires
politicians to focus in an almost self-absorbed fashion on who they are and
why their ideas are preferable to their opponents'. Good-we might argue
virtuous-politicians are required to convince the electorate that they are the
charismatic leader with the gifts necessary to respond to the current crises or
opportunities of a democratic society. While the very best politicians practice
attentiveness to the expressed concerns and needs of others (which is why
shaking hands and constituent services will never go out of style), it is highly
doubtful whether a politician could succeed in a campaign if he were effec-
tive in saying, "don't pay any attention to me at all. Look at the situation of
these people and the policies I am proposing to alleviate their concerns." Yet,
this is precisely what we are asking a good judge to do. It is difficult to imag-
ine many candidates exercising both the habits of self-promotion and self-
confidence necessary to convince others that they are in charge of the future
and, at the same time, possessing the habits of self-effacement and humility
that good judges need.
C. Honesty as Consistent Rhetoric
As with other public officials who must stand for election, judges walk a
complicated tightrope between being candid too frequently and honest not
often enough. As I have earlier suggested, some have argued that the willing-
ness to be completely candid has been a key virtue in the American story,
from George Washington's ill-fated cherry tree to William Jefferson Clin-
ton's performance in the Paula Jones deposition. 28 6 By contrast, we might
note the wide range of what religious and social cultures across the world will
tolerate in terms of truth-telling. Many cultures take a practical and situation-
dependent approach to this virtue, suggesting that some deception is prefer-
able to full candor and brute honesty, whereas others hold to the truth more
absolutely.
287
Honesty, and its robust twin candor, are qualities that Americans de-
mand in any public official, whether she occupies judicial, legislative, or ex-
285. Rob Hotakainen, The Old Guard; Not-for-prime-time Players; The Practice
of Keeping the Spotlight Studiously off the Party's Losing Presidential Candidates is
Criticized as Disloyal--and Defended as Forward-looking, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-
St. Paul), July 27, 2004, at 9A.
286. This point I owe to Robert Cover, who taught my ethics class in fall 1983.
287. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 9, at 192-93 (suggesting that Kant's abso-
lutist view about truth-telling may well stemmed from his Lutheran pietist culture,
which brought up its children to believe that they should tell everyone the truth at all
times, no matter what the consequences. By contrast, Maclntyre notes that Bantu
parents have taught their children not to tell the truth to strangers, because they be-
lieved that this would open their family up to harm through witchcraft.).
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ecutive office.2 88 But the specific "flavor" of the virtue of honesty that
Americans have come to expect from their leaders varies from post to post.
On rare occasion, the concern is with too much candor. Judges, for example,
are often expected to withhold views about controversial matters that may
concern them as citizens but not as judges, as Judge Wilkerson found out
when he opined that "God in Heaven" was not pleased with California's ex-
tension of benefits to same-sex couples.
289
But the more critical question for purposes of election campaigns is
whether judges can be good campaigners and still be honest enough to serve
in their public role as judges and community leaders. In the election of legis-
lators, for example, voters have come to expect a certain amount of exaggera-
tion and dissembling, both about the candidates' own qualifications and re-
cords and about their opponents'. 29 Indeed, they have come to expect these
things when an official is elected, so long as the nature of the exaggeration
does not pass into outright falsehood. Those politicians who have survived on
the virtue of uncompromising honesty are thought unusual, and are given
names such as "the conscience of the Senate.",291 Moreover, voters expect that
a politician who is trying to reflect the wishes of many constituencies, please
voters, and gain their trust will consider the audience he is speaking to and
frame his "pitch" accordingly, even promising inconsistent things to different
groups of voters. Indeed, because they have a keen and ironic sense both for
the myth of honesty and the reality of political success, a great sport of the
press is trying to expose politicians who engage in the rhetorical massaging of
their campaign messages by comparing their campaign speeches to uncover
inconsistencies.
By contrast, even if we would not accept the view that judges must be
held to a higher standard than other politicians, 292 judges who try to, in those
cynical words, "talk out of both sides of their mouths" are not likely to be
288. See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
289. See Miss. Comm'n on Judicial Performance v. Wilkerson, 876 So. 2d 1006,
1015 (Miss. 2004) (holding that the state had no compelling state interest that was
furthered by suppressing the judge's views on matters of politics or the public inter-
est). But see Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1990) (judge could not be
sanctioned for speaking out on problems regarding the administration of justice in his
state).
290. See Robert C. Berness, Note, Norms of Judicial Behavior: Understanding
Restrictions on Judicial Candidate Speech in the Age of Attack Politics, 53 RUTGERS
L. REv. 1027, 1028 (2001).
291. See Joseph Farah, The Conscience of the Senate?, WORLDNET DAILY NEWS,
Nov. 12, 2002, available at http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE
ID=29626 (describing the term to mean a person who will not compromise his prin-
ciples, and referencing Sen. Paul Wellstone).
292. But see ACLU v. Fla. Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (noting
that states may hold judges to higher standard of conduct than other officials in view
of the professional standing of lawyers).
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successful judges, much less respected ones. A judge who tries to appease
both litigants in a trial by saying one thing to one litigant and another to his
opponent is bound to add to the confusion, anger, and anxiety that comes with
interpersonal conflict instead of alleviating or ending it. A judge who is seen
as exaggerating the facts so that she can reach a particular conclusion is not
only called names-most often, "result-oriented 2 -but is rarely considered
virtuous. Indeed, so has the scientific view of judging affected the judicial
profession that the entire language of acceptable judging is permeated with
science's commitment to brutally honest observation of the material world.
Good judges, at least in the common wisdom, "find" the facts of a case, as if
they were discoverable like minerals in nature rather than through an intuitive
process of guessing which witness's story is more likely to be correct than any
other. They "interpret" (read: translate from one existing reality into another) or
"apply" (take an existing tool and use it) the law, rather than "make" it.
To elect to judicial office those who are successful politicians and thus
operate with a somewhat differently understood virtue of honesty is to give
up the cherished illusion that judges will be brutally and thoroughly honest in
confronting the facts "as they are" and the law "as written" in deciding cases.
It is to give up the illusion that when one asks a judge to participate in, say, a
charitable organization or community meeting, one is asking perhaps the
"most honest" man or woman in town to deliver credible assessments of the
work of that organization or community.
The decision to "fudge" on the judicial honesty factor by encouraging
good politicians to run for judge is also to give up on our vision of judges as
those who serve as the "conscience of the community." It is to give up on the
hope that in the toughest cases, such as when a brutal murder is committed
and passions for revenge run high, the judge will be the one who holds up the
values of the community to it, Atticus Finch-like, and demand that the com-
munity live up to those values by delivering the judgment that she believes
the community would have made if it were responding out of its "better self."
It is to give up the possibility that judges can hold litigants as well as them-
selves to the highest standards of self-criticism, that they will have the char-
acter that is worthy of demanding that an abusive husband, a common thief,
or a corporation acknowledge their own wrongdoing and make recompense
with their victims. It is to give up the hope that judges themselves, when in
their finest introspective moments in deciding cases, will turn the skill of
brutal honesty upon themselves, questioning whether they are taking the easi-
est or most popular route in deciding a case, or punishing a litigant because
he has not lived up to their personal values and expectations rather than the
law's demands.
293. See, e.g., Robert G. Miller, Machiavellian Justice, 65 TEX. B.J. 916, 916
(2002) (describing a Texas Supreme Court judge as the definition of a "result-
oriented" judge for "picking a result while disdaining precedent").
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As Comte-Sponville suggests, this ability to do justice through honesty
also implicates the quality of mercy.294 Comte-Sponville rejects what he un-
derstands to be a Christian reading of the quality of mercy-i.e., the choice to
un-remember an evil done against one and refuse to return evil with evil.295
Rather, he argues that the virtue of mercy or forgiveness means to hold a
wrongdoer accountable without hating him.296 In this account, for example, a
good judge works to transform a community desire for vengeance in the case
of a brutal slaying into an equally passioned but less destructive instinct to-
ward asking the offender to restore the imbalance he has created with his
crime by paying for it. At the same time, the quality of mercy refuses to re-
turn evil to this offender equal to the evil he has done, and offers him the
possibility of restoration into the community once he has paid the price.
Politicians also practice mercy, but because their vision is primarily pro-
spective as compared to the retrospective eye of the judge, politicians have
the luxury of practicing mercy understood in the larger sense that Comte-
Sponville rejects. That is, they can "let bygones be bygones" and focus their
attention on how to reform a system or identify those persons who will run it
properly for the future. Thus, political commissions rarely focus on holding
evil or incompetent officials accountable, in the sense of seeking an appropri-
ate punishment, whether they are Abu Ghraib torturers or people who have
failed in major national security responsibilities. 297 Rather, they leave that to
judges, and turn their energies toward the problem of changing "the system"
so that these acts cannot be repeated. Even those judicial campaigns that beat
an incessant drum about the incumbent's failures are primarily focused not on
holding an incumbent responsible for his failures, but on getting rid of him so
the next person can do a better job.
As such, the nuanced and difficult position of a judge who must temper
justice with mercy may well be lost on the virtuous politician who is simply
focused on making things better for the future. In the simplicity and practical-
ity of his search for practical solutions to community problems-solutions
that tend to involve structures, rules, and job descriptions-he may not be
good at discerning the complex way in which accountability demands both a
consideration of a litigant's evil and of his circumstances.
In summary, then, while judges like politicians may be called upon to
practice the virtues of fidelity, humility, and honesty, the shape of those vir-
tues required in judging is quite different than the way in which those virtues
are defined for political campaigners. If we accept that human beings have a
294. See COMTE-SPONVILLE, supra note 172, at 84-85.
295. Id. at 118-19.
296. Id.
297. See, e.g., Editorial, Holding the Pentagon Accountable: For Abu Ghraib,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/26/opinion
/26thursl.html (noting failure of Iraq commission to hold higher officials accountable
even while identifying their failures).
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limited store of virtues, we need to ask whether we want to identify those
with judicial virtues and forego the political virtues that make them electable,
or whether we want to accept those with the political "versions" of these vir-
tues along with the changes in judicial practice that they portend.
CONCLUSION: SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES
If, then, politicians have different virtues (and vices) than judges, which
makes direct popular election a poor vehicle to elect virtuous judges, we
might want to ask how a judicial selection procedure might be devised that
takes account both of the practical wisdom that common people have to offer,
and the expertise that lawyers and judges themselves can offer.
The ABA's recent report suggests a number of changes to both judicial
appointment and judicial election systems. For example, the report suggests
that all judges should be subject to evaluation by a nonpartisan, neutral, quali-
fied selection board, whether they are elected or appointed.298 Moreover, the
report suggests that every state incorporate some form of judicial evaluation
program, along with funding for organizations like NSCS and the State Jus-
tice Institute that collect information about judicial "best practices.' 299 In
addition, the ABA report suggests that there be a comprehensive review of
judicial ethics codes and more aggressive enforcement against violators. 300 In
addition to changing judicial selection procedures, the ABA also suggests
more attention to voter education, as well as voluntary agreements among
candidates on financing and election activities and public financing ofjudicial
elections.
30 1
However, some of these proposals merely tinker with existing systems
instead of offering new solutions to address the problem created especially by
judicial election processes. Just to give some examples of how states might
"think outside the box," I will offer only a few brief solutions, without trying
to make a substantial case for any of them. These suggestions serve as exam-
ples of the ways in which political accountability can be married with the
independence and expertise of independent bodies. Some of these suggestions
mimic others that have been discussed in some way.
Merit selection is touted as the great alternative to judicial elections or
pure appointment systems. However, in most states, merit selection, even
when it is regulated by state statute, remains vulnerable to the elitist charges
originally made in the move to elections in the 1800s. 302 Radicals who fa-
298. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 68-69 (following 2000 Report of
Commission on State Judicial Selection Standards); Daugherty, supra note 22, at 319.
299. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 71-72.
300. See id. at 75-76.
301. Id. at 78-81.
302. See Dimino, supra note 22, at 312 (describing Nelsons' view that the conflict
over elections was between elites and populists); Maute, supra note 14, at 1209. Jus-
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vored direct elections did so in order to supplant conservative judges of op-
posing parties with their own judges-that is, they saw elections as a chance
to substitute one party's views for another's on the bench.30 3 Moderates were
more concerned that judicial candidates would be sycophantic to appointing
entities, both before and after elections, thus destroying the possibility of
judicial independence.
30 4
Modem merit commissions fall prey to both of these concerns. First, al-
though many state statutes require that merit commissions be geographically
and professionally diverse, including non-lawyers as well as lawyers,30 5 there
is no guarantee that appointed merit selection commissions are going to obvi-
ate the problems of partisanship or elitism. Gubernatorial commissions are
likely to reflect either the political or the community connections of the gov-
ernor and his staff.30 6 As such, in the worst cases, such commissions may be
highly politicized and select judicial appointees who have been active in the
party, raised funds for candidates, or otherwise reflect party values.30 7 At
best, they will reflect the limits of the governor's acquaintances, who are
likely to be a small circle of state power-brokers. The likelihood that a gover-
nor will appoint "common people" whose experiences more mimic those of
the litigants who will come before a judge is thus small. Legislatively ap-
pointed commissions, while perhaps more reflective of diverse interests, may
tice O'Connor noted in White that the first 29 states adopted non-elective methods for
selecting judges, but that beginning with Georgia in 1812, and especially between the
1830s and 1850s, more election systems were used, so that by the Civil War, twenty-
two out of thirty-four states elected judges. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536
U.S. 765, 790-91 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
303. See Dimino, supra note 22, at 311.
304. Id. at 311-12.
305. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 480B.01(2) (2004) (describing composition of Minne-
sota's merit commission); Daugherty, supra note 22, at 329 (noting that the original
Missouri plan called for three lay people, three lawyers, and the chief judge of the
Supreme Court); Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and
Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 66-69 (1994) (describing national trends to increase
racial and ethnic, as well as geographical and experiential diversity of merit commis-
sions); Maute, supra note 14, at 1208-09 (noting requirement of lawyer/lay and politi-
cal party diversity in many statutes).
306. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 69 (noting that concern has been
expressed that the appointing authority or "politics in general" too often influences
merit selection boards). Daugherty, supra note 22, at 329 (noting attempts to lessen
the power of the Missouri governor to appoint members of the merit commission due
to charges ofcronyism).
307. See Cheek & Champagne, supra note 25, at 1361 (noting campaigns over
appointing merit commissions); Maute, supra note 14, at 1235 (also noting three
types of schemes for selecting candidates supporting gubernatorial political prefer-
ences); Daugherty, supra note 22, at 328 (noting the uproar in Missouri when political
favoritism resulted in a governor's staff member who had never been a judge' being
appointed to (and retained on) the Missouri Supreme Court in 1986).
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similarly reflect legislative circles of friends and influence.30 And, there is no
guarantee that minority groups will be represented in judicial selection proc-
esses, whether judges are appointed or elected, a concern that has led to a
number of Voting Rights Act suits against judicial selection schemes.30 9
One alternative to direct elections of judges would be to borrow from
the representative system we use to make other important democratic deci-
sions to elect our judicial merit commissions. Commissioners could be
elected in districts as well as some proportion of at-large seats, reflecting both
local and statewide concerns about the administration ofjustice. The merits of
such a plan would be the same merits as any form of representative govern-
ment: commissioners themselves could be good politicians who could employ
staff to counterbalance their virtues toward the wise selection of judges. Al-
though they would be beholden to the electorate for the body of work they
would perform, they could politically afford to take some risks on appointing
a particular candidate who might not be well-connected or even popular with
the electorate, so long as electors deemed their decisions sound on the whole.
A second direction for alternatives grows out of efforts to increase pub-
lic awareness of judicial qualifications through evaluation systems. Many
states already employ voluntary "judicial watch" or judicial evaluation pro-
grams, either through the bar or citizen groups, who make endorsements or
provide evaluations of judicial candidates based on significant information
about the candidates. However, these programs depend upon continued
public interest in evaluating judges, which is likely to wax and wane based on
the local judicial climate. By contrast, a public body like a statutory merit
selection commission not only has the advantage of guaranteed continuity,
but also an imprimatur of authority that voluntary bodies may lack, as well as
the economic wherewithal to actually get its message out. In fact, six states
have even set up official judicial evaluation programs that rate judges based
on such matters as integrity, judicial temperament, communication and ad-
ministrative skills, preparation and attention to cases, and fairness."1' These
evaluations are shared with the public.
312
One possible variation on this theme of informing voters without taking
away their choices is to follow the ABA's call for a Judicial Eligibility Com-
mission that would make their evaluations of applicants for judicial positions
308. See Driggers, Jr., supra note 6, at 1226-28, 1231-32 (noting that South Caro-
lina's old legislative appointment system resulted in the appointment of legislators to
the bench, and that its new legislatively appointed judicial merit commission gives
significant power to the three legislators who appoint the commission).
309. See, e.g., Daugherty, supra note 22, at 331-38, 340-41 (noting problem with
official appointments to the commission, in which "white male[s]" select others to
serve on these commissions).
310. See, e.g., JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 72-74 (noting that most other
states rely on bar association evaluations).
311. Id. at 72-73.
312. Id.
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public, even in states with contested elections. 313 Merit commissions might
screen candidates into a finalist pool, as they do now. However, instead of
turning their list of finalists over to the governor or legislature for appoint-
ment, the list of finalists could be voted on by the public, either with or with-
out the imprimatur of an endorsing authority.3 14 Since a major drawback to
the current judicial elections system is that voters do not have the interest or
time to do a thorough background check on possible judges, this system bor-
rows the strengths of the merit selection process. By conducting inquiries of
supporting and opposing lawyers, judges who have heard candidates' cases,
and others who have seen their work in depth and have a professional evalua-
tion of their competence and integrity, merit commissions could serve as a
voters' screening mechanism.
If a particular state polity was concerned that such a system would con-
tinue to produce partisan and elite candidates, they could expand this electoral
process to permit non-screened or non-final candidates to run for election
alongside those candidates "vetted" for election by the merit system. How-
ever, for those voters who want the experienced evaluation of elites, or do not
wish to wade through the qualification materials produced by the merit com-
missions, the endorsement of the merit commission alone could inform their
selection. This system would be preferable to the existing one, which at best
lets voters choose based on party endorsement. And candidates deemed the
best by their peers and other professionals would have a "leg up" on the op-
position in a campaign by having the endorsement of a respected body.
In those states where such endorsement would still be considered elitist,
merit commissions could serve as investigators of all candidates. Applicants
for judicial seats could be required to turn over their portfolios, resumes, and
references to the merit selection commission. The commission would under-
take an objective analysis of the candidates' credentials, summarize for voters
what kind of experience the candidates bring to the position, and educate
voters about the skills, gifts, experience, and virtues that they should look for
in a judge. Essentially, all of this work is already being done by merit corn-
313. Id. at 52; ABA STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, COMM'N ON
STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS, STANDARDS ON STATE JUDICIAL SELECTION
9 (July 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/downloads/refornat.pdf
[hereinafter JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS] (recommending that states that do not
currently have Missouri-plan nominating commissions create a commission which
must screen all candidates to determine whether they are qualified to stand for elec-
tion or appointment). This commission would be independent from any appointing
authority, whether it be gubernatorial, legislative or judicial, or any electoral system.
Id. at 10.
314. The ABA report on judicial selection contemplates that endorsing authorities
such as parties and bar associations will utilize Eligibility Commission findings in
their endorsement programs, as well as any additional criteria such as party loyalty.
JUDICIAL SELECTION STANDARDS, supra note 313, at 17-18, 21-22.
[Vol. 70
VIRTUE ETHICS
missions; 315 the only difference is that the public, and not the commission or
the governor, would be making the final vote on who should be selected.
Finally, the ABA report has suggested that judges be given lengthy
terms of around fifteen years to ensure their judicial independence after ap-
pointment and not be subject to reappointment to ensure judicial independ-
ence. 316 For those jurisdictions that want to retain a re-selection process, the
report recommends merit committee re-selection; and for those jurisdictions
that want to retain elections, it recommends that such elections be permitted
only when a judge initially takes the bench, to ensure that judges will not be
swayed in later rulings by the necessity of re-election. 3 1 7 The ABA plan seeks
to ensure judicial independence by avoiding the most problematic threats to
judicial independence-when sitting judges are attacked in single-issue cam-
paigns. 318 However, the ABA's plan would be an improvement on the Mis-
souri plan, which does not currently offer voters the opportunity to object to a
poor selection from the outset, possibly "sticking" a community with a bad
judge for a year or more until he can be voted out of office.
If the purpose of the judicial selection process is to identify a judge
based on competence rather than his political leanings on a given issue, an-
other option would be to retain the appointment of judges by the governor or
legislature upon recommendation of a merit commission but subject the judge
to an immediate process of voter approval or disapproval before the judge
took office. Unlike the Missouri plan, which sets up retention elections at the
same time as other elections, this process would entail significant administra-
tive burdens, as election machinery would have to be geared up at irregular
times. It might also be criticized by those who fear that off-time elections fail
to draw sufficient voters. 3 19 On the other hand, such a system would also tend
to highlight judicial races as important moments of voter participation, rather
than burying them on a long ballot with legislative offices that may take vot-
ers' attention away from judicial races.
This immediate appointment/election system is most likely to require
voters to judge a candidate on his qualifications rather than on some unpopu-
lar decision that might unseat him later in his career, since most candidates
who are subject to appointment will not have a judicial record vulnerable to
single-issue attack. Moreover, this system could provide some democratic
credibility to a judge at the outset, since she will have been "elected" (albeit
without opposition). Yet, she will not be required to engage in the traditional
politicking necessary to woo voters from her opponent's side to her own. It
solves, to some extent, the complaint that incumbents get an unfair advantage
315. See Goldschmidt, supra note 305, at 31-33.
316. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 8, at 93-95.
317. Id. at 74-75.
318. Id. at 72.




from their incumbency when they are up for re-election. 320 At the same time,
this process will discourage unscrupulous rivals from trying to "pick off' a
competent candidate by sparring about particular issues or engaging in dis-
honest conduct, since rivals would first have to win the battle to have voters
disapprove an appointed candidate and then be selected as the follow-up can-
didate.
There are, of course, at least two major possible drawbacks to the im-
mediate appointment/retention option. First, the judicial post might be subject
to an endless number of elections if the merit commission were required to
offer one candidate after another to be approved or rejected by the electorate.
However, statutory provision could be made for some limit to the number of
times merit-selected candidates could be defeated before the seat became
vacant. Second, if the merit commission has made a good, but not the best,
judgment, a single-candidate "up or down" approval vote might yield a judge
that the voters could live with, but no opportunity for them to vote for the best
candidate, as a three-candidate runoff or open election at least theoretically
provides.
These three proposals-election of merit commissions, prior official en-
dorsement of candidates standing for election by merit commissions, or im-
mediate election after appointment selection-may be no wiser solutions than
those currently available. However, if judicial selection reformers move from
focusing on the larger conflict about the values of independence and account-
ability and begin to focus on why good judges do not often make good candi-
dates, they may be able to come up with solutions that balance important
political values and still permit good judicial candidates to live out their vir-
tues both before and after they assume the bench.
To be sure, there will be no perfect solution for the problem of selecting
judges, and every system that is devised will contain ways in which ambitious
and unscrupulous candidates will evade it. And every system will be prey to
those whose actual pursuit of office is either too much an end, or simply a
means to quite another end. Greg Wersal, whose original quest for judicial
office was focused on his concerns about judicial activism and abortion, con-
tinued his litigation unabated. In addition to his lawsuit challenging the politi-
cal party restrictions of the Minnesota canons, he also embarked on an unsec-
cessful quest to unseat a former Democratic legislator appointed to the Min-
nesota Court of Appeals, and to put Wersal's brother on the ballot instead.32'
320. See, e.g., Cheek & Champagne, supra note 25, at 1366 (noting that incum-
bent judges have an advantage over non-incumbents); Nelson, supra note 11, at 1640-
41 (arguing that incumbency labels are less satisfactory than party labels).
321. See Patrick Sweeney, Lawsuit: Judge Is Out of Bounds, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, July 22, 2004, available at http://www.twincities.com/mld/twincities/news/loc
al/9210502.htm?lc. Wersal argued that redistricting made the appellate judge ineligi-
ble for the seat since he lived outside the district after his appointment was announced
and redistricting occurred. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected Wersal's argu-
ment in Clayton v. Kiffmeyer, 688 N.W.2d 117 (2004).
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